wbrawner/openssl
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

session tickets: use more sizeof

Browse source 
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

MR: #2153
This commit is contained in:
Kurt Roeckx 2016-03-02 14:39:14 +01:00
parent 05df5c2036
commit d139723b0e
3 changed files with 23 additions and 15 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

4
ssl/s3_lib.c
View file

@ -3396,8 +3396,8 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
unsigned char *keys = parg;
long tlsext_tick_keylen = (sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) +
sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key) + (ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key));
if (!keys)
sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key) + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key));
if (keys == NULL)
return tlsext_tick_keylen;
if (larg != tlsext_tick_keylen) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);

4
ssl/ssl_locl.h
View file

@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ DEFINE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION);
/* Needed in ssl_cert.c */
DEFINE_LHASH_OF(X509_NAME);
#define TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH 16
struct ssl_ctx_st {
const SSL_METHOD *method;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
@ -857,7 +859,7 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st {
int (*tlsext_servername_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *);
void *tlsext_servername_arg;
/* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */
unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[16];
unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[32];
unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[32];
/* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */

30
ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
View file

@ -2978,7 +2978,8 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
unsigned int hlen;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[16];
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
int iv_len;
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
@ -3028,13 +3029,14 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows handshake_header_length +
* 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
* 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
* session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
* length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
* sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
* max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
* max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
goto err;
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
@ -3045,10 +3047,14 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, hctx, 1) < 0)
goto err;
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
} else {
if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
goto err;
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
@ -3070,11 +3076,11 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
p += 2;
/* Output key name */
macstart = p;
memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
p += 16;
memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
p += sizeof(key_name);
/* output IV */
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
p += iv_len;
/* Encrypt session data */
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
goto err;