pay attention to blocksize before attempting decryption

This commit is contained in:
Bodo Möller 2001-06-15 18:06:06 +00:00
parent 19352b794d
commit dab4c2824f
3 changed files with 30 additions and 3 deletions

View file

@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [XX xxx XXXX]
*) Verify that incoming data obeys the block size in
ssl3_enc (ssl/s3_enc.c) and tls1_enc (ssl/t1_enc.c).
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Fix OAEP check.
[Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]

View file

@ -366,7 +366,6 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
/* COMPRESS */
/* This should be using (bs-1) and bs instead of 7 and 8 */
if ((bs != 1) && send)
{
i=bs-((int)l%bs);
@ -376,12 +375,24 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
rec->length+=i;
rec->input[l-1]=(i-1);
}
if (!send)
{
if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
return(0);
}
}
EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
{
i=rec->data[l-1]+1;
/* SSL 3.0 bounds the number of padding bytes by the block size;
* padding bytes (except that last) are arbitrary */
if (i > bs)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);

View file

@ -447,11 +447,21 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
rec->length+=i;
}
if (!send)
{
if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
return(0);
}
}
EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
{
ii=i=rec->data[l-1];
ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
i++;
if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
{
@ -462,6 +472,8 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
i--;
}
/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
* All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
if (i > (int)rec->length)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);