Fix the ASN1 sanity check: correct header length
calculation and check overflow against LONG_MAX.
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2 changed files with 11 additions and 4 deletions
6
CHANGES
6
CHANGES
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@ -1895,6 +1895,12 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
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Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.6f [XX xxx XXXX]
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*) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX
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and get fix the header length calculation.
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[Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>,
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Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others),
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Steve Henson]
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*) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer
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overflow checks added in 0.9.6e. This prevents DoS (the
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assertions could call abort()).
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@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include "cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
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@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ int ASN1_get_object(unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag, int *pclass,
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(int)(omax+ *pp));
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#endif
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if (*plength > (omax - (*pp - p)))
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if (*plength > (omax - (*p - *pp)))
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{
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
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/* Set this so that even if things are not long enough
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@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ err:
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static int asn1_get_length(unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl, int max)
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{
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unsigned char *p= *pp;
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long ret=0;
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unsigned long ret=0;
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int i;
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if (max-- < 1) return(0);
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@ -170,10 +171,10 @@ static int asn1_get_length(unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl, int max)
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else
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ret=i;
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}
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if (ret < 0)
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if (ret > LONG_MAX)
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return 0;
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*pp=p;
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*rl=ret;
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*rl=(long)ret;
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return(1);
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}
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