There are some compiling errors for mips32r6 and mips64r6:
crypto/bn/bn-mips.S:56: Error: opcode not supported on this processor: mips2 (mips2) `mulu $1,$12,$7'
crypto/mips_arch.h: Assembler messages:
crypto/mips_arch.h:15: Error: junk at end of line, first unrecognized character is `&'
Signed-off-by: Hua Zhang <hua.zhang1974@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8464)
(cherry picked from commit 1b9c5f2e2f)
The secret point R can be recovered from S using the equation R = S - P.
The X and Z coordinates should be sufficient for that.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8504)
(cherry picked from commit 8a74bb5c7b)
There are two copy-paste errors in handling CTR mode. When dealing
with a 2 or 3 block tail, the code branches to the CBC decryption exit
path, rather than to the CTR exit path.
This can lead to data corruption: in the Linux kernel we have a copy
of this file, and the bug leads to corruption of the IV, which leads
to data corruption when we call the encryption function again later to
encrypt subsequent blocks.
Originally reported to the Linux kernel by Ondrej Mosnáček <omosnacek@gmail.com>
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8510)
(cherry picked from commit f643deac41)
The function felem_diff_128_64 in ecp_nistp521.c substracts the number |in|
from |out| mod p. In order to avoid underflow it first adds 32p mod p
(which is equivalent to 0 mod p) to |out|. The comments and variable naming
suggest that the original author intended to add 64p mod p. In fact it
has been shown that with certain unusual co-ordinates it is possible to
cause an underflow in this function when only adding 32p mod p while
performing a point double operation. By changing this to 64p mod p the
underflow is avoided.
It turns out to be quite difficult to construct points that satisfy the
underflow criteria although this has been done and the underflow
demonstrated. However none of these points are actually on the curve.
Finding points that satisfy the underflow criteria and are also *on* the
curve is considered significantly more difficult. For this reason we do
not believe that this issue is currently practically exploitable and
therefore no CVE has been assigned.
This only impacts builds using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 Configure
option.
With thanks to Bo-Yin Yang, Billy Brumley and Dr Liu for their significant
help in investigating this issue.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8405)
(cherry picked from commit 13fbce17fc)
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
ignored.
It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
reused nonce.
Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
affected.
Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe
because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
CVE-2019-1543
Fixes#8345
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d5)
GNU strerror_r may return either a pointer to a string that the function
stores in buf, or a pointer to some (immutable) static string in which case
buf is unused.
In such a case we need to set buf manually.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8371)
(cherry picked from commit e3b35d2b29)
Use select to wait for /dev/random in readable state,
but do not actually read anything from /dev/random,
use /dev/urandom first.
Use linux define __NR_getrandom instead of the
glibc define SYS_getrandom, in case the kernel headers
are more current than the glibc headers.
Fixes#8215
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8251)
(cherry picked from commit 38023b87f0)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8281)
(cherry picked from commit 54d00677f3)
Currently SM2 shares the ameth with EC, so the current default digest
algorithm returned is SHA256. This fixes the default digest algorithm of
SM2 to SM3, which is the only valid digest algorithm for SM2 signature.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8186)
(cherry picked from commit e766f4a053)
This restores the behavior of previous versions of the /dev/crypto
engine, in alignment with the default implementation.
Reported-by: Gerard Looije <lglooije@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8306)
cipher_init may be called on an already initialized context, without a
necessary cleanup. This separates cleanup from initialization, closing
an eventual open session before creating a new one.
Move the /dev/crypto session cleanup code to its own function.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8306)
The real cause for this change is that test/ec_internal_test.c
includes ec_lcl.h, and including curve448/curve448_lcl.h from there
doesn't work so well with compilers who always do inclusions relative
to the C file being compiled.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8334)
Thanks to David Benjamin who reported this, performed the analysis and
suggested the patch. I have incorporated some of his analysis in the
comments below.
This issue can cause an out-of-bounds read. It is believed that this was
not reachable until the recent "fixed top" changes. Analysis has so far
only identified one code path that can encounter this - although it is
possible that others may be found. The one code path only impacts 1.0.2 in
certain builds. The fuzzer found a path in RSA where iqmp is too large. If
the input is all zeros, the RSA CRT logic will multiply a padded zero by
iqmp. Two mitigating factors:
- Private keys which trip this are invalid (iqmp is not reduced mod p).
Only systems which take untrusted private keys care.
- In OpenSSL 1.1.x, there is a check which rejects the oversize iqmp,
so the bug is only reproducible in 1.0.2 so far.
Fortunately, the bug appears to be relatively harmless. The consequences of
bn_cmp_word's misbehavior are:
- OpenSSL may crash if the buffers are page-aligned and the previous page is
non-existent.
- OpenSSL will incorrectly treat two BN_ULONG buffers as not equal when they
are equal.
- Side channel concerns.
The first is indeed a concern and is a DoS bug. The second is fine in this
context. bn_cmp_word and bn_cmp_part_words are used to compute abs(a0 - a1)
in Karatsuba. If a0 = a1, it does not matter whether we use a0 - a1 or
a1 - a0. The third would be worth thinking about, but it is overshadowed
by the entire Karatsuba implementation not being constant time.
Due to the difficulty of tripping this and the low impact no CVE is felt
necessary for this issue.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8326)
(cherry picked from commit 576129cd72)
This commit adds a dedicated function in `EC_METHOD` to access a modular
field inversion implementation suitable for the specifics of the
implemented curve, featuring SCA countermeasures.
The new pointer is defined as:
`int (*field_inv)(const EC_GROUP*, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX*)`
and computes the multiplicative inverse of `a` in the underlying field,
storing the result in `r`.
Three implementations are included, each including specific SCA
countermeasures:
- `ec_GFp_simple_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through
blinding.
- `ec_GFp_mont_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through Fermat's
Little Theorem (FLT) inversion.
- `ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv()`, that uses `BN_GF2m_mod_inv()` which
already features SCA hardening through blinding.
From a security point of view, this also helps addressing a leakage
previously affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates.
This commit also adds a new error reason code (i.e.,
`EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT`) to improve consistency between the three
implementations as all of them could fail for the same reason but
through different code paths resulting in inconsistent error stack
states.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit e0033efc30)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8262)
Cygwin binaries should not enforce text mode these days, just
use text mode if the underlying mount point requests it
Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8248)
(cherry picked from commit 9b57e4a1ef)
The add/double shortcut in ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl left one instruction
point that did not unwind, and the "slow" path in AES_cbc_encrypt was
not annotated correctly. For the latter, add
.cfi_{remember,restore}_state support to perlasm.
Next, fill in a bunch of functions that are missing no-op .cfi_startproc
and .cfi_endproc blocks. libunwind cannot unwind those stack frames
otherwise.
Finally, work around a bug in libunwind by not encoding rflags. (rflags
isn't a callee-saved register, so there's not much need to annotate it
anyway.)
These were found as part of ABI testing work in BoringSSL.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
GH: #8109
(cherry picked from commit c0e8e5007b)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8137)
(cherry picked from commit b754a8a159)
ARMv8.3 adds pointer authentication extension, which in this case allows
to ensure that, when offloaded to stack, return address is same at return
as at entry to the subroutine. The new instructions are nops on processors
that don't implement the extension, so that the vetification is backward
compatible.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8205)
(cherry picked from commit 9a18aae5f2)
If the old openssl versions not supporting the .include directive
load a config file with it, they will bail out with error.
This change allows using the .include = <filename> syntax which
is interpreted as variable assignment by the old openssl
config file parser.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8141)
(cherry picked from commit 9d5560331d)
o2i_ECPublicKey() requires an EC_KEY structure filled with an EC_GROUP.
o2i_ECPublicKey() is called by d2i_PublicKey(). In order to fulfill the
o2i_ECPublicKey()'s requirement, d2i_PublicKey() needs to be called with
an EVP_PKEY with an EC_KEY containing an EC_GROUP.
However, the call to EVP_PKEY_set_type() frees any existing key structure
inside the EVP_PKEY, thus freeing the EC_KEY with the EC_GROUP that
o2i_ECPublicKey() needs.
This means you can't d2i_PublicKey() for an EC key...
The fix is to check to see if the type is already set appropriately, and
if so, not call EVP_PKEY_set_type().
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8168)
(cherry picked from commit 2aa2beb06c)
Trim trailing whitespace. It doesn't match OpenSSL coding standards,
AFAICT, and it can cause problems with git tooling.
Trailing whitespace remains in test data and external source.
Backport-of: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8092
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8134)
If the call the ERR_set_error_data() in ERR_add_error_vdata() fails then
a mem leak can occur. This commit checks that we successfully added the
error data, and if not frees the buffer.
Fixes#8085
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8105)
(cherry picked from commit fa6b1ee111)
When the ret parameter is NULL the generated prime
is in rnd variable and not in ret.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8076)
(cherry picked from commit 3d43f9c809)
If this fails try out if mfspr268 works.
Use OPENSSL_ppccap=0x20 for enabling mftb,
OPENSSL_ppccap=0x40 for enabling mfspr268,
and OPENSSL_ppccap=0 for enabling neither.
Fixes#8012
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8043)
(cherry picked from commit c8f370485c)
If you use a BIO and set up your own buffer that is not freed, the
memory bio will leak the BIO_BUF_MEM object it allocates.
The trouble is that the BIO_BUF_MEM is allocated and kept around,
but it is not freed if BIO_NOCLOSE is set.
The freeing of BIO_BUF_MEM was fairly confusing, simplify things
so mem_buf_free only frees the memory buffer and free the BIO_BUF_MEM
in mem_free(), where it should be done.
Alse add a test for a leak in the memory bio
Setting a memory buffer caused a leak.
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8051)
(cherry picked from commit c6048af23c)
Having a weak getauxval() and only depending on GNU C without looking
at the library we build against meant that it got picked up where not
really expected.
So we change this to check for the glibc version, and since we know it
exists from that version, there's no real need to make it weak.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8028)
(cherry picked from commit 5f40dd158c)
It turns out that AT_SECURE may be defined through other means than
our inclusion of sys/auxv.h, so to be on the safe side, we define our
own guard and use that to determine if getauxval() should be used or
not.
Fixes#7932
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7933)
(cherry picked from commit aefb980c45)
1. In addition to overriding the default application name,
one can now also override the configuration file name
and flags passed to CONF_modules_load_file().
2. By default we still keep going when configuration file
processing fails. But, applications that want to be
strict about initialization errors can now make explicit
flag choices via non-null OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS that omit
the CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_RETURN_CODES flag (which had so far
been both undocumented and unused).
3. In OPENSSL_init_ssl() do not request OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG
if the options already include OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG.
4. Don't set up atexit() handlers when called with opts equal to
OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY (this flag should only be used alone).
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7969)
Some Travis builds appear to fail because generated objects get
2019 copyrights now, and the diff complains.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7969)
This enables cleanup to happen on DLL unload instead of at process exit.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7983)
