Actually supply a chain and then test:
1) A successful check of both the ee and chain certs
2) A failure to check the ee cert
3) A failure to check a chain cert
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9443)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9295)
Implement the GNU C library's random(3) pseudorandom number generator.
The algorithm is described: https://www.mscs.dal.ca/~selinger/random/
The rationale is to make the tests repeatable across differing platforms with
different underlying implementations of the random(3) library call.
More specifically: when executing tests with random ordering.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9463)
(cherry picked from commit e9a5932d04)
Happens when trying to generate 4 or 5 bit safe primes.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9311)
(cherry picked from commit 291f616ced)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9275)
Augment the cert_cb sslapitest to include a run that uses
SSL_check_chain() to inspect the certificate prior to installing
it on the SSL object. If the check shows the certificate as not
valid in that context, we do not install a certificate at all, so
the handshake will fail later on in processing (tls_choose_sigalg()),
exposing the indicated regression.
Currently it fails, since we have not yet set the shared sigalgs
by the time the cert_cb runs.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9157)
(cherry picked from commit 7cb8fb07e8)
This feature is enabled by default outside of FIPS builds
which ban such actions completely.
Encryption is always disallowed and will generate an error.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9112)
(cherry picked from commit 2c840201e5)
The BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST flag behavior was not properly documented
and it also caused the length to be incorrectly set after the reset
operation.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9179)
(cherry picked from commit 8b7b32921e)
[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9102)
(cherry picked from commit 87762939b5)
Fixes#8923
Found using the openssl cms -resign option.
This uses an alternate path to do the signing which was not adding the required signed attribute
content type. The content type attribute should always exist since it is required is there are
any signed attributes.
As the signing time attribute is always added in code, the content type attribute is also required.
The CMS_si_check_attributes() method adds validity checks for signed and unsigned attributes
e.g. The message digest attribute is a signed attribute that must exist if any signed attributes
exist, it cannot be an unsigned attribute and there must only be one instance containing a single
value.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8944)
(cherry picked from commit 19e512a824)
Add a few coverage test case.
Fixes#8949
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8959)
(cherry picked from commit 5b3accde60)
This imports all of the NIST CAVS test vectors for CCM (SP800-38C) and
coverts them for use within evp_test. This commit also adds a script to
convert the .rsp CAVS files into the evp_test format.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8981)
(cherry picked from commit ecb0f148a9)
This change allows to pass the authentication tag after specifying
the AAD in CCM mode. This is already true for the other two supported
AEAD modes (GCM and OCB) and it seems appropriate to match the
behavior.
GCM and OCB also support to set the tag at any point before the call
to `EVP_*Final`, but this won't work for CCM due to a restriction
imposed by section 2.6 of RFC3610: The tag must be set before
actually decrypting data.
This commit also adds a test case for setting the tag after supplying
plaintext length and AAD.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7243)
(cherry picked from commit 67c81ec311)
Since commit 137096a7ea it is possible to specify keywords instead
of negative magic numbers for the salt length. This commit replaces
the remaining occurrences of `rsa_pss_saltlen:-3` in the test recipes
by `rsa_pss_saltlen:max`.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8860)
(cherry picked from commit 31fc48ddc3)
Add a Chi^2 goodness of fit test to empirically provide a degree of confidence
in the uniformity of the output of the random range generation function.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8818)
(cherry picked from commit bb5b3e6dd0)
The previous commit fixed an underflow that may occur in ecp_nistp521.c.
This commit adds a test for that condition. It is heavily based on an
original test harness by Billy Brumley.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8405)
(cherry picked from commit 6855b496b2)
There is too high a risk that perl and OpenSSL are linked with
different C RTLs, and thereby get different messages for even the most
mundane error numbers.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8343)
(cherry picked from commit 565a19eef3)
Prior to this commit we were keeping a count of how many KeyUpdates we
have processed and failing if we had had too many. This simplistic approach
is not sufficient for long running connections. Since many KeyUpdates
would not be a particular good DoS route anyway, the simplest solution is
to simply remove the key update count.
Fixes#8068
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8299)
(cherry picked from commit 3409a5ff8a)
This commit adds a simple unit test to make sure that the constant-time
flag does not "leak" among BN_CTX frames:
- test_ctx_consttime_flag() initializes (and later frees before
returning) a BN_CTX object, then it calls in sequence
test_ctx_set_ct_flag() and test_ctx_check_ct_flag() using the same
BN_CTX object. The process is run twice, once with a "normal"
BN_CTX_new() object, then with a BN_CTX_secure_new() one.
- test_ctx_set_ct_flag() starts a frame in the given BN_CTX and sets the
BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on some of the BIGNUMs obtained from the frame
before ending it.
- test_ctx_check_ct_flag() then starts a new frame and gets a number of
BIGNUMs from it. In absence of leaks, none of the BIGNUMs in the new
frame should have BN_FLG_CONSTTIME set.
In actual BN_CTX usage inside libcrypto the leak could happen at any
depth level in the BN_CTX stack, with varying results depending on the
patterns of sibling trees of nested function calls sharing the same
BN_CTX object, and the effect of unintended BN_FLG_CONSTTIME on the
called BN_* functions.
This simple unit test abstracts away this complexity and verifies that
the leak does not happen between two sibling functions sharing the same
BN_CTX object at the same level of nesting.
(cherry picked from commit fe16ae5f95)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8253)
Otherwise this can result in an incorrect calculation of the maximum
encoded integer length, meaning an insufficient buffer size is allocated.
Thanks to Billy Brumley for helping to track this down.
Fixes#8209
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8237)
(cherry picked from commit 9fc8f18f59)
The original 1.1.1 design was to use SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and
SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal start/end of a post-handshake message
exchange in TLSv1.3. Unfortunately experience has shown that this confuses
some applications who mistake it for a TLSv1.2 renegotiation. This means
that KeyUpdate messages are not handled properly.
This commit removes the use of SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and
SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal the start/end of a post-handshake
message exchange. Individual post-handshake messages are still signalled in
the normal way.
This is a potentially breaking change if there are any applications already
written that expect to see these TLSv1.3 events. However, without it,
KeyUpdate is not currently usable for many applications.
Fixes#8069
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8096)
(cherry picked from commit 4af5836b55)
set_cipher_list() sets TLSv1.2 (and below) ciphers, and its success or
failure should not depend on whether set_ciphersuites() has been used to
setup TLSv1.3 ciphers.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7759)
(cherry picked from commit 3c83c5ba4f)
