Make all scripts produce .S, make interpretation of $(CFLAGS)
pre-processor's responsibility, start accepting $(PERLASM_SCHEME).
[$(PERLASM_SCHEME) is redundant in this case, because there are
no deviataions between Solaris and Linux assemblers. This is
purely to unify .pl->.S handling across all targets.]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Not all assemblers of "gas" flavour handle binary constants, e.g.
seasoned MacOS Xcode doesn't, so give them a hand.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Once upon a time, there was chop, which somply chopped off the last
character of $_ or a given variable, and it was used to take off the
EOL character (\n) of strings.
... but then, you had to check for the presence of such character.
So came chomp, the better chop which checks for \n before chopping it
off. And this worked well, as long as Perl made internally sure that
all EOLs were converted to \n.
These days, though, there seems to be a mixture of perls, so lines
from files in the "wrong" environment might have \r\n as EOL, or just
\r (Mac OS, unless I'm misinformed).
So it's time we went for the more generic variant and use s|\R$||, the
better chomp which recognises all kinds of known EOLs and chops them
off.
A few chops were left alone, as they are use as surgical tools to
remove one last slash or one last comma.
NOTE: \R came with perl 5.10.0. It means that from now on, our
scripts will fail with any older version.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Though this doesn't mean that masm becomes supported, the script is
still provided on don't-ask-in-case-of-doubt-use-nasm basis.
See RT#3650 for background.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
"Teaser" means that it's not integrated yet and purpose of this
commit is primarily informational, to exhibit design choices,
such as how to handle alignment and endianness. In other words
it's proof-of-concept code that EVP module will build upon.
The problem is that OpenSSH calls EVP_Cipher, which is not as
protective as EVP_CipherUpdate. Formally speaking we ought to
do more checks in *_cipher methods, including rejecting
lengths not divisible by block size (unless ciphertext stealing
is in place). But for now I implement check for zero length in
low-level based on precedent.
PR: 3087, 2775
