If the client sends a status_request extension in the ClientHello
and the server responds with a status_request extension in the
ServerHello then normally the server will also later send a
CertificateStatus message. However this message is *optional* even
if the extensions were sent. This adds a test to ensure that if
the extensions are sent then we can still omit the message.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
TLSProxy was failing if we are Configured with compression because it
doesn't support it. This fix simply switches compression off for the
purposes of the test.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Previously TLSProxy would detect a successful handshake once it saw the
server Finished message. This causes problems with abbreviated handshakes,
or if the client fails to process a message from the last server flight.
This change additionally sends some application data and finishes when the
client sends a CloseNotify.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
- select an actual file handle for devnull
- do not declare $msgdata twice
- SKE records sometimes seem to come without sig
- in SKE parsing, use and use $pub_key_len when parsing $pub_key
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Use a dynamic engine for ossltest engine so that we can build it without
subsequently deploying it during install. We do not want people accidentally
using this engine.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Add ServerHello parsing to TLSProxy.
Also add some (very) limited ServerKeyExchange parsing.
Add the capability to set client and server cipher lists
Fix a bug with fragment lengths
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This commit provides a set of perl modules that support the testing of
libssl. The test harness operates as a man-in-the-middle proxy between
s_server and s_client. Both s_server and s_client must be started using the
"-testmode" option which loads the new OSSLTEST engine.
The test harness enables scripts to be written that can examine the packets
sent during a handshake, as well as (potentially) modifying them so that
otherwise illegal handshake messages can be sent.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
