Ensure SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK (or d1->change_cipher_spec_ok for DTLS) is reset
once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED. This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state. (Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this, though.) Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
de2c7504eb
commit
e94a6c0ede
8 changed files with 90 additions and 20 deletions
10
CHANGES
10
CHANGES
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@ -305,6 +305,11 @@
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Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
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early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
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renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
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[Emilia Käsper]
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*) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
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ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
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the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
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@ -638,6 +643,11 @@
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Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
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early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
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renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
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[Emilia Käsper]
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*) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
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ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
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the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
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@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
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memset(s->s3->client_random,0,sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
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s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
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s->hit = 0;
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s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
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/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
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s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
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break;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
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@ -510,7 +513,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
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else
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#endif
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s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
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s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
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}
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s->init_num=0;
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@ -531,7 +533,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
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#endif
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s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
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s->init_num=0;
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s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
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@ -264,6 +264,9 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
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}
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s->init_num=0;
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s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
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/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
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s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
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if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
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{
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@ -694,8 +697,14 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
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s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
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/*
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* This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
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* extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
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* to set this here because we don't know if we're
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* expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
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*/
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if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
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s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
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/* we should decide if we expected this one */
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ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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@ -711,7 +720,18 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
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case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
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s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
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/*
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* Enable CCS for resumed handshakes.
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* In a full handshake, we end up here through
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* SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, so change_cipher_spec_ok was
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* already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
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* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
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* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
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* processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until
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* the client's Finished message is read.
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*/
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if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
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s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
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ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
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SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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@ -256,6 +256,10 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st
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unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
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unsigned int retransmitting;
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/*
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* Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
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* Cleared after the message has been processed.
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*/
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unsigned int change_cipher_spec_ok;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
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@ -280,6 +280,9 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
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s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
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s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
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s->init_num=0;
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s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
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s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
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@ -428,12 +431,10 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
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else
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{
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s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
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s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
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}
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if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
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{
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s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
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s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
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}
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s->init_num=0;
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
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s->init_num=0;
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s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
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s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
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s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
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/* clear flags */
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case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
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case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
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s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
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SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
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s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
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pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
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s->hit = 1;
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s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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}
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}
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#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
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goto f_err;
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}
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s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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s->hit=1;
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}
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/* a miss or crap from the other end */
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s->init_num=0;
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s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
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s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
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s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
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s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
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if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
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{
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
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s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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/*
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* This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
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* extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
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* to set this here because we don't know if we're
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* expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
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*/
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if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
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s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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/* we should decide if we expected this one */
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ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
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case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
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/*
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* Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
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* In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
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* SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
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* already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
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* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
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* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
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* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
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* the client's Finished message is read.
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*/
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if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
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s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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s->init_num = 0;
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case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
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s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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/*
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* Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
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* In a full handshake, we end up here through
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* SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
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* already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
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* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
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* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
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* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
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* the client's Finished message is read.
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*/
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if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
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s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
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SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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#else
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if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
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{
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s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
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}
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else
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13
ssl/ssl3.h
13
ssl/ssl3.h
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#define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008
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#define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010
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#define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020
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/*
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* Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
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* Cleared after the message has been processed.
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*/
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#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080
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/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
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* restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
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* from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
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* and freed and MD_CTX-es for all required digests are stored in
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* this array */
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EVP_MD_CTX **handshake_dgst;
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/* this is set whenerver we see a change_cipher_spec message
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* come in when we are not looking for one */
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/*
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* Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
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* Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
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* Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
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*/
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int change_cipher_spec;
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int warn_alert;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
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#endif
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s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
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s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
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if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
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{
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