Remodel the if sequence for handling alerts
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6370)
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fb62e47c78
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bcf2907c68
1 changed files with 28 additions and 36 deletions
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@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
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SSL3_RECORD *rr;
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SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
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void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
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int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
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rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
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@ -1340,7 +1341,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
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if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
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|| (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
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&& type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
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&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
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&& !is_tls13)) {
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/*
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* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
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* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
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@ -1497,7 +1498,6 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
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if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
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unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
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int tls13_user_cancelled;
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unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
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+ SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
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PACKET alert;
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@ -1525,9 +1525,8 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
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cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
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}
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tls13_user_cancelled = SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
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&& alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED;
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if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING || tls13_user_cancelled) {
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if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING
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|| (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
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s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
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SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
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@ -1537,38 +1536,19 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
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SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
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return -1;
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}
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/*
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* Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
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* is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
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*/
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if (tls13_user_cancelled)
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goto start;
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}
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if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
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&& (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
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s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
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* renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
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* alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
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* presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
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* future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
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* the peer refused it where we carry on.
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* Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
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* is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
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*/
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if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
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&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
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&& alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
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SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
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return -1;
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}
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if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
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if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
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goto start;
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} else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
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&& (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
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s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
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return 0;
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} else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
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char tmp[16];
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s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
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@ -1581,11 +1561,23 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
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SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
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SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
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return 0;
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} else {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
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SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
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} else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
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/*
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* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
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* renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
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* alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
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* presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
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* future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
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* the peer refused it where we carry on.
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*/
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
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SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
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return -1;
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}
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
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SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
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return -1;
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}
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if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
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