We now send the highest supported version by the client, even if the session
uses an older version.
This fixes 2 problems:
- When you try to reuse a session but the other side doesn't reuse it and
uses a different protocol version the connection will fail.
- When you're trying to reuse a session with an old version you might be
stuck trying to reuse the old version while both sides support a newer
version
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
GH: #852, MR: #2452
Don't have #error statements in header files, but instead wrap
the contents of that file in #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx
This means it is now always safe to include the header file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Adjust ssl_set_client_hello_version to get both the minimum and maximum and then
make ssl_set_client_hello_version use the maximum version.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
MR: #1595
* Perform ALPN after the SNI callback; the SSL_CTX may change due to
that processing
* Add flags to indicate that we actually sent ALPN, to properly error
out if unexpectedly received.
* clean up ssl3_free() no need to explicitly clear when doing memset
* document ALPN functions
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
This capability is required for read pipelining. We will only read in as
many records as will fit in the read buffer (and the network can provide
in one go). The bigger the buffer the more records we can process in
parallel.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Use the new pipeline cipher capability to encrypt multiple records being
written out all in one go. Two new SSL/SSL_CTX parameters can be used to
control how this works: max_pipelines and split_send_fragment.
max_pipelines defines the maximum number of pipelines that can ever be used
in one go for a single connection. It must always be less than or equal to
SSL_MAX_PIPELINES (currently defined to be 32). By default only one
pipeline will be used (i.e. normal non-parallel operation).
split_send_fragment defines how data is split up into pipelines. The number
of pipelines used will be determined by the amount of data provided to the
SSL_write call divided by split_send_fragment. For example if
split_send_fragment is set to 2000 and max_pipelines is 4 then:
SSL_write called with 0-2000 bytes == 1 pipeline used
SSL_write called with 2001-4000 bytes == 2 pipelines used
SSL_write called with 4001-6000 bytes == 3 pipelines used
SSL_write_called with 6001+ bytes == 4 pipelines used
split_send_fragment must always be less than or equal to max_send_fragment.
By default it is set to be equal to max_send_fragment. This will mean that
the same number of records will always be created as would have been
created in the non-parallel case, although the data will be apportioned
differently. In the parallel case data will be spread equally between the
pipelines.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
- Always prefer forward-secure handshakes.
- Consistently order ECDSA above RSA.
- Next, always prefer AEADs to non-AEADs, irrespective of strength.
- Within AEADs, prefer GCM > CHACHA > CCM for a given strength.
- Prefer TLS v1.2 ciphers to legacy ciphers.
- Remove rarely used DSS, IDEA, SEED, CAMELLIA, CCM from the default
list to reduce ClientHello bloat.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Disabled by default, but can be enabled by setting the
ct_validation_callback on a SSL or SSL_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Implementation experience has shown that the original plan for async wait
fds was too simplistic. Originally the async logic created a pipe internally
and user/engine code could then get access to it via API calls. It is more
flexible if the engine is able to create its own fd and provide it to the
async code.
Another issue is that there can be a lot of churn in the fd value within
the context of (say) a single SSL connection leading to continually adding
and removing fds from (say) epoll. It is better if we can provide some
stability of the fd value across a whole SSL connection. This is
problematic because an engine has no concept of an SSL connection.
This commit refactors things to introduce an ASYNC_WAIT_CTX which acts as a
proxy for an SSL connection down at the engine layer.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The ssl_set_masks() function no longer depends on the cipher. This
also means there is no need to set the masks for each cipher in
ssl3_choose_cipher.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Add -DBIO_DEBUG to --strict-warnings.
Remove comments about outdated debugging ifdef guards.
Remove md_rand ifdef guarding an assert; it doesn't seem used.
Remove the conf guards in conf_api since we use OPENSSL_assert, not assert.
For pkcs12 stuff put OPENSSL_ in front of the macro name.
Merge TLS_DEBUG into SSL_DEBUG.
Various things just turned on/off asserts, mainly for checking non-NULL
arguments, which is now removed: camellia, bn_ctx, crypto/modes.
Remove some old debug code, that basically just printed things to stderr:
DEBUG_PRINT_UNKNOWN_CIPHERSUITES, DEBUG_ZLIB, OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG,
RL_DEBUG, RSA_DEBUG, SCRYPT_DEBUG.
Remove OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Remove support for static ECDH ciphersuites. They require ECDH keys
in certificates and don't support forward secrecy.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Commit 7823d792d0 added DEFINE_LHASH_OF
to a C source file. DEFINE_LHASH_OF() and DEFINE_STACK_OF() must
be used only in header files to avoid clang warnings for unused
static-inline functions.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
To enable heartbeats for DTLS, configure with enable-heartbeats.
Heartbeats for TLS have been completely removed.
This addresses RT 3647
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Update ciphers documentation as well (based on -04 rev of ID).
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
RT: #4206, GH: #642
PACKET contents should be read-only. To achieve this, also
- constify two user callbacks
- constify BUF_reverse.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
There was an unused macro in ssl_locl.h that used an internal
type, so I removed it.
Move bio_st from bio.h to ossl_type.h
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
This is an internal facility, never documented, not for
public consumption. Move it into ssl (where it's only used
for DTLS).
I also made the typedef's for pqueue and pitem follow our style: they
name structures, not pointers.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
It turns out that -pause calls the undocumented function SSL_set_debug.
That just sets flag inside the SSL structure. That flag, despite
the command is never used. So remove the flag, the field, and the
function.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Applications wishing to include their own stacks now just need to include
DEFINE_STACK_OF(foo)
in a header file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Also tweak some of the code in demos/bio, to enable interactive
testing of BIO_s_accept's use of SSL_dup. Changed the sconnect
client to authenticate the server, which now exercises the new
SSL_set1_host() function.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The protocol selection code is now consolidated in a few consecutive
short functions in a single file and is table driven. Protocol-specific
constraints that influence negotiation are moved into the flags
field of the method structure. The same protocol version constraints
are now applied in all code paths. It is now much easier to add
new protocol versions without reworking the protocol selection
logic.
In the presence of "holes" in the list of enabled client protocols
we no longer select client protocols below the hole based on a
subset of the constraints and then fail shortly after when it is
found that these don't meet the remaining constraints (suiteb, FIPS,
security level, ...). Ideally, with the new min/max controls users
will be less likely to create "holes" in the first place.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Add new flag TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS which is set when the peer sends
the extended master secret extension.
Server now sends extms if and only if the client sent extms.
Check consistency of extms extension when resuming sessions following (where
practical) RFC7627.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
SSL_{CTX}_set_tmp_ecdh() allows to set 1 EC curve and then tries to use it. On
the other hand SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves() allows you to set a list of curves, but
only when SSL_{CTX_}set_ecdh_auto() was called to turn it on.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This only gets used to set a specific curve without actually checking that the
peer supports it or not and can therefor result in handshake failures that can
be avoided by selecting a different cipher.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Don't hard code EVP_sha* etc for signature algorithms: use table
indices instead. Add SHA224 and SHA512 to tables.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Change handshake hash array into a single digest context simplifying the
handhake hash code. Use EVP_md5_sha1() if needed for handshake hashes in
TLS 1.1 and earlier.
Simplify PRF code to also use a single digest and treat EVP_md5_sha1()
as a special case.
Modify algorithm2 field of ciphers to use a single index value for handshake
hash and PRF instead of a bitmap.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This patch contains the necessary changes to provide GOST 2012
ciphersuites in TLS. It requires the use of an external GOST 2012 engine.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The following entry points have been made async aware:
SSL_accept
SSL_read
SSL_write
Also added is a new mode - SSL_MODE_ASYNC. Calling the above functions with
the async mode enabled will initiate a new async job. If an async pause is
encountered whilst executing the job (such as for example if using SHA1/RSA
with the Dummy Async engine), then the above functions return with
SSL_WANT_ASYNC. Calling the functions again (with exactly the same args
as per non-blocking IO), will resume the job where it left off.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
There are lots of calls to EVP functions from within libssl There were
various places where we should probably check the return value but don't.
This adds these checks.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This disables some ciphersuites which aren't supported in SSL v3:
specifically PSK ciphersuites which use SHA256 or SHA384 for the MAC.
Thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for identifying this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The new function SSL_use_certificate_chain_file was always crashing in
the internal function use_certificate_chain_file because it would pass a
NULL value for SSL_CTX *, but use_certificate_chain_file would
unconditionally try to dereference it.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
There were a few remaining references to SSLv2 support which are no longer
relevant now that it has been removed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The function dtls1_link_min_mtu() was only used within d1_lib.c so make
it static.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The SSL variable |in_handshake| seems misplaced. It would be better to have
it in the STATEM structure.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The |no_cert_verify| should be in the state machine structure not in SSL
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The next_state variable is no longer needed in the new state machine.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Move some function definitions around within the state machine to make sure
they are in the correct files. Also create a statem_locl.h header for stuff
entirely local to the state machine code and move various definitions into
it.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Pull out the state machine into a separate sub directory. Also moved some
functions which were nothing to do with the state machine but were in state
machine files. Pulled all the SSL_METHOD definitions into one place...most
of those files had very little left in them any more.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
ssl_get_message is no longer used so it should be removed from
ssl_method_st
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Previously each message specific process function would create its own
PACKET structure. Rather than duplicate all of this code lots of times we
should create it in the state machine itself.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The SSL structure contained a "state" variable that kept track of the state
machine in the old code. The new state machine does not use this so it can
be removed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The SSL structure contained a "type" variable that was set to either
SSL_ST_ACCEPT or SSL_ST_CONNECT depending on whether we are the server or
the client. This duplicates the capability of the "server" variable and was
actually rarely used.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Clean up and remove lots of code that is now no longer needed due to the
move to the new state machine.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Implement all of the necessary changes to make DTLS on the server work
with the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Split the TLS server ssl3_get_* and ssl3_send_* functions into two ready
for the migration to the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Remove all the functions and dead code that is now no longer required as
a result of the DTLS client move into the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Move all DTLS client side processing into the new state machine code. A
subsequent commit will clean up the old dead code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Create a dtls_get_message function similar to the old dtls1_get_message but
in the format required for the new state machine code. The old function will
eventually be deleted in later commits.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This swaps the implementation of the client TLS state machine to use the
new state machine code instead.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The new state machine code will split up the reading and writing of
hanshake messages into discrete phases. In order to facilitate that the
existing "get" type functions will be split into two halves: one to get
the message and one to process it. The "send" type functions will also have
all work relating to constructing the message split out into a separate
function just for that. For some functions there will also be separate
pre and post "work" phases to prepare or update state.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This is the first drop of the new state machine code.
The rewrite has the following objectives:
- Remove duplication of state code between client and server
- Remove duplication of state code between TLS and DTLS
- Simplify transitions and bring the logic together in a single location
so that it is easier to validate
- Remove duplication of code between each of the message handling functions
- Receive a message first and then work out whether that is a valid
transition - not the other way around (the other way causes lots of issues
where we are expecting one type of message next but actually get something
else)
- Separate message flow state from handshake state (in order to better
understand each)
- message flow state = when to flush buffers; handling restarts in the
event of NBIO events; handling the common flow of steps for reading a
message and the common flow of steps for writing a message etc
- handshake state = what handshake message are we working on now
- Control complexity: only the state machine can change state: keep all
the state changes local to a file
This builds on previous state machine related work:
- Surface CCS processing in the state machine
- Version negotiation rewrite
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The function ssl3_get_message gets a whole message from the underlying bio
and returns it to the state machine code. The new state machine code will
split this into two discrete steps: get the message header and get the
message body. This commit splits the existing function into these two
sub steps to facilitate the state machine implementation.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Note that this commit constifies a user callback parameter and therefore
will break compilation for applications using this callback. But unless
they are abusing write access to the buffer, the fix is trivial.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Move all packet parsing to the beginning of the method. This limits the
SSLv2 compatibility soup to the parsing, and makes the rest of the
processing uniform.
This is also needed for simpler EMS support: EMS servers need to do an
early scan for EMS to make resumption decisions. This'll be easier when
the entire ClientHello is parsed in the beginning.
As a side effect,
1) PACKETize ssl_get_prev_session and tls1_process_ticket; and
2) Delete dead code for SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This patch updates the "DEFAULT" cipherstring to be
"ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL". COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT is now defined
internally by a flag on each ciphersuite indicating whether it should be
excluded from DEFAULT or not. This gives us control at an individual
ciphersuite level as to exactly what is in DEFAULT and what is not.
Finally all DES, RC4 and RC2 ciphersuites are added to COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT
and hence removed from DEFAULT.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The old implementation of DTLSv1_listen which has now been replaced still
had a few vestiges scattered throughout the code. This commit removes them.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
The existing implementation of DTLSv1_listen() is fundamentally flawed. This
function is used in DTLS solutions to listen for new incoming connections
from DTLS clients. A client will send an initial ClientHello. The server
will respond with a HelloVerifyRequest containing a unique cookie. The
client the responds with a second ClientHello - which this time contains the
cookie.
Once the cookie has been verified then DTLSv1_listen() returns to user code,
which is typically expected to continue the handshake with a call to (for
example) SSL_accept().
Whilst listening for incoming ClientHellos, the underlying BIO is usually in
an unconnected state. Therefore ClientHellos can come in from *any* peer.
The arrival of the first ClientHello without the cookie, and the second one
with it, could be interspersed with other intervening messages from
different clients.
The whole purpose of this mechanism is as a defence against DoS attacks. The
idea is to avoid allocating state on the server until the client has
verified that it is capable of receiving messages at the address it claims
to come from. However the existing DTLSv1_listen() implementation completely
fails to do this. It attempts to super-impose itself on the standard state
machine and reuses all of this code. However the standard state machine
expects to operate in a stateful manner with a single client, and this can
cause various problems.
A second more minor issue is that the return codes from this function are
quite confused, with no distinction made between fatal and non-fatal errors.
Most user code treats all errors as non-fatal, and simply retries the call
to DTLSv1_listen().
This commit completely rewrites the implementation of DTLSv1_listen() and
provides a stand alone implementation that does not rely on the existing
state machine. It also provides more consistent return codes.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Since SSLv3, a CipherSuite is always 2 bytes. The only place where we
need 3-byte ciphers is SSLv2-compatible ClientHello processing.
So, remove the ssl_put_cipher_by_char indirection.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
For server use a PSK identity hint value in the CERT structure which
is inherited when SSL_new is called and which allows applications to
set hints on a per-SSL basis. The previous version of
SSL_use_psk_identity_hint tried (wrongly) to use the SSL_SESSION structure.
PR#4039
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This was obsolete in 2001. This is not the same as Gost94 digest.
Thanks to Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> for review and advice.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Continuing on from the previous commit this moves the processing of DTLS
CCS messages out of the record layer and into the state machine.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not
a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages.
Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality
is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake.
Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In
order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state
a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS.
Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should
only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not
visible to the state machine.
Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine.
This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit
will handle DTLS.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Provide more robust (inline) functions to replace n2s, n2l, etc. These
functions do the same thing as the previous macros, but also keep track
of the amount of data remaining and return an error if we try to read more
data than we've got.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Add support for RSAPSK, DHEPSK and ECDHEPSK server side.
Update various checks to ensure certificate and server key exchange messages
are only sent when required.
Update message handling. PSK server key exchange parsing now include an
identity hint prefix for all PSK server key exchange messages. PSK
client key exchange message expects PSK identity and requests key for
all PSK key exchange ciphersuites.
Update flags for RSA, DH and ECDH so they are also used in PSK.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This flag was not set anywhere within the codebase (only read). It could
only be set by an app reaching directly into s->s3->flags and setting it
directly. However that method became impossible when libssl was opaquified.
Even in 1.0.2/1.0.1 if an app set the flag directly it is only relevant to
ssl3_connect(), which calls SSL_clear() during initialisation that clears
any flag settings. Therefore it could take effect if the app set the flag
after the handshake has started but before it completed. It seems quite
unlikely that any apps really do this (especially as it is completely
undocumented).
The purpose of the flag is suppress flushing of the write bio on the client
side at the end of the handshake after the client has written the Finished
message whilst resuming a session. This enables the client to send
application data as part of the same flight as the Finished message.
This flag also controls the setting of a second flag SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
There is an interesting comment in the code about this second flag in the
implementation of ssl3_write:
/* This is an experimental flag that sends the
* last handshake message in the same packet as the first
* use data - used to see if it helps the TCP protocol during
* session-id reuse */
It seems the experiment did not work because as far as I can tell nothing
is using this code. The above comment has been in the code since SSLeay.
This commit removes support for SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED, as well
as the associated SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Rewrite ssl3_digest_cached_records handling. Only digest cached records
if digest array is NULL: this means it is safe to call
ssl3_digest_cached_records multiple times (subsequent calls are no op).
Remove flag TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE instead only update handshake buffer
if digest array is NULL.
Add additional "keep" parameter to ssl3_digest_cached_records to indicate
if the handshake buffer should be retained after digesting cached records
(needed for TLS 1.2 client authentication).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
As numerous comments indicate the certificate and key array is not an
appopriate structure to store the peers certificate: so remove it and
just the s->session->peer instead.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
c0bf69a791
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Given the pervasive nature of TLS extensions it is inadvisable to run
OpenSSL without support for them. It also means that maintaining
the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option within the code is very invasive (and probably
not well tested). Therefore it is being removed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Move per-connection state out of the CERT structure: which should just be
for shared configuration data (e.g. certificates to use).
In particular move temporary premaster secret, raw ciphers, peer signature
algorithms and shared signature algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Following the version negotiation rewrite all of the previous code that was
dedicated to version negotiation can now be deleted - all six source files
of it!!
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
This commit changes the way that we do server side protocol version
negotiation. Previously we had a whole set of code that had an "up front"
state machine dedicated to the negotiating the protocol version. This adds
significant complexity to the state machine. Historically the justification
for doing this was the support of SSLv2 which works quite differently to
SSLv3+. However, we have now removed support for SSLv2 so there is little
reason to maintain this complexity.
The one slight difficulty is that, although we no longer support SSLv2, we
do still support an SSLv3+ ClientHello in an SSLv2 backward compatible
ClientHello format. This is generally only used by legacy clients. This
commit adds support within the SSLv3 code for these legacy format
ClientHellos.
Server side version negotiation now works in much the same was as DTLS,
i.e. we introduce the concept of TLS_ANY_VERSION. If s->version is set to
that then when a ClientHello is received it will work out the most
appropriate version to respond with. Also, SSLv23_method and
SSLv23_server_method have been replaced with TLS_method and
TLS_server_method respectively. The old SSLv23* names still exist as
macros pointing at the new name, although they are deprecated.
Subsequent commits will look at client side version negotiation, as well of
removal of the old s23* code.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Remove RFC2712 Kerberos support from libssl. This code and the associated
standard is no longer considered fit-for-purpose.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Since COMP_METHOD is now defined in comp_lcl.h, it is no
longer possible to create new TLS compression methods without
using the OpenSSL source. Only ZLIB is supported by default.
Also, since the types are opaque, #ifdef guards to use "char *"
instead of the real type aren't necessary.
The changes are actually minor. Adding missing copyright to some
files makes the diff misleadingly big.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The return value is checked for 0. This is currently safe but we should
really check for <= 0 since -1 is frequently used for error conditions.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Also push some usage of last_write_sequence out of dtls1_retransmit_message
and into the record layer.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
