From fd836aeee017d4c7fef8e4d21afa07081e815be2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 22:37:08 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Make sure that the last argument to RAND_add() is a float, or
 some compilers may complain.

---
 crypto/rand/md_rand.c   | 2 +-
 crypto/rand/rand_unix.c | 8 ++++----
 crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c    | 2 +-
 crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c    | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 66b229c9b9..303e5898c4 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
 
 static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
 	{
-	ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, num);
+	ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (float)num);
 	}
 
 static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index ef80201212..aef6914bb1 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -233,19 +233,19 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
 #if defined(DEVRANDOM) || defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
 	if (n > 0)
 		{
-		RAND_add(tmpbuf,sizeof tmpbuf,n);
+		RAND_add(tmpbuf,sizeof tmpbuf,(float)n);
 		OPENSSL_cleanse(tmpbuf,n);
 		}
 #endif
 
 	/* put in some default random data, we need more than just this */
 	l=curr_pid;
-	RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
+	RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0.0);
 	l=getuid();
-	RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
+	RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0.0);
 
 	l=time(NULL);
-	RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
+	RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0.0);
 
 #if defined(DEVRANDOM) || defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
 	return 1;
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index ee2a70bb48..5beb9c9fdf 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static BN_BLINDING *setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
 		{
 		/* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
-		RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0);
+		RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
 		if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
 		}
 	else
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
index e4d622851e..cba2dd66cd 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *p_ctx)
 	if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
 		{
 		/* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
-		RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0);
+		RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
 		if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
 		}
 	else