Clarify use of |$end0| in stitched x86-64 AES-GCM code.
There was some uncertainty about what the code is doing with |$end0| and whether it was necessary for |$len| to be a multiple of 16 or 96. Hopefully these added comments make it clear that the code is correct except for the caveat regarding low memory addresses. Change-Id: Iea546a59dc7aeb400f50ac5d2d7b9cb88ace9027 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7194 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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@ -116,6 +116,23 @@ _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x:
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vpxor $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3
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vmovups 0x10-0x80($key),$T2 # borrow $T2 for $rndkey
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vpclmulqdq \$0x01,$Hkey,$Z3,$Z2
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# At this point, the current block of 96 (0x60) bytes has already been
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# loaded into registers. Concurrently with processing it, we want to
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# load the next 96 bytes of input for the next round. Obviously, we can
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# only do this if there are at least 96 more bytes of input beyond the
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# input we're currently processing, or else we'd read past the end of
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# the input buffer. Here, we set |%r12| to 96 if there are at least 96
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# bytes of input beyond the 96 bytes we're already processing, and we
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# set |%r12| to 0 otherwise. In the case where we set |%r12| to 96,
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# we'll read in the next block so that it is in registers for the next
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# loop iteration. In the case where we set |%r12| to 0, we'll re-read
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# the current block and then ignore what we re-read.
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#
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# At this point, |$in0| points to the current (already read into
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# registers) block, and |$end0| points to 2*96 bytes before the end of
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# the input. Thus, |$in0| > |$end0| means that we do not have the next
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# 96-byte block to read in, and |$in0| <= |$end0| means we do.
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xor %r12,%r12
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cmp $in0,$end0
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@ -408,6 +425,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
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.align 32
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aesni_gcm_decrypt:
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xor $ret,$ret
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# We call |_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x|, which requires at least 96 (0x60)
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# bytes of input.
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cmp \$0x60,$len # minimal accepted length
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jb .Lgcm_dec_abort
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@ -462,7 +482,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
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vmovdqu 0x50($inp),$Z3 # I[5]
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lea ($inp),$in0
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vmovdqu 0x40($inp),$Z0
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# |_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x| requires |$end0| to point to 2*96 (0xc0)
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# bytes before the end of the input. Note, in particular, that this is
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# correct even if |$len| is not an even multiple of 96 or 16. XXX: This
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# seems to require that |$inp| + |$len| >= 2*96 (0xc0); i.e. |$inp| must
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# not be near the very beginning of the address space when |$len| < 2*96
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# (0xc0).
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lea -0xc0($inp,$len),$end0
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vmovdqu 0x30($inp),$Z1
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shr \$4,$len
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xor $ret,$ret
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@ -618,6 +646,10 @@ _aesni_ctr32_6x:
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.align 32
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aesni_gcm_encrypt:
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xor $ret,$ret
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# We call |_aesni_ctr32_6x| twice, each call consuming 96 bytes of
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# input. Then we call |_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x|, which requires at
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# least 96 more bytes of input.
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cmp \$0x60*3,$len # minimal accepted length
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jb .Lgcm_enc_abort
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@ -667,7 +699,16 @@ $code.=<<___;
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.Lenc_no_key_aliasing:
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lea ($out),$in0
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# |_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x| requires |$end0| to point to 2*96 (0xc0)
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# bytes before the end of the input. Note, in particular, that this is
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# correct even if |$len| is not an even multiple of 96 or 16. Unlike in
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# the decryption case, there's no caveat that |$out| must not be near
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# the very beginning of the address space, because we know that
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# |$len| >= 3*96 from the check above, and so we know
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# |$out| + |$len| >= 2*96 (0xc0).
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lea -0xc0($out,$len),$end0
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shr \$4,$len
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call _aesni_ctr32_6x
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