If the key type does not match any CMS recipient type return
an error instead of using a random key (MMA mitigation). This
does not leak any useful information to an attacker.
PR#3348
(cherry picked from commit 83a3182e0560f76548f4378325393461f6275493)
This patch resolves RT ticket #2608.
Thanks to Robert Dugal for originally spotting this, and to David
Ramos for noticing that the ball had been dropped.
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
The lazy-initialisation of BN_MONT_CTX was serialising all threads, as
noted by Daniel Sands and co at Sandia. This was to handle the case that
2 or more threads race to lazy-init the same context, but stunted all
scalability in the case where 2 or more threads are doing unrelated
things! We favour the latter case by punishing the former. The init work
gets done by each thread that finds the context to be uninitialised, and
we then lock the "set" logic after that work is done - the winning
thread's work gets used, the losing threads throw away what they've done.
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
Use bufsiz - 1 not BUFSIZ - 1 when prompting for a password in
the openssl utility.
Thanks to Rob Mackinnon, Leviathan Security for reporting this issue.
(cherry picked from commit 7ba08a4d73)
Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix.
Thanks for mancha for backporting the fix to OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch.
Remove reference to ERR_TXT_MALLOCED in the error library as that is
only used internally. Indicate that returned error data must not be
freed.
(cherry picked from commit f2d678e6e8)
The flag SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING hasn't done anything since OpenSSL
0.9.7h but deleting it will break source compatibility with any software
that references it. Restore it but #define to zero.
(cherry picked from commit b17d6b8d1d)
- EC_GROUP_cmp shouldn't consider curves equal just because
the curve name is the same. (They really *should* be the same
in this case, but there's an EC_GROUP_set_curve_name API,
which could be misused.)
- EC_POINT_cmp shouldn't return 0 for ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
or EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS errors because in a cmp API, 0 indicates
equality (not an error).
Reported by: king cope
(cherry picked from commit ca567a03ad)
Conflicts:
Configure
This fix ensures that
* A HelloRequest is retransmitted if not responded by a ClientHello
* The HelloRequest "consumes" the sequence number 0. The subsequent
ServerHello uses the sequence number 1.
* The client also expects the sequence number of the ServerHello to
be 1 if a HelloRequest was received earlier.
This patch fixes the RFC violation.
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_pkt.c
(cherry picked from commit 6f87807e62)