Tidy up the SSL options in SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3070)
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1 changed files with 50 additions and 42 deletions
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@ -62,27 +62,11 @@ The following B<bug workaround> options are available:
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=over 4
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=item SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
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...
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=item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
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...
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=item SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
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Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X.
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OS X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers.
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=item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
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...
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=item SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
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...
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=item SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
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Disables a countermeasure against a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol
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@ -98,7 +82,8 @@ implementations.
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=item SSL_OP_ALL
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All of the above bug workarounds.
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All of the above bug workarounds plus B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> as
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mentioned below.
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=back
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@ -122,22 +107,6 @@ only understands up to SSLv3. In this case the client must still use the
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same SSLv3.1=TLSv1 announcement. Some clients step down to SSLv3 with respect
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to the server's answer and violate the version rollback protection.)
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=item SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
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Always create a new key when using temporary/ephemeral DH parameters
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(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>).
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This option must be used to prevent small subgroup attacks, when
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the DH parameters were not generated using "strong" primes
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(e.g. when using DSA-parameters, see L<dhparam(1)>).
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If "strong" primes were used, it is not strictly necessary to generate
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a new DH key during each handshake but it is also recommended.
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B<SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE> should therefore be enabled whenever
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temporary/ephemeral DH parameters are used.
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=item SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
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This option is no longer implemented and is treated as no op.
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=item SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
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When choosing a cipher, use the server's preferences instead of the client
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@ -145,15 +114,6 @@ preferences. When not set, the SSL server will always follow the clients
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preferences. When set, the SSL/TLS server will choose following its
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own preferences.
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=item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
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...
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=item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
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...
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=item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1,
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SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
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@ -170,6 +130,19 @@ When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session
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(i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial
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handshake). This option is not needed for clients.
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=item SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
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Do not use compression even if it is supported.
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=item SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU
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Do not query the MTU. Only affects DTLS connections.
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=item SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
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Turn on Cookie Exchange as described in RFC4347 Section 4.2.1. Only affects
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DTLS connections.
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=item SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
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Normally clients and servers will, where possible, transparently make use
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@ -199,6 +172,41 @@ propose, and servers will not accept the extension.
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=back
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The following options no longer have any effect but their identifiers are
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retained for compatibility purposes:
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=over 4
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=item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
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=item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
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=item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
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=item SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
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=item SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
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=item SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
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=item SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
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=item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG
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=item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG
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=item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
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=item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
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=item SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
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=item SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
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=item SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
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=back
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=head1 SECURE RENEGOTIATION
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OpenSSL always attempts to use secure renegotiation as
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