Stop DTLS servers asking for unsafe legacy renegotiation
If a DTLS client that does not support secure renegotiation connects to an OpenSSL DTLS server then, by default, renegotiation is disabled. If a server application attempts to initiate a renegotiation then OpenSSL is supposed to prevent this. However due to a discrepancy between the TLS and DTLS code, the server sends a HelloRequest anyway in DTLS. This is not a security concern because the handshake will still fail later in the process when the client responds with a ClientHello. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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@ -285,6 +285,19 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
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ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
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s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
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s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
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} else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
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!(s->options &
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SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
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/*
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* Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
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* support secure renegotiation.
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*/
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SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,
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SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
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ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
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ret = -1;
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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goto end;
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} else {
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/*
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* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
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