This module includes bn.h via other headers, so it picks up the
definition from there and doesn't need to define them locally (any
more?). Worst case scenario, the redefinition may be different and
cause all sorts of compile errors.
Fixes#7227
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7287)
(cherry picked from commit dda5396aae)
Add bn_{mul|sqr}_fixed_top, bn_from_mont_fixed_top, bn_mod_sub_fixed_top.
Switch to bn_{mul|sqr}_fixed_top in bn_mul_mont_fixed_top and remove
memset in bn_from_montgomery_word.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6915)
New implementation failed to correctly reset r->neg flag. Spotted by
OSSFuzz.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6783)
A number intended to treat the base as secret should not be branching on
whether it is zero. Test-wise, this is covered by existing tests in bnmod.txt.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6733)
Originally suggested solution for "Return Of the Hidden Number Problem"
is arguably too expensive. While it has marginal impact on slower
curves, none to ~6%, optimized implementations suffer real penalties.
Most notably sign with P-256 went more than 2 times[!] slower. Instead,
just implement constant-time BN_mod_add_quick.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6664)
It was false positive, but one can as well view it as readability issue.
Switch even to unsigned indices because % BN_BYTES takes 4-6 instructions
with signed dividend vs. 1 (one) with unsigned.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
"Computationally constant-time" means that it might still leak
information about input's length, but only in cases when input
is missing complete BN_ULONG limbs. But even then leak is possible
only if attacker can observe memory access pattern with limb
granularity.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5254)
Note that exported functions maintain original behaviour, so that
external callers won't observe difference. While internally we can
now perform Montogomery multiplication on fixed-length vectors, fixed
at modulus size. The new functions, bn_to_mont_fixed_top and
bn_mul_mont_fixed_top, are declared in bn_int.h, because one can use
them even outside bn, e.g. in RSA, DSA, ECDSA...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6662)
The new flag marks vectors that were not treated with bn_correct_top,
in other words such vectors are permitted to be zero padded. For now
it's BN_DEBUG-only flag, as initial use case for zero-padded vectors
would be controlled Montgomery multiplication/exponentiation, not
general purpose. For general purpose use another type might be more
appropriate. Advantage of this suggestion is that it's possible to
back-port it...
bn/bn_div.c: fix memory sanitizer problem.
bn/bn_sqr.c: harmonize with BN_mul.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6662)
Trouble is that addition is postponing expansion till carry is
calculated, and if addition carries, top word can be zero, which
triggers assertion in bn_check_top.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6662)
These headers are internal and never exposed to a cpp compiler, hence no
need for the preamble.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6554)
848113a30b added mitigation for a
side-channel attack. This commit extends approach to all code
paths for consistency.
[It also removes redundant white spaces introduced in last commit.]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6480)
This module is used only with odd input lengths, i.e. not used in normal
PKI cases, on contemporary processors. The problem was "illuminated" by
fuzzing tests.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6440)
The One&Done attack, which is described in a paper to appear in the
USENIX Security'18 conference, uses EM emanations to recover the values
of the bits that are obtained using BN_is_bit_set while constructing
the value of the window in BN_mod_exp_consttime. The EM signal changes
slightly depending on the value of the bit, and since the lookup of a
bit is surrounded by highly regular execution (constant-time Montgomery
multiplications) the attack is able to isolate the (very brief) part of
the signal that changes depending on the bit. Although the change is
slight, the attack recovers it successfully >90% of the time on several
phones and IoT devices (all with ARM processors with clock rates around
1GHz), so after only one RSA decryption more than 90% of the bits in
d_p and d_q are recovered correctly, which enables rapid recovery of
the full RSA key using an algorithm (also described in the paper) that
modifies the branch-and-prune approach for a situation in which the
exponents' bits are recovered with errors, i.e. where we do not know
a priori which bits are correctly recovered.
The mitigation for the attack is relatively simple - all the bits of
the window are obtained at once, along with other bits so that an
entire integer's worth of bits are obtained together using masking and
shifts, without unnecessarily considering each bit in isolation. This
improves performance somewhat (one call to bn_get_bits is faster than
several calls to BN_is_bit_set), so the attacker now gets one signal
snippet per window (rather than one per bit) in which the signal is
affected by all bits in the integer (rather than just the one bit).
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6276)
Experiments have shown that the lookup table used by BN_GF2m_mod_arr
introduces sufficient timing signal to recover the private key for an
attacker with access to cache timing information on the victim's host.
This only affects binary curves (which are less frequently used).
No CVE is considered necessary for this issue.
The fix is to replace the lookup table with an on-the-fly calculation of
the value from the table instead, which can be performed in constant time.
Thanks to Youngjoo Shin for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6270)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6070)
Calculating BN_mod_inverse where n is 1 (or -1) doesn't make sense. We
should return an error in that case. Instead we were returning a valid
result with value 0.
Fixes#6004
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6119)
Montgomery multiplication post-conditions in some of code paths were
formally non-constant time. Cache access pattern was result-neutral,
but a little bit asymmetric, which might have produced a signal [if
processor reordered load and stores at run-time].
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6141)
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6009)
Old code replaced in favor of a clearer implementation.
Performances are not penalized.
Updated the copyright end date to 2018.
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5963)
This removes some code because we cannot trace the original contributor
to get their agreement for the licence change (original commit e03ddfae).
After this change there will be numerous failures in the test cases until
someone rewrites the missing code.
All *_free functions should accept a NULL parameter. After this change
the following *_free functions will fail if a NULL parameter is passed:
BIO_ACCEPT_free()
BIO_CONNECT_free()
BN_BLINDING_free()
BN_CTX_free()
BN_MONT_CTX_free()
BN_RECP_CTX_free()
BUF_MEM_free()
COMP_CTX_free()
ERR_STATE_free()
TXT_DB_free()
X509_STORE_free()
ssl3_free()
ssl_cert_free()
SSL_SESSION_free()
SSL_free()
[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5757)
