Fix Typos
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9288)
This commit is contained in:
Antoine Cœur
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
parent
f663ddc7b0
commit
c2969ff6e7
69 changed files with 89 additions and 89 deletions
4
CHANGES
4
CHANGES
|
|
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
|
|||
EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE.
|
||||
[Shane Lontis]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Default cipher lists/suites are now avaialble via a function, the
|
||||
*) Default cipher lists/suites are now available via a function, the
|
||||
#defines are deprecated.
|
||||
[Todd Short]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -462,7 +462,7 @@
|
|||
SSL_set_ciphersuites()
|
||||
[Matt Caswell]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Memory allocation failures consistenly add an error to the error
|
||||
*) Memory allocation failures consistently add an error to the error
|
||||
stack.
|
||||
[Rich Salz]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
#### iPhoneOS/iOS
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It takes recent enough XCode to use following two targets. It shouldn't
|
||||
# It takes recent enough Xcode to use following two targets. It shouldn't
|
||||
# be a problem by now, but if they don't work, original targets below
|
||||
# that depend on manual definition of environment variables should still
|
||||
# work...
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
# Windows OneCore targets.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# OneCore is new API stability "contract" that transends Desktop, IoT and
|
||||
# OneCore is new API stability "contract" that transcends Desktop, IoT and
|
||||
# Mobile[?] Windows editions. It's a set up "umbrella" libraries that
|
||||
# export subset of Win32 API that are common to all Windows 10 devices.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
|
|||
our @generated =
|
||||
sort ( ( grep { defined $unified_info{generate}->{$_} }
|
||||
sort keys %generatables ),
|
||||
# Scripts are assumed to be generated, so add thhem too
|
||||
# Scripts are assumed to be generated, so add them too
|
||||
( grep { defined $unified_info{sources}->{$_} }
|
||||
@{$unified_info{scripts}} ) );
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ static int alg_print(const X509_ALGOR *alg)
|
|||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err, ", Salt length: %d, Cost(N): %ld, "
|
||||
"Block size(r): %ld, Paralelizm(p): %ld",
|
||||
"Block size(r): %ld, Parallelism(p): %ld",
|
||||
ASN1_STRING_length(kdf->salt),
|
||||
ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->costParameter),
|
||||
ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->blockSize),
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1876,7 +1876,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
buflen = lengths[size_num - 1];
|
||||
if (buflen < 36) /* size of random vector in RSA bencmark */
|
||||
if (buflen < 36) /* size of random vector in RSA benchmark */
|
||||
buflen = 36;
|
||||
buflen += MAX_MISALIGNMENT + 1;
|
||||
loopargs[i].buf_malloc = app_malloc(buflen, "input buffer");
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int storeutl_main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
|||
}
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If expected wasn't set at this point, it means the map
|
||||
* isn't syncronised with the possible options leading here.
|
||||
* isn't synchronised with the possible options leading here.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
OPENSSL_assert(expected != 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ The tree height is dynamically increased as needed based on additions.
|
|||
An empty tree is represented by a NULL root pointer. Inserting a value at
|
||||
index 0 results in the allocation of a top level node full of null pointers
|
||||
except for the single pointer to the user's data (N = SA_BLOCK_MAX for
|
||||
breviety):
|
||||
brevity):
|
||||
|
||||
+----+
|
||||
|Root|
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -38,14 +38,14 @@
|
|||
# Implement AES_set_[en|de]crypt_key. Key schedule setup is avoided
|
||||
# for 128-bit keys, if hardware support is detected.
|
||||
|
||||
# Januray 2009.
|
||||
# January 2009.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Add support for hardware AES192/256 and reschedule instructions to
|
||||
# minimize/avoid Address Generation Interlock hazard and to favour
|
||||
# dual-issue z10 pipeline. This gave ~25% improvement on z10 and
|
||||
# almost 50% on z9. The gain is smaller on z10, because being dual-
|
||||
# issue z10 makes it impossible to eliminate the interlock condition:
|
||||
# critial path is not long enough. Yet it spends ~24 cycles per byte
|
||||
# critical path is not long enough. Yet it spends ~24 cycles per byte
|
||||
# processed with 128-bit key.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Unlike previous version hardware support detection takes place only
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static void determine_days(struct tm *tm)
|
|||
}
|
||||
c = y / 100;
|
||||
y %= 100;
|
||||
/* Zeller's congruance */
|
||||
/* Zeller's congruence */
|
||||
tm->tm_wday = (d + (13 * m) / 5 + y + y / 4 + c / 4 + 5 * c + 6) % 7;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
|
|||
* reasons. When BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE was first defined its value
|
||||
* was incorrectly clashing with BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE. The
|
||||
* value has been updated to a non-clashing value. However to preserve
|
||||
* binary compatiblity we now respond to both the old value and the new one
|
||||
* binary compatibility we now respond to both the old value and the new one
|
||||
*/
|
||||
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE:
|
||||
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
|||
#if 0
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The bn_div_3_words entry point is re-used for constant-time interface.
|
||||
* Implementation is retained as hystorical reference.
|
||||
* Implementation is retained as historical reference.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
.align 5
|
||||
.globl bn_div_3_words
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
|
|||
*
|
||||
* - availability of constant-time bn_div_3_words;
|
||||
* - dividend is at least as "wide" as divisor, limb-wise, zero-padded
|
||||
* if so requied, which shouldn't be a privacy problem, because
|
||||
* if so required, which shouldn't be a privacy problem, because
|
||||
* divisor's length is considered public;
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ struct bn_gencb_st {
|
|||
(b) > 23 ? 3 : 1)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* BN_mod_exp_mont_conttime is based on the assumption that the L1 data cache
|
||||
* BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime is based on the assumption that the L1 data cache
|
||||
* line width of the target processor is at least the following value.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
# define MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH ( 64 )
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
|
|||
* one bit longer than the modulus.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this. More
|
||||
* specificly refer to the discussion starting with:
|
||||
* specifically refer to the discussion starting with:
|
||||
* https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705
|
||||
* The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_montx:
|
|||
|
||||
################################# reduction
|
||||
mulx 8*0+128(%r14), $t0, $t1
|
||||
adcx $t0, $acc3 # guranteed to be zero
|
||||
adcx $t0, $acc3 # guaranteed to be zero
|
||||
adox $t1, $acc4
|
||||
|
||||
mulx 8*1+128(%r14), $t0, $t1
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ x25519_fe64_tobytes:
|
|||
and $t0,$t0,$t1
|
||||
sldi $a3,$a3,1
|
||||
add $t0,$t0,$t1 # compare to modulus in the same go
|
||||
srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most signifcant bit cleared
|
||||
srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most significant bit cleared
|
||||
|
||||
addc $a0,$a0,$t0
|
||||
addze $a1,$a1
|
||||
|
|
@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ x25519_fe64_tobytes:
|
|||
sradi $t0,$a3,63 # most significant bit -> mask
|
||||
sldi $a3,$a3,1
|
||||
andc $t0,$t1,$t0
|
||||
srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most signifcant bit cleared
|
||||
srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most significant bit cleared
|
||||
|
||||
subi $rp,$rp,1
|
||||
subfc $a0,$t0,$a0
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ struct ec_method_st {
|
|||
int (*field_div) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
|
||||
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
|
||||
/*-
|
||||
* 'field_inv' computes the multipicative inverse of a in the field,
|
||||
* 'field_inv' computes the multiplicative inverse of a in the field,
|
||||
* storing the result in r.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If 'a' is zero (or equivalent), you'll get an EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
|
|||
* ffffffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb
|
||||
* 71e913863f7, in that case the penultimate intermediate is -9G and
|
||||
* the final digit is also -9G. Since this only happens for a single
|
||||
* scalar, the timing leak is irrelevent. (Any attacker who wanted to
|
||||
* scalar, the timing leak is irrelevant. (Any attacker who wanted to
|
||||
* check whether a secret scalar was that exact value, can already do
|
||||
* so.)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static int ecd_item_sign25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
|
|||
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ED25519), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
|
||||
if (alg2)
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ED25519), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
|
||||
/* Algorithm idetifiers set: carry on as normal */
|
||||
/* Algorithm identifiers set: carry on as normal */
|
||||
return 3;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2439,7 +2439,7 @@ EVP_R_NO_OPERATION_SET:149:no operation set
|
|||
EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED:177:only oneshot supported
|
||||
EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE:150:\
|
||||
operation not supported for this keytype
|
||||
EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED:151:operaton not initialized
|
||||
EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED:151:operation not initialized
|
||||
EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE:187:parameter too large
|
||||
EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING:162:partially overlapping buffers
|
||||
EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR:181:pbkdf2 error
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[] = {
|
|||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),
|
||||
"operation not supported for this keytype"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED),
|
||||
"operaton not initialized"},
|
||||
"operation not initialized"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE),
|
||||
"parameter too large"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING),
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ init_get_thread_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *local, int alloc, int keep)
|
|||
* destructor for threads terminating before libcrypto is initialized or
|
||||
* after it's de-initialized. Access to the key doesn't have to be
|
||||
* serialized for the said threads, because they didn't use libcrypto
|
||||
* and it doesn't matter if they pick "impossible" or derefernce real
|
||||
* and it doesn't matter if they pick "impossible" or dereference real
|
||||
* key value and pull NULL past initialization in the first thread that
|
||||
* intends to use libcrypto.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
|
|||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* A hashing implementation that appears to be based on the linear hashing
|
||||
* alogrithm:
|
||||
* algorithm:
|
||||
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_hashing
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Litwin, Witold (1980), "Linear hashing: A new tool for file and table
|
||||
* addressing", Proc. 6th Conference on Very Large Databases: 212-223
|
||||
* http://hackthology.com/pdfs/Litwin-1980-Linear_Hashing.pdf
|
||||
* https://hackthology.com/pdfs/Litwin-1980-Linear_Hashing.pdf
|
||||
*
|
||||
* From the wikipedia article "Linear hashing is used in the BDB Berkeley
|
||||
* From the Wikipedia article "Linear hashing is used in the BDB Berkeley
|
||||
* database system, which in turn is used by many software systems such as
|
||||
* OpenLDAP, using a C implementation derived from the CACM article and first
|
||||
* published on the Usenet in 1988 by Esmond Pitt."
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -969,15 +969,15 @@ __poly1305_blocks_vsx:
|
|||
addi $t1,$ctx,`48+(12^$BIG_ENDIAN)`
|
||||
bl __poly1305_splat
|
||||
|
||||
bl __poly1305_mul # caclulate r^2
|
||||
bl __poly1305_mul # calculate r^2
|
||||
addi $t1,$ctx,`48+(4^$BIG_ENDIAN)`
|
||||
bl __poly1305_splat
|
||||
|
||||
bl __poly1305_mul # caclulate r^3
|
||||
bl __poly1305_mul # calculate r^3
|
||||
addi $t1,$ctx,`48+(8^$BIG_ENDIAN)`
|
||||
bl __poly1305_splat
|
||||
|
||||
bl __poly1305_mul # caclulate r^4
|
||||
bl __poly1305_mul # calculate r^4
|
||||
addi $t1,$ctx,`48+(0^$BIG_ENDIAN)`
|
||||
bl __poly1305_splat
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
|
|||
/*
|
||||
* NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy
|
||||
* and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing
|
||||
* the minimum length to accomadate the length of the nonce.
|
||||
* the minimum length to accommodate the length of the nonce.
|
||||
* We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
|
|||
|
||||
/* TODO(3.0): Do we need to handle this somehow in the FIPS module? */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file decriptors are
|
||||
* RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file descriptors are
|
||||
* closed after use.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value,
|
|||
*
|
||||
* This strategy has the following goals:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 1. 1024-bit factors are effcient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key
|
||||
* 1. 1024-bit factors are efficient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key
|
||||
* 2. stay the same logic with normal 2-prime key
|
||||
*/
|
||||
bitse -= bitsr[i];
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
|
|||
# over 2x than 32-bit code. X[16] resides on stack, but access to it
|
||||
# is scheduled for L2 latency and staged through 32 least significant
|
||||
# bits of %l0-%l7. The latter is done to achieve 32-/64-bit ABI
|
||||
# duality. Nevetheless it's ~40% faster than SHA256, which is pretty
|
||||
# duality. Nevertheless it's ~40% faster than SHA256, which is pretty
|
||||
# good [optimal coefficient is 50%].
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SHA512 on UltraSPARC T1.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -313,12 +313,12 @@ static int sm2_sig_verify(const EC_KEY *key, const ECDSA_SIG *sig,
|
|||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* B1: verify whether r' in [1,n-1], verification failed if not
|
||||
* B2: vefify whether s' in [1,n-1], verification failed if not
|
||||
* B2: verify whether s' in [1,n-1], verification failed if not
|
||||
* B3: set M'~=ZA || M'
|
||||
* B4: calculate e'=Hv(M'~)
|
||||
* B5: calculate t = (r' + s') modn, verification failed if t=0
|
||||
* B6: calculate the point (x1', y1')=[s']G + [t]PA
|
||||
* B7: calculate R=(e'+x1') modn, verfication pass if yes, otherwise failed
|
||||
* B7: calculate R=(e'+x1') modn, verification pass if yes, otherwise failed
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
|
|||
#include "internal/sparse_array.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* How many bits are used to index each level in the tree structre?
|
||||
* How many bits are used to index each level in the tree structure?
|
||||
* This setting determines the number of pointers stored in each node of the
|
||||
* tree used to represent the sparse array. Having more pointers reduces the
|
||||
* depth of the tree but potentially wastes more memory. That is, this is a
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ typedef OSSL_STORE_INFO *(*file_try_decode_fn)(const char *pem_name,
|
|||
typedef int (*file_eof_fn)(void *handler_ctx);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The destroy_ctx function is used to destroy the handler_ctx that was
|
||||
* intiated by a repeatable try_decode fuction. This is only used when
|
||||
* initiated by a repeatable try_decode function. This is only used when
|
||||
* the handler is marked repeatable.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
typedef void (*file_destroy_ctx_fn)(void **handler_ctx);
|
||||
|
|
@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static FILE_HANDLER PrivateKey_handler = {
|
|||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Public key decoder. Only supports SubjectPublicKeyInfo formated keys.
|
||||
* Public key decoder. Only supports SubjectPublicKeyInfo formatted keys.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PUBKEY(const char *pem_name,
|
||||
const char *pem_header,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ server-arg.exe : server-arg.obj
|
|||
server-cmod.exe : server-cmod.obj
|
||||
server-conf.exe : server-conf.obj
|
||||
|
||||
# Stoopid MMS doesn't infer this automatically...
|
||||
# MMS doesn't infer this automatically...
|
||||
client-arg.obj : client-arg.c
|
||||
client-conf.obj : client-conf.c
|
||||
saccept.obj : saccept.c
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ void aes_gcm_decrypt(void)
|
|||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
|
||||
int outlen, tmplen, rv;
|
||||
unsigned char outbuf[1024];
|
||||
printf("AES GCM Derypt:\n");
|
||||
printf("AES GCM Decrypt:\n");
|
||||
printf("Ciphertext:\n");
|
||||
BIO_dump_fp(stdout, gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct));
|
||||
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ as a C<CRYPTO_EX_DATA>, which allows data from diverse parts of the
|
|||
library to be added and removed dynamically.
|
||||
Each such data item must have a corresponding CRYPTO_EX_DATA index
|
||||
associated with it. Unlike normal CRYPTO_EX_DATA objects we use static indexes
|
||||
to identify data items. These are mapped transparetnly to CRYPTO_EX_DATA dynamic
|
||||
to identify data items. These are mapped transparently to CRYPTO_EX_DATA dynamic
|
||||
indexes internally to the implementation.
|
||||
See the example further down to see how that's done.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ must be incremented, using ossl_provider_upref().
|
|||
|
||||
This function is expected to set the method's reference count to 1.
|
||||
|
||||
=item desctruct()
|
||||
=item destruct()
|
||||
|
||||
Decrement the I<method>'s reference count, and destruct it when
|
||||
the reference count reaches zero.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ function will get called.
|
|||
|
||||
=item *
|
||||
|
||||
If no intialization function was given with ossl_provider_new(), a
|
||||
If no initialization function was given with ossl_provider_new(), a
|
||||
loadable module with the I<name> that was given to ossl_provider_new()
|
||||
will be located and loaded, then the symbol B<OSSL_provider_init> will
|
||||
be located in that module, and called.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ To see the list of supported digests, use the command I<list -digest-commands>.
|
|||
|
||||
=item B<cipher:string>
|
||||
|
||||
Used by CMAC and GMAC to specifiy the cipher algorithm.
|
||||
Used by CMAC and GMAC to specify the cipher algorithm.
|
||||
For CMAC it must be one of AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC or
|
||||
DES-EDE3-CBC.
|
||||
For GMAC it should be a GCM mode cipher e.g. AES-128-GCM.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ ADMISSION_SYNTAX_set0_contentsOfAdmissions()
|
|||
functions free any existing value and set the pointer to the specified value.
|
||||
|
||||
The B<ADMISSION> type has an authority name, authority object, and a
|
||||
stack of B<PROFSSION_INFO> items.
|
||||
stack of B<PROFESSION_INFO> items.
|
||||
The ADMISSIONS_get0_admissionAuthority(), ADMISSIONS_get0_namingAuthority(),
|
||||
and ADMISSIONS_get0_professionInfos()
|
||||
functions return pointers to those values within the object.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Calling BIO_reset() on a read write memory BIO with BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST
|
|||
flag set can have unexpected outcome when the reads and writes to the
|
||||
BIO are intertwined. As documented above the BIO will be reset to the
|
||||
state after the last completed write operation. The effects of reads
|
||||
preceeding that write operation cannot be undone.
|
||||
preceding that write operation cannot be undone.
|
||||
|
||||
Calling BIO_get_mem_ptr() prior to a BIO_reset() call with
|
||||
BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST set has the same effect as a write operation.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ EVP_MD_CTX is freed).
|
|||
|
||||
The digest B<type> may be NULL if the signing algorithm supports it.
|
||||
|
||||
No B<EVP_PKEY_CTX> will be created by EVP_DigsetSignInit() if the passed B<ctx>
|
||||
No B<EVP_PKEY_CTX> will be created by EVP_DigestSignInit() if the passed B<ctx>
|
||||
has already been assigned one via L<EVP_MD_CTX_set_ctx(3)>. See also L<SM2(7)>.
|
||||
|
||||
Only EVP_PKEY types that support signing can be used with these functions. This
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ being passed to EVP_DigestVerifyInit() (which means the EVP_PKEY_CTX is created
|
|||
inside EVP_DigestVerifyInit() and it will be freed automatically when the
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX is freed).
|
||||
|
||||
No B<EVP_PKEY_CTX> will be created by EVP_DigsetSignInit() if the passed B<ctx>
|
||||
No B<EVP_PKEY_CTX> will be created by EVP_DigestSignInit() if the passed B<ctx>
|
||||
has already been assigned one via L<EVP_MD_CTX_set_ctx(3)>. See also L<SM2(7)>.
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ See L<EVP_CIPHER_up_ref(3)>.
|
|||
|
||||
Where an application that previously used implicit fetch is converted to use
|
||||
explicit fetch care should be taken with the L<EVP_MD_CTX_md(3)> function.
|
||||
Specifically, this function returns the EVP_MD object orginally passed to
|
||||
Specifically, this function returns the EVP_MD object originally passed to
|
||||
EVP_DigestInit_ex() (or other similar function). With implicit fetch the
|
||||
returned EVP_MD object is guaranteed to be available throughout the application
|
||||
lifetime. However, with explicit fetch EVP_MD objects are reference counted.
|
||||
|
|
@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ implementation of whirlpool from it:
|
|||
EVP_MD_meth_free(md);
|
||||
|
||||
Note that in the above example the property string "legacy=yes" is optional
|
||||
since, assuming no other providers have been loaded, the only implmentation of
|
||||
since, assuming no other providers have been loaded, the only implementation of
|
||||
the "whirlpool" algorithm is in the "legacy" provider. Also note that the
|
||||
default provider should be explicitly loaded if it is required in addition to
|
||||
other providers:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ The MD5 algorithm which produces a 128-bit output from a given input.
|
|||
|
||||
=item EVP_md5_sha1()
|
||||
|
||||
A hash algorithm of SSL v3 that combines MD5 with SHA-1 as decirbed in RFC
|
||||
A hash algorithm of SSL v3 that combines MD5 with SHA-1 as described in RFC
|
||||
6101.
|
||||
|
||||
WARNING: this algorithm is not intended for non-SSL usage.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new
|
|||
|
||||
OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new() generates a PBM (Password-Based MAC) based on given PBM
|
||||
parameters B<pbmp>, message B<msg>, and secret B<sec>, along with the respective
|
||||
lengths B<msglen> and B<seclen>. On success writes the adddress of the newly
|
||||
lengths B<msglen> and B<seclen>. On success writes the address of the newly
|
||||
allocated MAC via the B<mac> reference parameter and writes the length via the
|
||||
B<maclen> reference parameter unless it its NULL.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ OSSL_PARAM_get_TYPE() retrieves a value of type B<TYPE> from the parameter B<p>.
|
|||
The value is copied to the address B<val>.
|
||||
Type coercion takes place as discussed in the NOTES section.
|
||||
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_set_TYPE() stores a value B<val> of type B<TYPE> into the paramter
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_set_TYPE() stores a value B<val> of type B<TYPE> into the parameter
|
||||
B<p>.
|
||||
Type coercion takes place as discussed in the NOTES section.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ OSSL_PARAM_get_BN() retrieves a BIGNUM from the parameter pointed to by B<p>.
|
|||
The BIGNUM referenced by B<val> is updated and is allocated if B<*val> is
|
||||
B<NULL>.
|
||||
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_set_BN() stores the BIGNUM B<val> into the paramater B<p>.
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_set_BN() stores the BIGNUM B<val> into the parameter B<p>.
|
||||
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string() retrieves a UTF8 string from the parameter
|
||||
pointed to by B<p>.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ manner possible according to the scheme the loader implements, it also
|
|||
takes a B<UI_METHOD> and associated data, to be used any time
|
||||
something needs to be prompted for.
|
||||
Furthermore, this function is expected to initialize what needs to be
|
||||
initialized, to create a privata data store (B<OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX>, see
|
||||
initialized, to create a private data store (B<OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX>, see
|
||||
above), and to return it.
|
||||
If something goes wrong, this function is expected to return NULL.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ grained search of objects.
|
|||
|
||||
OSSL_STORE_supports_search() checks if the loader of the given OSSL_STORE
|
||||
context supports the given search type.
|
||||
See L<OSSL_STORE_SEARCH/SUPPORED CRITERION TYPES> for information on the
|
||||
See L<OSSL_STORE_SEARCH/SUPPORTED CRITERION TYPES> for information on the
|
||||
supported search criterion types.
|
||||
|
||||
OSSL_STORE_expect() and OSSL_STORE_find I<must> be called before the first
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ and is being used.
|
|||
The derivation function is disabled during initialization by calling the
|
||||
RAND_DRBG_set() function with the RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF flag.
|
||||
For more information on the derivation function and when it can be omitted,
|
||||
see [NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1]. Roughly speeking it can be omitted if the random
|
||||
see [NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1]. Roughly speaking it can be omitted if the random
|
||||
source has "full entropy", i.e., contains 8 bits of entropy per byte.
|
||||
|
||||
Even if a nonce is required, the B<get_nonce>() and B<cleanup_nonce>()
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ B<ssl>.
|
|||
|
||||
SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites() is used to configure the available TLSv1.3
|
||||
ciphersuites for B<ctx>. This is a simple colon (":") separated list of TLSv1.3
|
||||
ciphersuite names in order of perference. Valid TLSv1.3 ciphersuite names are:
|
||||
ciphersuite names in order of preference. Valid TLSv1.3 ciphersuite names are:
|
||||
|
||||
=over 4
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ user salt, B<v> the password verifier and B<info> is the optional user info.
|
|||
|
||||
The SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw() function sets all SRP parameters for the
|
||||
connection B<s> by generating a random salt and a password verifier.
|
||||
B<user> is the username, B<pass> the password and B<grp> the SRP group paramters
|
||||
B<user> is the username, B<pass> the password and B<grp> the SRP group parameters
|
||||
identifier for L<SRP_get_default_gN(3)>.
|
||||
|
||||
The SSL_get_srp_g() function returns the SRP group generator for B<s>, or from
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname,
|
|||
SSL_SESSION_set1_hostname,
|
||||
SSL_SESSION_get0_alpn_selected,
|
||||
SSL_SESSION_set1_alpn_selected
|
||||
- get and set SNI and ALPN data ssociated with a session
|
||||
- get and set SNI and ALPN data associated with a session
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 SYNOPSIS
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ of bytes of the file written to the TLS/SSL connection.
|
|||
=item E<lt> 0
|
||||
|
||||
The write operation was not successful, because either the connection was
|
||||
closed, an error occured or action must be taken by the calling process.
|
||||
closed, an error occurred or action must be taken by the calling process.
|
||||
Call SSL_get_error() with the return value to find out the reason.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ SSKDF derives a key using input such as a shared secret key (that was generated
|
|||
during the execution of a key establishment scheme) and fixedinfo.
|
||||
SSKDF is also informally referred to as 'Concat KDF'.
|
||||
|
||||
=head2 Auxilary function
|
||||
=head2 Auxiliary function
|
||||
|
||||
The implementation uses a selectable auxiliary function H, which can be one of:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -68,12 +68,12 @@ Sets the type for the SSHHKDF operation. There are six supported types:
|
|||
|
||||
=over 4
|
||||
|
||||
=item EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_ININITAL_IV_CLI_TO_SRV
|
||||
=item EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_CLI_TO_SRV
|
||||
|
||||
The Initial IV from client to server.
|
||||
A single char of value 65 (ASCII char 'A').
|
||||
|
||||
=item EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_ININITAL_IV_SRV_TO_CLI
|
||||
=item EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_SRV_TO_CLI
|
||||
|
||||
The Initial IV from server to client
|
||||
A single char of value 66 (ASCII char 'B').
|
||||
|
|
@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ A single char of value 70 (ASCII char 'F').
|
|||
EVP_KDF_ctrl_str() type string: "type"
|
||||
|
||||
The value is a string of length one character. The only valid values
|
||||
are the numerical values of the ASCII caracters: "A" (65) to "F" (70).
|
||||
are the numerical values of the ASCII characters: "A" (65) to "F" (70).
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ This example derives an 8 byte IV using SHA-256 with a 1K "key" and appropriate
|
|||
if (EVP_KDF_CTX_set1_sshkdf_session_id(kctx, session_id, 32) <= 0)
|
||||
/* Error */
|
||||
if (EVP_KDF_CTX_set_sshkdf_type(kctx,
|
||||
EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_ININITAL_IV_CLI_TO_SRV) <= 0)
|
||||
EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_CLI_TO_SRV) <= 0)
|
||||
/* Error */
|
||||
if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, &outlen) <= 0)
|
||||
/* Error */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ decoded before being passed on as the control value.
|
|||
|
||||
=head1 NOTES
|
||||
|
||||
X963KDF is very similar to the SSKDF that uses a digest as the auxilary function,
|
||||
X963KDF is very similar to the SSKDF that uses a digest as the auxiliary function,
|
||||
X963KDF appends the counter to the secret, whereas SSKDF prepends the counter.
|
||||
|
||||
A context for X963KDF can be obtained by calling:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Matching such clauses is not a requirement, but any additional optional
|
|||
match counts in favor of the algorithm.
|
||||
More details about that in the B<Lookups> section.
|
||||
A I<property query> is a sequence of comma separated property query clauses.
|
||||
The full syntax for property queries appears below, but the available syntatic
|
||||
The full syntax for property queries appears below, but the available syntactic
|
||||
features are:
|
||||
|
||||
=over 4
|
||||
|
|
@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ Where both the context and local queries include a clause with the same name,
|
|||
the local clause overrides the context clause.
|
||||
|
||||
It is possible for a local property query to remove a clause in the context
|
||||
property query by preceeding the property name with a '-'.
|
||||
property query by preceding the property name with a '-'.
|
||||
For example, a context property query that contains "fips=yes" would normally
|
||||
result in implementations that have "fips=yes".
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ struct driver_info_st {
|
|||
|
||||
enum devcrypto_accelerated_t {
|
||||
DEVCRYPTO_NOT_ACCELERATED = -1, /* software implemented */
|
||||
DEVCRYPTO_ACCELERATION_UNKNOWN = 0, /* acceleration support unkown */
|
||||
DEVCRYPTO_ACCELERATION_UNKNOWN = 0, /* acceleration support unknown */
|
||||
DEVCRYPTO_ACCELERATED = 1 /* hardware accelerated */
|
||||
} accelerated;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ int ossl_method_store_fetch(OSSL_METHOD_STORE *store, int nid,
|
|||
int ossl_method_store_set_global_properties(OSSL_METHOD_STORE *store,
|
||||
const char *prop_query);
|
||||
|
||||
/* proeprty query cache functions */
|
||||
/* property query cache functions */
|
||||
int ossl_method_store_cache_get(OSSL_METHOD_STORE *store, int nid,
|
||||
const char *prop_query, void **result);
|
||||
int ossl_method_store_cache_set(OSSL_METHOD_STORE *store, int nid,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -72,9 +72,9 @@
|
|||
* function defined via DEFINE_ONCE_STATIC where both functions use the same
|
||||
* CRYPTO_ONCE object to synchronise. Where an alternative initialiser function
|
||||
* is used only one of the primary or the alternative initialiser function will
|
||||
* ever be called - and that function will be called exactly once. Definitition
|
||||
* ever be called - and that function will be called exactly once. Definition
|
||||
* of an alternative initialiser function MUST occur AFTER the definition of the
|
||||
* primiary initialiser function.
|
||||
* primary initialiser function.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Typical usage might be:
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
|
|||
* if (var == NOT_YET_INITIALIZED)
|
||||
* var = function_returning_same_value();
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This does work provided that loads and stores are single-instuction
|
||||
* This does work provided that loads and stores are single-instruction
|
||||
* operations (and integer ones are on *all* supported platforms), but
|
||||
* it upsets Thread Sanitizer. Suggested solution is
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ struct testdata {
|
|||
int expected_type; /* expected type after set/set_string_gmt */
|
||||
int check_result; /* check result */
|
||||
time_t t; /* expected time_t*/
|
||||
int cmp_result; /* compariston to baseline result */
|
||||
int convert_result; /* convertion result */
|
||||
int cmp_result; /* comparison to baseline result */
|
||||
int convert_result; /* conversion result */
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static struct testdata tbl_testdata_pos[] = {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
|
|||
* Personalisation string tests
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* Test detection of too large personlisation string */
|
||||
/* Test detection of too large personalisation string */
|
||||
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|
||||
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, drbg->max_perslen + 1) > 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static int test_dtls_unprocessed(int testidx)
|
|||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Create the connection. We use "create_bare_ssl_connection" here so that
|
||||
* we can force the connection to not do "SSL_read" once partly conencted.
|
||||
* we can force the connection to not do "SSL_read" once partly connected.
|
||||
* We don't want to accidentally read the dummy records we injected because
|
||||
* they will fail to decrypt.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1178,7 +1178,7 @@ static int test_EVP_MD_fetch(int tst)
|
|||
md = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Explicitly asking for the default implementation should succeeed except
|
||||
* Explicitly asking for the default implementation should succeed except
|
||||
* in test 4 where the default provider is not loaded.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "SHA256", "default=yes");
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -46,13 +46,13 @@ struct object_st {
|
|||
double p2;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Documented as an arbitrarly large unsigned integer.
|
||||
* The data size must be large enough to accomodate.
|
||||
* The data size must be large enough to accommodate.
|
||||
* Assumed data type OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER
|
||||
*/
|
||||
BIGNUM *p3;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Documented as a C string.
|
||||
* The data size must be large enough to accomodate.
|
||||
* The data size must be large enough to accommodate.
|
||||
* Assumed data type OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
|
||||
*/
|
||||
char *p4;
|
||||
|
|
@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static const struct provider_dispatch_st provider_api = {
|
|||
|
||||
/* In all our tests, these are variables that get manipulated as parameters
|
||||
*
|
||||
* These arrays consistenly do nothing with the "p2" parameter, and
|
||||
* These arrays consistently do nothing with the "p2" parameter, and
|
||||
* always include a "foo" parameter. This is to check that the
|
||||
* set_params and get_params calls ignore the lack of parameters that
|
||||
* the application isn't interested in, as well as ignore parameters
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ int create_ssl_connection(SSL *serverssl, SSL *clientssl, int want)
|
|||
/*
|
||||
* We attempt to read some data on the client side which we expect to fail.
|
||||
* This will ensure we have received the NewSessionTicket in TLSv1.3 where
|
||||
* appropriate. We do this twice because there are 2 NewSesionTickets.
|
||||
* appropriate. We do this twice because there are 2 NewSessionTickets.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
|
||||
if (SSL_read_ex(clientssl, &buf, sizeof(buf), &readbytes) > 0) {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
|
|||
#define KEYLEN 16
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Based on the test vectors availble in:
|
||||
* Based on the test vectors available in:
|
||||
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-vectors-06
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -165,13 +165,13 @@ C<indir> takes some additional options OPTS that affect the subdirectory:
|
|||
|
||||
=item B<create =E<gt> 0|1>
|
||||
|
||||
When set to 1 (or any value that perl preceives as true), the subdirectory
|
||||
When set to 1 (or any value that perl perceives as true), the subdirectory
|
||||
will be created if it doesn't already exist. This happens before BLOCK
|
||||
is executed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<cleanup =E<gt> 0|1>
|
||||
|
||||
When set to 1 (or any value that perl preceives as true), the subdirectory
|
||||
When set to 1 (or any value that perl perceives as true), the subdirectory
|
||||
will be cleaned out and removed. This happens both before and after BLOCK
|
||||
is executed.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue