Avoid a -Wundef warning in refcount.h
Avoid a -Wundef warning in o_str.c
Avoid a -Wundef warning in testutil.h
Include internal/cryptlib.h before openssl/stack.h
to avoid use of undefined symbol OPENSSL_API_COMPAT.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2712)
X509_CRL_digest() didn't check if the precomputed sha1 hash was actually
present. This also makes sure there's an appropriate flag to check.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2314)
The use of EXFLAG_SET requires the inclusion of openssl/x509v3.h.
openssl/ocsp.h does that, except when OCSP is disabled.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2227)
Don't have #error statements in header files, but instead wrap
the contents of that file in #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx
This means it is now always safe to include the header file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
There are header files in crypto/ that are used by a number of crypto/
submodules. Move those to crypto/include/internal and adapt the
affected source code and Makefiles.
The header files that got moved are:
crypto/cryptolib.h
crypto/md32_common.h
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
Two typo's on #endif comments fixed:
OPENSSL_NO_ECB fixed to OPENSSL_NO_OCB
OPENSSL_NO_HW_SureWare fixed to OPENSSL_NO_HW_SUREWARE
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reencode certificates in X509_sign_ctx as well as X509_sign.
This was causing a problem in the x509 application when it modified an
existing certificate.
this means that some implementations will be used automatically, e.g. aesni,
we do this for cryptodev anyway.
Setup cpuid in ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() too as some ENGINEs use it.
loaded. Add new function X509_CRL_get0_by_serial() to lookup a revoked
entry to avoid the need to access the structure directly.
Add new X509_CRL_METHOD to allow common CRL operations (verify, lookup) to be
redirected.
Split private key PEM and normal PEM handling. Private key
handling needs to link in stuff like PKCS#8.
Relocate the ASN1 *_dup() functions, to the relevant ASN1
modules using new macro IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION. Previously
these were all in crypto/x509/x_all.c along with every ASN1
BIO/fp function which linked in *every* ASN1 function if
a single dup was used.
Move the authority key id ASN1 structure to a separate file.
This is used in the X509 routines and its previous location
linked in all the v3 extension code.
Also move ASN1_tag2bit to avoid linking in a_bytes.c which
is now largely obsolete.
So far under Linux stripped binary with single PEM_read_X509
is now 238K compared to 380K before these changes.
change the way ASN1 modules are exported.
Still needs a bit of work for example the hack which a
dummy function prototype to avoid compilers warning about
multiple ;s.
sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting
with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making
sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with
opensslconf.h.
I've checked fairly well that nothing breaks with this (apart from
external software that will adapt if they have used something like
NO_KRB5), but I can't guarantee it completely, so a review of this
change would be a good thing.
most of the old wrappers. A few of the old versions remain
because they are non standard and the corresponding ASN1
code has not been reimplemented yet.
currently OpenSSL itself wont compile with this set
because some old style stuff remains.
Change old functions X509_sign(), X509_verify() etc
to use new item based functions.
Replace OCSP function declarations with DECLARE macros.
yet tighter, and also put some heat on the rest of the library by
insisting (correctly) that compare callbacks used in stacks are prototyped
with "const" parameters. This has led to a depth-first explosion of
compiler warnings in the code where 1 constification has led to 3 or 4
more. Fortunately these have all been resolved to completion and the code
seems cleaner as a result - in particular many of the _cmp() functions
should have been prototyped with "const"s, and now are. There was one
little problem however;
X509_cmp() should by rights compare "const X509 *" pointers, and it is now
declared as such. However, it's internal workings can involve
recalculating hash values and extensions if they have not already been
setup. Someone with a more intricate understanding of the flow control of
X509 might be able to tighten this up, but for now - this seemed the
obvious place to stop the "depth-first" constification of the code by
using an evil cast (they have migrated all the way here from safestack.h).
Fortunately, this is the only place in the code where this was required
to complete these type-safety changes, and it's reasonably clear and
commented, and seemed the least unacceptable of the options. Trying to
take the constification further ends up exploding out considerably, and
indeed leads directly into generalised ASN functions which are not likely
to cooperate well with this.
that can automatically determine the type of a DER encoded
"traditional" format private key and change some of the
d2i functions to use it instead of requiring the application
to work out the key type.
in a table. Doesn't do too much yet.
Make the -<digestname> options in 'x509' affect all relevant
options.
Change the name of the 'notrust' options to 'reject' as this
causes less confusion and is a better description of the
effect.
A few constification changes.
new DSA public key functions that were missing.
Also beginning of a cache for X509_EXTENSION structures: this will allow them
to be accessed more quickly for things like certificate chain verification...
