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Add RSAX builtin engine. It optimizes RSA1024 sign benchmark.

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This commit is contained in:
Andy Polyakov 2011-07-20 21:49:46 +00:00
parent dafce90ae5
commit be9a8cc2af
8 changed files with 2171 additions and 12 deletions
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2
Configure
View file

@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ my $x86_asm="x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o x86-gf2m.o:des-586.o crypt5
my $x86_elf_asm="$x86_asm:elf";
my $x86_64_asm="x86_64cpuid.o:x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o::aes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o::md5-x86_64.o:sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o::rc4-x86_64.o:::wp-x86_64.o:cmll-x86_64.o cmll_misc.o:ghash-x86_64.o";
my $x86_64_asm="x86_64cpuid.o:x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o::aes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o::md5-x86_64.o:sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o::rc4-x86_64.o:::wp-x86_64.o:cmll-x86_64.o cmll_misc.o:ghash-x86_64.o";
my $ia64_asm="ia64cpuid.o:bn-ia64.o ia64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ia64.o::md5-ia64.o:sha1-ia64.o sha256-ia64.o sha512-ia64.o::rc4-ia64.o rc4_skey.o:::::ghash-ia64.o:void";
my $sparcv9_asm="sparcv9cap.o sparccpuid.o:bn-sparcv9.o sparcv9-mont.o sparcv9a-mont.o:des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o:aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-sparcv9.o:::sha1-sparcv9.o sha256-sparcv9.o sha512-sparcv9.o:::::::ghash-sparcv9.o:void";
my $sparcv8_asm=":sparcv8.o:des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o::::::::::::void";

18
TABLE
View file

@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ $sys_id =
$lflags =
$bn_ops = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
$cpuid_obj = x86_64cpuid.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o
$des_obj =
$aes_obj = aes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o
$bf_obj =
@ -1385,7 +1385,7 @@ $sys_id = MACOSX
$lflags = -Wl,-search_paths_first%
$bn_ops = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
$cpuid_obj = x86_64cpuid.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o
$des_obj =
$aes_obj = aes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o
$bf_obj =
@ -2313,7 +2313,7 @@ $sys_id =
$lflags = -ldl
$bn_ops = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
$cpuid_obj = x86_64cpuid.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o
$des_obj =
$aes_obj = aes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o
$bf_obj =
@ -2505,7 +2505,7 @@ $sys_id =
$lflags = -ldl
$bn_ops = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
$cpuid_obj = x86_64cpuid.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o
$des_obj =
$aes_obj = aes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o
$bf_obj =
@ -2569,7 +2569,7 @@ $sys_id =
$lflags = -ldl
$bn_ops = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
$cpuid_obj = x86_64cpuid.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o
$des_obj =
$aes_obj = aes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o
$bf_obj =
@ -4073,7 +4073,7 @@ $sys_id =
$lflags = -ldl
$bn_ops = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
$cpuid_obj = x86_64cpuid.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o
$des_obj =
$aes_obj = aes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o
$bf_obj =
@ -4233,7 +4233,7 @@ $sys_id = MINGW64
$lflags = -lws2_32 -lgdi32 -lcrypt32
$bn_ops = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN
$cpuid_obj = x86_64cpuid.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o
$des_obj =
$aes_obj = aes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o
$bf_obj =
@ -5193,7 +5193,7 @@ $sys_id =
$lflags = -lsocket -lnsl -ldl
$bn_ops = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
$cpuid_obj = x86_64cpuid.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o
$des_obj =
$aes_obj = aes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o
$bf_obj =
@ -5225,7 +5225,7 @@ $sys_id =
$lflags = -lsocket -lnsl -ldl
$bn_ops = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
$cpuid_obj = x86_64cpuid.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o
$bn_obj = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o
$des_obj =
$aes_obj = aes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o
$bf_obj =

2
crypto/bn/Makefile
View file

@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ x86_64-mont.s: asm/x86_64-mont.pl
$(PERL) asm/x86_64-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
x86_64-gf2m.s: asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
$(PERL) asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
modexp512-x86_64.s: asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl
$(PERL) asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
bn-ia64.s: asm/ia64.S
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E asm/ia64.S > $@

1496
crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

4
crypto/engine/Makefile
View file

@ -22,13 +22,13 @@ LIBSRC= eng_err.c eng_lib.c eng_list.c eng_init.c eng_ctrl.c \
tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \
tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \
eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \
eng_aesni.c
eng_aesni.c eng_rsax.c
LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \
eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \
tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \
tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \
eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \
eng_aesni.o
eng_aesni.o eng_rsax.o
SRC= $(LIBSRC)

3
crypto/engine/eng_all.c
View file

@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void)
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_AESNI)
ENGINE_load_aesni();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSAX
ENGINE_load_rsax();
#endif
ENGINE_load_dynamic();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE

657
crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,657 @@
/* crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c */
/* Copyright (c) 2010-2010 Intel Corp.
* Author: Vinodh.Gopal@intel.com
* Jim Guilford
* Erdinc.Ozturk@intel.com
* Maxim.Perminov@intel.com
* Ying.Huang@intel.com
*
* More information about algorithm used can be found at:
* http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/srds2009/escs2009_submission_Gopal.pdf
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
/* RSAX is available **ONLY* on x86_64 CPUs */
#undef COMPILE_RSAX
#if (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
#define COMPILE_RSAX
static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax (void);
#endif
void ENGINE_load_rsax (void)
{
/* On non-x86 CPUs it just returns. */
#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX
ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_rsax();
if(!toadd) return;
ENGINE_add(toadd);
ENGINE_free(toadd);
ERR_clear_error();
#endif
}
#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX
#define E_RSAX_LIB_NAME "rsax engine"
static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e);
static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e);
static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e);
static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* RSA stuff */
static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *r);
#endif
static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN e_rsax_cmd_defns[] = {
{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
};
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
static RSA_METHOD e_rsax_rsa =
{
"Intel RSA-X method",
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp,
NULL,
NULL,
e_rsax_rsa_finish,
RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL
};
#endif
/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
static const char *engine_e_rsax_id = "rsax";
static const char *engine_e_rsax_name = "RSAX engine support";
/* This internal function is used by ENGINE_rsax() */
static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
const RSA_METHOD *meth1;
#endif
if(!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rsax_id) ||
!ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rsax_name) ||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &e_rsax_rsa) ||
#endif
!ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, e_rsax_destroy) ||
!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, e_rsax_init) ||
!ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, e_rsax_finish) ||
!ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, e_rsax_ctrl) ||
!ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, e_rsax_cmd_defns))
return 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc;
e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec;
e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth1->rsa_priv_enc;
e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth1->rsa_priv_dec;
e_rsax_rsa.bn_mod_exp = meth1->bn_mod_exp;
#endif
return 1;
}
static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax(void)
{
ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
if(!ret)
return NULL;
if(!bind_helper(ret))
{
ENGINE_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* Used to attach our own key-data to an RSA structure */
static int rsax_ex_data_idx = -1;
#endif
static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e)
{
return 1;
}
/* (de)initialisation functions. */
static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1)
rsax_ex_data_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
#endif
if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e)
{
return 1;
}
static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
{
int to_return = 1;
switch(cmd)
{
/* The command isn't understood by this engine */
default:
to_return = 0;
break;
}
return to_return;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
#include <stdint.h>
typedef uint64_t UINT64;
typedef uint16_t UINT16;
/* Table t is interleaved in the following manner:
* The order in memory is t[0][0], t[0][1], ..., t[0][7], t[1][0], ...
* A particular 512-bit value is stored in t[][index] rather than the more
* normal t[index][]; i.e. the qwords of a particular entry in t are not
* adjacent in memory
*/
/* Init BIGNUM b from the interleaved UINT64 array */
static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM* b, UINT64 *array);
/* Extract array elements from BIGNUM b
* To set the whole array from b, call with n=8
*/
static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM* b, unsigned int n, UINT64 *array);
struct mod_ctx_512 {
UINT64 t[8][8];
UINT64 m[8];
UINT64 m1[8]; /* 2^278 % m */
UINT64 m2[8]; /* 2^640 % m */
UINT64 k1[2]; /* (- 1/m) % 2^128 */
};
static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data);
void mod_exp_512(UINT64 *result, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
UINT64 *g, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
UINT64 *exp, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
struct mod_ctx_512 *data);
typedef struct st_e_rsax_mod_ctx
{
UINT64 type;
union {
struct mod_ctx_512 b512;
} ctx;
} E_RSAX_MOD_CTX;
static E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *e_rsax_get_ctx(RSA *rsa, int idx, BIGNUM* m)
{
E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr;
if (idx < 0 || idx > 2)
return NULL;
hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx);
if (!hptr) {
hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(3*sizeof(E_RSAX_MOD_CTX));
if (!hptr) return NULL;
hptr[2].type = hptr[1].type= hptr[0].type = 0;
RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, hptr);
}
if (hptr[idx].type == BN_num_bits(m))
return hptr+idx;
if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) {
UINT64 _m[8];
bn_extract_to_array_512(m, 8, _m);
memset( &hptr[idx].ctx.b512, 0, sizeof(struct mod_ctx_512));
mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(_m, &hptr[idx].ctx.b512);
}
hptr[idx].type = BN_num_bits(m);
return hptr+idx;
}
static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
{
E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx);
if(!hptr) return 0;
OPENSSL_free(hptr);
RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, NULL);
return 1;
}
static int e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *e,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont, E_RSAX_MOD_CTX* rsax_mod_ctx )
{
if (rsax_mod_ctx && BN_get_flags(e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) {
UINT64 _r[8];
UINT64 _g[8];
UINT64 _e[8];
/* Init the arrays from the BIGNUMs */
bn_extract_to_array_512(g, 8, _g);
bn_extract_to_array_512(e, 8, _e);
mod_exp_512(_r, _g, _e, &rsax_mod_ctx->ctx.b512);
/* Return the result in the BIGNUM */
interleaved_array_to_bn_512(r, _r);
return 1;
}
}
return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, g, e, m, ctx, in_mont);
}
/* Declares for the Intel CIAP 512-bit / CRT / 1024 bit RSA modular
* exponentiation routine precalculations and a structure to hold the
* necessary values. These files are meant to live in crypto/rsa/ in
* the target openssl.
*/
/*
* Local method: extracts a piece from a BIGNUM, to fit it into
* an array. Call with n=8 to extract an entire 512-bit BIGNUM
*/
static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM* b, unsigned int n, UINT64 *array)
{
int i;
UINT64 tmp;
unsigned char bn_buff[64];
memset(bn_buff, 0, 64);
if (BN_num_bytes(b) > 64) {
printf ("Can't support this byte size\n");
return 0; }
if (BN_num_bytes(b)!=0) {
if (!BN_bn2bin(b, bn_buff+(64-BN_num_bytes(b)))) {
printf ("Error's in bn2bin\n");
/* We have to error, here */
return 0; } }
while (n-- > 0) {
array[n] = 0;
for (i=7; i>=0; i--) {
tmp = bn_buff[63-(n*8+i)];
array[n] |= tmp << (8*i); } }
return 1;
}
/* Init a 512-bit BIGNUM from the UINT64*_ (8 * 64) interleaved array */
static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM* b, UINT64 *array)
{
unsigned char tmp[64];
int n=8;
int i;
while (n-- > 0) {
for (i = 7; i>=0; i--) {
tmp[63-(n*8+i)] = (unsigned char)(array[n]>>(8*i)); } }
BN_bin2bn(tmp, 64, b);
return 0;
}
/* The main 512bit precompute call */
static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data)
{
BIGNUM two_768, two_640, two_128, two_512, tmp, _m, tmp2;
/* We need a BN_CTX for the modulo functions */
BN_CTX* ctx;
/* Some tmps */
UINT64 _t[8];
int i, j, ret = 0;
/* Init _m with m */
BN_init(&_m);
interleaved_array_to_bn_512(&_m, m);
memset(_t, 0, 64);
/* Inits */
BN_init(&two_768);
BN_init(&two_640);
BN_init(&two_128);
BN_init(&two_512);
BN_init(&tmp);
BN_init(&tmp2);
/* Create our context */
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { goto err; }
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
/*
* For production, if you care, these only need to be set once,
* and may be made constants.
*/
BN_lshift(&two_768, BN_value_one(), 768);
BN_lshift(&two_640, BN_value_one(), 640);
BN_lshift(&two_128, BN_value_one(), 128);
BN_lshift(&two_512, BN_value_one(), 512);
if (0 == (m[7] & 0x8000000000000000)) {
exit(1);
}
if (0 == (m[0] & 0x1)) { /* Odd modulus required for Mont */
exit(1);
}
/* Precompute m1 */
BN_mod(&tmp, &two_768, &_m, ctx);
if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m1[0])) {
goto err; }
/* Precompute m2 */
BN_mod(&tmp, &two_640, &_m, ctx);
if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m2[0])) {
goto err;
}
/*
* Precompute k1, a 128b number = ((-1)* m-1 ) mod 2128; k1 should
* be non-negative.
*/
BN_mod_inverse(&tmp, &_m, &two_128, ctx);
if (!BN_is_zero(&tmp)) { BN_sub(&tmp, &two_128, &tmp); }
if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 2, &data->k1[0])) {
goto err; }
/* Precompute t */
for (i=0; i<8; i++) {
BN_zero(&tmp);
if (i & 1) { BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp); }
if (i & 2) { BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp); }
if (i & 4) { BN_add(&tmp, &two_640, &tmp); }
BN_nnmod(&tmp2, &tmp, &_m, ctx);
if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp2, 8, _t)) {
goto err; }
for (j=0; j<8; j++) data->t[j][i] = _t[j]; }
/* Precompute m */
for (i=0; i<8; i++) {
data->m[i] = m[i]; }
ret = 1;
err:
/* Cleanup */
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx); }
BN_free(&two_768);
BN_free(&two_640);
BN_free(&two_128);
BN_free(&two_512);
BN_free(&tmp);
BN_free(&tmp2);
BN_free(&_m);
return ret;
}
static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
int ret=0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
{
BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
int error = 0;
/* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery
* intialization uses the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag
* (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
*/
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
BN_init(&local_p);
p = &local_p;
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_init(&local_q);
q = &local_q;
BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
{
p = rsa->p;
q = rsa->q;
}
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
{
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
error = 1;
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
error = 1;
}
/* clean up */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
BN_free(&local_p);
BN_free(&local_q);
}
if ( error )
goto err;
}
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
goto err;
/* compute I mod q */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
c = &local_c;
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
}
else
{
if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
}
/* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_q, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 0, rsa->q) )) goto err;
/* compute I mod p */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
c = &local_c;
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
}
else
{
if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
}
/* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_p, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 1, rsa->p) )) goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
* affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
if (BN_is_negative(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
/* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
pr1 = &local_r1;
BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
pr1 = r1;
if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
* adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
* second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
* This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
* they ensure p > q [steve]
*/
if (BN_is_negative(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
{
if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, rsa->n) ))
goto err;
/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
* will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
* the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
* for absolute equality, just congruency. */
if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
{
/* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
* miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
* mod_exp and return that instead. */
BIGNUM local_d;
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
d = &local_d;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
d = rsa->d;
if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, rsa->n) )) goto err;
}
}
ret=1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
#endif /* !COMPILE_RSAX */

1
crypto/engine/engine.h
View file

@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ void ENGINE_load_gost(void);
#endif
void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
void ENGINE_load_aesni(void);
void ENGINE_load_rsax(void);
void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
/* Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation