This will never be the case for 1.1.1 so removed.
Fixes: comment 1 of #9757
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9762)
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9734)
(cherry picked from commit 46a9cc9451213039fd53f62733b2ccd04e853bb2)
There is a problem in the rand_unix.c code when the random seed fd is greater
than or equal to FD_SETSIZE and the FDSET overruns its limit and walks the
stack.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9686)
(cherry picked from commit e1f8584d47)
Improve handling of low entropy at start up from /dev/urandom by waiting for
a read(2) call on /dev/random to succeed. Once one such call has succeeded,
a shared memory segment is created and persisted as an indicator to other
processes that /dev/urandom is properly seeded.
This does not fully prevent against attacks weakening the entropy source.
An attacker who has control of the machine early in its boot sequence
could create the shared memory segment preventing detection of low entropy
conditions. However, this is no worse than the current situation.
An attacker would also be capable of removing the shared memory segment
and causing seeding to reoccur resulting in a denial of service attack.
This is partially mitigated by keeping the shared memory alive for the
duration of the process's existence. Thus, an attacker would not only need
to have called call shmctl(2) with the IPC_RMID command but the system
must subsequently enter a state where no instances of libcrypto exist in
any process. Even one long running process will prevent this attack.
The System V shared memory calls used here go back at least as far as
Linux kernel 2.0. Linux kernels 4.8 and later, don't have a reliable way
to detect that /dev/urandom has been properly seeded, so a failure is raised
for this case (i.e. the getentropy(2) call has already failed).
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9595)
[manual merge]
Fix a few places where calling ossl_isdigit does the wrong thing on
EBCDIC based systems.
Replaced with ascii_isdigit.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9556)
(cherry picked from commit 48102247ff)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9295)
The rand pool support allocates maximal sized buffers -- this is typically
12288 bytes in size. These pools are allocated in secure memory which is a
scarse resource. They are also allocated per DRBG of which there are up to two
per thread.
This change allocates 64 byte pools and grows them dynamically if required.
64 is chosen to be sufficiently large so that pools do not normally need to
grow.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9428)
(cherry picked from commit a6a66e4511)
The additional data allocates 12K per DRBG instance in the
secure memory, which is not necessary. Also nonces are not
considered secret.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9424)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9149)
The DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature added a select() call to wait for the
`/dev/random` device to become readable before reading from the
`/dev/urandom` device. It was introduced in commit 38023b87f0
in order to mitigate the fact that the `/dev/urandom` device
does not block until the initial seeding of the kernel CSPRNG
has completed, contrary to the behaviour of the `getrandom()`
system call.
It turned out that this change had negative side effects on
performance which were not acceptable. After some discussion it
was decided to revert this feature and leave it up to the OS
resp. the platform maintainer to ensure a proper initialization
during early boot time.
Fixes#9078
This partially reverts commit 38023b87f0.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a08714e181)
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9118)
I turns out that this made crypto/rand/rand_win.c to never build with
BCrypt support unless the user sets _WIN32_WINNT. That wasn't the
intent.
This reverts commit cc8926ec8f.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8641)
(cherry picked from commit 705a27f7e0)
Use select to wait for /dev/random in readable state,
but do not actually read anything from /dev/random,
use /dev/urandom first.
Use linux define __NR_getrandom instead of the
glibc define SYS_getrandom, in case the kernel headers
are more current than the glibc headers.
Fixes#8215
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8251)
(cherry picked from commit 38023b87f0)
Commit c7504aeb64 (pr #6432) fixed a regression for applications in
chroot environments, which compensated the fact that the new OpenSSL CSPRNG
(based on the NIST DRBG) now reseeds periodically, which the previous
one didn't. Now the reseeding could fail in the chroot environment if the
DEVRANDOM devices were not present anymore and no other entropy source
(e.g. getrandom()) was available.
The solution was to keep the file handles for the DEVRANDOM devices open
by default. In fact, the fix did more than this, it opened the DEVRANDOM
devices early and unconditionally in rand_pool_init(), which had the
unwanted side effect that the devices were opened (and kept open) even
in cases when they were not used at all, for example when the getrandom()
system call was available. Due to a bug (issue #7419) this even happened
when the feature was disabled by the application.
This commit removes the unconditional opening of all DEVRANDOM devices.
They will now only be opened (and kept open) on first use. In particular,
if getrandom() is available, the handles will not be opened unnecessarily.
This change does not introduce a regression for applications compiled for
libcrypto 1.1.0, because the SSLEAY RNG also seeds on first use. So in the
above constellation the CSPRNG will only be properly seeded if it is happens
before the forking and chrooting.
Fixes#7419
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7437)
(cherry picked from commit 8cfc19716c)
... to make the intended use more clear and differentiate
it from the data member "adin_pool".
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7575)
(cherry picked from commit 31f32abb8e)
Found by Coverity Scan
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7511)
(cherry picked from commit 59f90557dd)
Commit 5b4cb385c1 (#7382) introduced a bug which had the effect
that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() failed for buffer sizes less than
32 bytes. The reason was that now the added random data was used
exlusively as entropy source for reseeding. When the random input
was too short or contained not enough entropy, the DRBG failed
without querying the available entropy sources.
This commit makes drbg_add() act smarter: it checks the entropy
requirements explicitely. If the random input fails this check,
it won't be added as entropy input, but only as additional data.
More precisely, the behaviour depends on whether an os entropy
source was configured (which is the default on most os):
- If an os entropy source is avaible then we declare the buffer
content as additional data by setting randomness to zero and
trigger a regular reseeding.
- If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail
inevitably. So drbg_add() uses a trick to mix the buffer contents
into the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: it generates a
dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data.
Related-to: #7449
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7456)
(cherry picked from commit 8817215d5c)
In commit 8bf3665196 some renamings andd typo fixes were made
while adding back the DRBG-HMAC and DRBG-HASH implementation.
Since the commit could not be backported, a lot of unnecessary
differences between master and 1.1.1 were introduced.
These differences result in tiresome merge conflicts when
cherry-picking. To minimize these merge-conflicts, this patch
ports all 'non-feature' changes of commit 8bf3665196
(e.g., renamings of private variables, fixes of typographical
errors, comment changes) manually back to 1.1.1.
The commits a83dc59afa (#7399) and 8817215d5c (#7456)
failed to cherry-pick previously to 1.1.1, with this patch
they both cherry-pick without conflicts.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7505)
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7474)
(cherry picked from commit 21311777ad)
Increase the load buffer size such that it exceeds the chunk
size by a comfortable amount. This is done to avoid calling
RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such a small
final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk
(unless it's the only one).
Related-to: #7449
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7456)
The failure of RAND_load_file was only noticed because of the
heap corruption which was reported in #7499 and fixed in commit
5b4cb385c1. To prevent this in the future, RAND_load_file()
now explicitly checks RAND_status() and reports an error if it
fails.
Related-to: #7449
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7456)
This bug was introduced by #7382 which enhanced RAND_add() to
accept large buffer sizes. As a consequence, RAND_add() now fails
for buffer sizes less than 32 bytes (i.e. less than 256 bits).
In addition, rand_drbg_get_entropy() forgets to reset the attached
drbg->pool in the case of an error, which leads to the heap corruption.
The problem occurred with RAND_load_file(), which reads the file in
chunks of 1024 bytes each. If the size of the final chunk is less than
32 bytes, then RAND_add() fails, whence RAND_load_file() fails
silently for buffer sizes n = k * 1024 + r with r = 1,...,31.
This commit fixes the heap corruption only. The other issues will
be addressed in a separate pull request.
Thanks to Gisle Vanem for reporting this issue.
Fixes#7449
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7455)
(cherry picked from commit 5b4cb385c1)
In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed()
was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is
picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer
was limited to the size of 4096 bytes.
When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG,
the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored
by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code.
As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively
ignored.
This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which
does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit
to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits
but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems
like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion.
Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to
pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state,
which forces a reinstantiation on next call.
Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the
openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue
has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG
reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional
randomness provided by the application.
Fixes#7381
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382)
(cherry picked from commit 3064b55134)
Fixes a compiler warning about an unused syscall_random()
and cleans up the OPENSSL_RAND_SEED preprocessor logic.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/779)
(cherry picked from commit d90e128be6)
Change all calls to getenv() inside libcrypto to use a new wrapper function
that use secure_getenv() if available and an issetugid then getenv if not.
CPU processor override flags are unchanged.
Extra checks for OPENSSL_issetugid() have been removed in favour of the
safe getenv.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7047)
(cherry picked from commit 5c39a55d04)
