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570 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
a73d990e2b Add documentation for the RAND_DRBG API
The RAND_DRBG API was added in PR #5462 and modified by PR #5547.
This commit adds the corresponding documention.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5461)
2018-03-30 00:10:38 +02:00
Benjamin Kaduk
f2633200eb Document RAND_DRBG fork-safety locking model
Add some more exposition on why unlocked access to the global rand_fork_count
is safe, and provide a comment for the struct rand_drbg_st fork_count field.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4110)
2018-03-29 09:04:23 -05:00
Richard Levitte
5848be0488 Fix setbuf use for VMS C
The VMS C RTL has setbuf() working for short pointers only, probably
the FILE pointer will always be in P0 (the lower 4GB).  Fortunately,
this only generates a warning about possible data loss (doesn't apply
in this case) that we can simply turn off.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5789)
2018-03-29 10:34:11 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
242fcd695d rand/randfile.c: permit non-regular files in RAND_load_file.
Apparently applications rely on RAND_load_file's ability to work with
non-regular files, customarily with /dev/urandom, so that the ban was
not exactly appropriate.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5737)
2018-03-27 19:55:54 +02:00
Kurt Roeckx
dbdcc04f27 DRBG: Use the EVP layer to do AES encryption
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #5580
2018-03-21 21:32:47 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
9d9dc6ac85 o_fopen.c,rand/randfile.c: compensate for e_os.h omission.
At earlier point e_os.h was omitted from a number of headers (in order
to emphasize OS neutrality), but this affected o_fopen.c and randfile.c
which are not OS-neutral, and contain some Win32-specific code.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5676)
2018-03-21 10:12:36 +01:00
Matt Caswell
b0edda11cb Update copyright year
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5689)
2018-03-20 13:08:46 +00:00
Richard Levitte
93bf194584 crypto/rand/rand_vms.c: include "internal/rand_int.h"
Without it, the RAND_POOL typedef is missing

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5685)
2018-03-20 09:13:48 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
7caf122e71 Make the public and private DRBG thread local
This avoids lock contention.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5547)
2018-03-19 15:04:40 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
311276ffe3 Return error when trying to use prediction resistance
There is a requirements of having access to a live entropy source
which we can't do with the default callbacks. If you need prediction
resistance you need to set up your own callbacks that follow the
requirements of NIST SP 800-90C.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
GH: #5402
2018-03-17 11:35:33 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
eb238134e0 Propagate the request for prediction resistance to the get entropy call
Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
GH: #5402
2018-03-17 11:35:33 +01:00
Bernd Edlinger
f96ff4e908 Fixed a crash in error handing of rand_drbg_new
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5646)
2018-03-17 08:19:41 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
31393fd906 RAND_DRBG: add a function for setting the default DRBG type and flags
This commit adds a new api RAND_DRBG_set_defaults() which sets the
default type and flags for new DRBG instances. See also #5576.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5632)
2018-03-16 18:31:30 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
6decf9436f Publish the RAND_DRBG API
Fixes #4403

This commit moves the internal header file "internal/rand.h" to
<openssl/rand_drbg.h>, making the RAND_DRBG API public.
The RAND_POOL API remains private, its function prototypes were
moved to "internal/rand_int.h" and converted to lowercase.

Documentation for the new API is work in progress on GitHub #5461.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5462)
2018-03-15 18:58:38 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
4917e91160 RAND_DRBG: add a function for setting the reseeding defaults
The introduction of thread local public and private DRBG instances (#5547)
makes it very cumbersome to change the reseeding (time) intervals for
those instances. This commit provides a function to set the default
values for all subsequently created DRBG instances.

 int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults(
                                   unsigned int master_reseed_interval,
                                   unsigned int slave_reseed_interval,
                                   time_t master_reseed_time_interval,
                                   time_t slave_reseed_time_interval
                                   );

The function is intended only to be used during application initialization,
before any threads are created and before any random bytes are generated.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5576)
2018-03-10 00:26:30 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
35503b7cdc Check the parent DRBG's strength
We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source

Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
GH: #5506
2018-03-06 18:34:23 +01:00
Matt Caswell
0d66475908 Update copyright year
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2018-02-27 13:59:42 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
60595292ae Check return value of time() when getting additional data for the DRBG
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #5400
2018-02-21 20:44:11 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
812b153706 DRBG: make locking api truly private
In PR #5295 it was decided that the locking api should remain private
and used only inside libcrypto. However, the locking functions were added
back to `libcrypto.num` by `mkdef.pl`, because the function prototypes
were still listed in `internal/rand.h`. (This header contains functions
which are internal, but shared between libcrypto and libssl.)

This commit moves the prototypes to `rand_lcl.h` and changes the names
to lowercase, following the convention therein. It also corrects an
outdated documenting comment.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5375)
2018-02-15 12:25:01 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
7296027956 Use both getrandom() and /dev/urandom by default on Linux.
getrandom() is now used on Linux by default when using Linux >= 3.17
and glibc >= 2.25

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #5314
2018-02-13 21:15:30 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
8164d91d18 DRBG: make the derivation function the default for ctr_drbg
The NIST standard presents two alternative ways for seeding the
CTR DRBG, depending on whether a derivation function is used or not.
In Section 10.2.1 of NIST SP800-90Ar1 the following is assessed:

  The use of the derivation function is optional if either an
  approved RBG or an entropy source provides full entropy output
  when entropy input is requested by the DRBG mechanism.
  Otherwise, the derivation function shall be used.

Since the OpenSSL DRBG supports being reseeded from low entropy random
sources (using RAND_POOL), the use of a derivation function is mandatory.
For that reason we change the default and replace the opt-in flag
RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF with an opt-out flag RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
This change simplifies the RAND_DRBG_new() calls.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
2018-02-13 17:32:54 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
4f9dabbfe3 DRBG: unify initialization and cleanup code
The functions drbg_setup() and drbg_cleanup() used to duplicate a lot of
code from RAND_DRBG_new() and RAND_DRBG_free(). This duplication has been
removed, which simplifies drbg_setup() and makes drbg_cleanup() obsolete.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
2018-02-13 17:32:54 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
3ce1c27b56 DRBG: add locking api
This commit adds three new accessors to the internal DRBG lock

   int RAND_DRBG_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
   int RAND_DRBG_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
   int RAND_DRBG_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg)

The three shared DRBGs are intended to be used concurrently, so they
have locking enabled by default. It is the callers responsibility to
guard access to the shared DRBGs by calls to RAND_DRBG_lock() and
RAND_DRBG_unlock().

All other DRBG instances don't have locking enabled by default, because
they are intendended to be used by a single thread. If it is desired,
locking can be enabled by using RAND_DRBG_enable_locking().

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
2018-02-13 17:32:54 +01:00
Pauli
4cd58771d8 Fix glibc version detection.
Simplify Posix timer detection.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5279)
2018-02-09 10:10:45 +01:00
Pauli
bed4afa81b Fix glibc specific conditional for Mac OS/X
MacOS seems to define __GLIBC__ but not __GLIBC_PREREQ.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5269)
2018-02-07 11:46:15 +10:00
Pauli
2b66fd5720 Unify timer code
Remove the timer and TSC additional input code and instead provide a single
routine that attempts to use the "best" timer/counter available on the
system.  It attempts to use TSC, then various OS dependent resources and
finally several tries to obtain the date.  If any of these timer/counters
is successful, the rest are skipped.

No randomness is credited for this.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5231)
2018-02-07 10:08:15 +10:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
f61f62ea13 Use RAND_DRBG_bytes() for RAND_bytes() and RAND_priv_bytes()
The functions RAND_bytes() and RAND_priv_bytes() are now both based
on a common implementation using RAND_DRBG_bytes() (if the default
OpenSSL rand method is active). This not only simplifies the code
but also has the advantage that additional input from a high precision
timer is added on every generate call if the timer is available.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5251)
2018-02-05 20:05:14 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
1648338ba1 Fix size limitation of RAND_DRBG_bytes()
When comparing the implementations of drbg_bytes() and RAND_DRBG_bytes(),
it was noticed that the former split the buffer into chunks when calling
RAND_DRBG_generate() to circumvent the size limitation of the buffer
to outlen <= drb->max_request. This loop was missing in RAND_DRBG_bytes(),
so it was adopted from drbg_bytes().

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5251)
2018-02-05 20:05:14 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
58351fbd02 drbg_bytes: remove check for DRBG_UNINITIALIZED state
This check not only prevented the automatic reinstantiation of the
DRBG, which is implemented in RAND_DRBG_generate(), but also prevented
an error message from being generated in the case of failure.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5251)
2018-02-05 20:05:14 +01:00
Benjamin Kaduk
63ab5ea13b Revert the crypto "global lock" implementation
Conceptually, this is a squashed version of:

    Revert "Address feedback"

    This reverts commit 75551e07bd.

and

    Revert "Add CRYPTO_thread_glock_new"

    This reverts commit ed6b2c7938.

But there were some intervening commits that made neither revert apply
cleanly, so instead do it all as one shot.

The crypto global locks were an attempt to cope with the awkward
POSIX semantics for pthread_atfork(); its documentation (the "RATIONALE"
section) indicates that the expected usage is to have the prefork handler
lock all "global" locks, and the parent and child handlers release those
locks, to ensure that forking happens with a consistent (lock) state.
However, the set of functions available in the child process is limited
to async-signal-safe functions, and pthread_mutex_unlock() is not on
the list of async-signal-safe functions!  The only synchronization
primitives that are async-signal-safe are the semaphore primitives,
which are not really appropriate for general-purpose usage.

However, the state consistency problem that the global locks were
attempting to solve is not actually a serious problem, particularly for
OpenSSL.  That is, we can consider four cases of forking application
that might use OpenSSL:

(1) Single-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL in the child (e.g.,
the child calls exec() immediately)

For this class of process, no locking is needed at all, since there is
only ever a single thread of execution and the only reentrancy is due to
signal handlers (which are themselves limited to async-signal-safe
operation and should not be doing much work at all).

(2) Single-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()

The application must ensure that it does not fork() with an unexpected
lock held (that is, one that would get unlocked in the parent but
accidentally remain locked in the child and cause deadlock).  Since
OpenSSL does not expose any of its internal locks to the application
and the application is single-threaded, the OpenSSL internal locks
will be unlocked for the fork(), and the state will be consistent.
(OpenSSL will need to reseed its PRNG in the child, but that is
an orthogonal issue.)  If the application makes use of locks from
libcrypto, proper handling for those locks is the responsibility of
the application, as for any other locking primitive that is available
for application programming.

(3) Multi-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL after fork()

As for (1), the OpenSSL state is only relevant in the parent, so
no particular fork()-related handling is needed.  The internal locks
are relevant, but there is no interaction with the child to consider.

(4) Multi-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()

This is the case where the pthread_atfork() hooks to ensure that all
global locks are in a known state across fork() would come into play,
per the above discussion.  However, these "calls into OpenSSL after
fork()" are still subject to the restriction to async-signal-safe
functions.  Since OpenSSL uses all sorts of locking and libc functions
that are not on the list of safe functions (e.g., malloc()), this
case is not currently usable and is unlikely to ever be usable,
independently of the locking situation.  So, there is no need to
go through contortions to attempt to support this case in the one small
area of locking interaction with fork().

In light of the above analysis (thanks @davidben and @achernya), go
back to the simpler implementation that does not need to distinguish
"library-global" locks or to have complicated atfork handling for locks.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5089)
2018-01-31 12:25:28 -06:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
2e230e8687 crypto/rand/rand_lib.c: fix undefined reference to `clock_gettime'
Some older glibc versions require the `-lrt` linker option for
resolving the reference to `clock_gettime'. Since it is not desired
to add new library dependencies in version 1.1.1, the call to
clock_gettime() is replaced by a call to gettimeofday() for the
moment. It will be added back in version 1.2.

Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5199)
2018-01-31 17:16:40 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
20928ff635 Add RAND_DRBG_bytes
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4752)
2018-01-29 12:42:06 +01:00
Richard Levitte
48e5119a6b Copyright update of more files that have changed this year
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5110)
2018-01-19 13:34:03 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
39571fcabf Fix memory leak in do_rand_drbg_init()
Fixes #5076

Since do_rand_drbg_init() allocates three locks, it needs to ensure
that OPENSSL_init_crypto() is called, otherwise these resources are
not cleaned up properly.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5083)
2018-01-16 08:38:13 -06:00
Richard Levitte
3c7d0945b6 Update copyright years on all files merged since Jan 1st 2018
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5038)
2018-01-09 05:49:01 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
8212d50576 crypto/rand: restore the generic DRBG implementation
The DRGB concept described in NIST SP 800-90A provides for having different
algorithms to generate random output. In fact, the FIPS object module used to
implement three of them, CTR DRBG, HASH DRBG and HMAC DRBG.

When the FIPS code was ported to master in #4019, two of the three algorithms
were dropped, and together with those the entire code that made RAND_DRBG
generic was removed, since only one concrete implementation was left.

This commit restores the original generic implementation of the DRBG, making it
possible again to add additional implementations using different algorithms
(like RAND_DRBG_CHACHA20) in the future.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4998)
2018-01-04 11:47:31 +10:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
4e585e7201 crypto/rand: rename drbg_rand.c to drbg_ctr.c
The generic part of the FIPS DRBG was implemented in fips_drbg_lib.c and the
algorithm specific parts in fips_drbg_<alg>.c for <alg> in {ctr, hash, hmac}.
Additionally, there was the module fips_drbg_rand.c which contained 'gluing'
code between the RAND_METHOD api and the FIPS DRBG.

When the FIPS code was ported to master in #4019, for some reason the ctr-drbg
implementation from fips_drbg_ctr.c ended up in drbg_rand.c instead of drbg_ctr.c.

This commit renames the module drbg_rand.c back to drbg_ctr.c, thereby restoring
a simple relationship between the original fips modules and the drbg modules
in master:

 fips_drbg_lib.c    =>  drbg_lib.c    /* generic part of implementation */
 fips_drbg_<alg>.c  =>  drbg_<alg>.c  /* algorithm specific implementations */

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4998)
2018-01-04 11:47:30 +10:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
efb8128ad5 Make DRBG uninstantiate() and instantiate() methods inverse to each other
Previously, the RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate() call was not exactly inverse to
RAND_DRBG_instantiate(), because some important member values of the
drbg->ctr member where cleared. Now these values are restored internally.

Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
2017-12-17 23:12:10 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
933033b692 Allocate the three shared DRBGs on the secure heap
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
2017-12-17 23:12:10 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
08a65d9686 Implement automatic reseeding of DRBG after a specified time interval
Every DRBG now supports automatic reseeding not only after a given
number of generate requests, but also after a specified time interval.

Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
2017-12-17 23:12:10 +01:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
a93ba405b0 Add master DRBG for reseeding
A third shared DRBG is added, the so called master DRBG. Its sole purpose
is to reseed the two other shared DRBGs, the public and the private DRBG.
The randomness for the master DRBG is either pulled from the os entropy
sources, or added by the application using the RAND_add() call.

The master DRBG reseeds itself automatically after a given number of generate
requests, but can also be reseeded using RAND_seed() or RAND_add().
A reseeding of the master DRBG is automatically propagated to the public
and private DRBG. This construction fixes the problem, that up to now
the randomness provided by RAND_add() was added only to the public and
not to the private DRBG.

Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
2017-12-17 23:12:10 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
3a63c0edab Resolve warnings in VC-WIN32 build, which allows to add /WX.
It's argued that /WX allows to keep better focus on new code, which
motivates its comeback...

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4721)
2017-11-13 10:58:57 +01:00
Benjamin Kaduk
2139145b72 Add missing RAND_DRBG locking
The drbg's lock must be held across calls to RAND_DRBG_generate()
to prevent simultaneous modification of internal state.

This was observed in practice with simultaneous SSL_new() calls attempting
to seed the (separate) per-SSL RAND_DRBG instances from the global
rand_drbg instance; this eventually led to simultaneous calls to
ctr_BCC_update() attempting to increment drbg->bltmp_pos for their
respective partial final block, violating the invariant that bltmp_pos < 16.
The AES operations performed in ctr_BCC_blocks() makes the race window
quite easy to trigger.  A value of bltmp_pos greater than 16 induces
catastrophic failure in ctr_BCC_final(), with subtraction overflowing
and leading to an attempt to memset() to zero a very large range,
which eventually reaches an unmapped page and segfaults.

Provide the needed locking in get_entropy_from_parent(), as well as
fixing a similar issue in RAND_priv_bytes().  There is also an
unlocked call to RAND_DRBG_generate() in ssl_randbytes(), but the
requisite serialization is already guaranteed by the requirements on
the application's usage of SSL objects, and no further locking is
needed for correct behavior.  In that case, leave a comment noting
the apparent discrepancy and the reason for its safety (at present).

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-10-18 08:39:20 -05:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
e0b625f9db Remove unnecessary DRBG_RESEED state
The DRBG_RESEED state plays an analogue role to the |reseed_required_flag| in
Appendix B.3.4 of [NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1]. The latter is a local variable,
the scope of which is limited to the RAND_DRBG_generate() function. Hence there
is no need for a DRBG_RESEED state outside of the generate function. This state
was removed and replaced by a local variable |reseed_required|.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-10-18 08:39:20 -05:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
c16de9d832 Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG
Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API
and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when
the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular,
RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed
on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API'
and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues,
introducing the following changes:

- Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which
  facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback.
- Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the
  get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by
  RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy().
- Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG
  in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current
  state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller
  provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding.
- Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll()
  (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based
  on rand_drbg_restart().
- Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy
  source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-10-18 08:39:20 -05:00
Rich Salz
ed6b2c7938 Add CRYPTO_thread_glock_new
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4294)
2017-08-31 19:42:03 -04:00
Pauli
07016a8a31 Move e_os.h to be the very first include.
cryptilib.h is the second.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
2017-08-30 07:20:44 +10:00
Kurt Roeckx
58891025ef Make the global DRBGs static
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #4268
2017-08-28 23:16:26 +02:00
Kurt Roeckx
0b14a5b7cc Don't auto-instantiate a DRBG when trying to use it and it's not
The one creating the DRBG should instantiate it, it's there that we
know which parameters we should use to instantiate it.

This splits the rand init in two parts to avoid a deadlock
because when the global drbg is created it wands to call
rand_add on the global rand method.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #4268
2017-08-28 23:15:52 +02:00
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
6969a3f49a DRBG: Remove 'randomness' buffer from 'RAND_DRBG'
The DRBG callbacks 'get_entropy()' and 'cleanup_entropy()' are designed
in such a way that the randomness buffer does not have to be allocated
by the calling function. It receives the address of a dynamically
allocated buffer from get_entropy() and returns this address to
cleanup_entropy(), where it is freed. If these two calls are properly
paired, the address can be stored in a stack local variable of the
calling function, so there is no need for having a 'randomness' member
(and a 'filled' member) in 'RAND_DRBG'.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
2017-08-28 08:58:50 -04:00