Submitted by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>
Since SSLv2 doesn't support renegotiation at all don't reject it if
legacy renegotiation isn't enabled.
Also can now use SSL2 compatible client hello because RFC5746 supports it.
Although it will be many years before TLS v2.0 or later appears old versions
of servers have a habit of hanging around for a considerable time so best
if we handle this properly now.
des_old.h redefines crypt:
#define crypt(b,s)\
DES_crypt((b),(s))
This scheme leads to failure, if header files with the OS's true definition
of crypt() are processed _after_ des_old.h was processed. This is e.g. the
case on HP-UX with unistd.h.
As evp.h now again includes des.h (which includes des_old.h), this problem
only came up after this modification.
Solution: move header files (indirectly) including e_os.h before the header
files (indirectly) including evp.h.
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
New macros SSL[_CTX]_set_msg_callback_arg().
Message callback imlementation for SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 (no SSL 2.0 yet).
New '-msg' option for 'openssl s_client' and 'openssl s_server'
that enable a message callback that displays all protocol messages.
In ssl3_get_client_hello (ssl/s3_srvr.c), generate a fatal alert if
client_version is smaller than the protocol version in use.
Also change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0
if the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then the
client will at least see that alert.
Fix SSL[_CTX]_ctrl prototype (void * instead of char * for generic
pointer).
Add/update some OpenSSL copyright notices.
SSL 2.0 client hellos added with the previous commit was totally wrong --
it must start with the message type, not the protocol version.
(Not that this particular header is actually used anywhere ...)
'Handshake' protocol structures are kept in memory, including
'msg_type' and 'length'.
(This is in preparation of future support for callbacks that get to
peek at handshake messages and the like.)
test was never triggered due to an off-by-one error.
In s23_clnt.c, don't use special rollback-attack detection padding
(RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the
client; similarly, in s23_srvr.c, don't do the rollback check if
SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the server.
like Malloc, Realloc and especially Free conflict with already existing names
on some operating systems or other packages. That is reason enough to change
the names of the OpenSSL memory allocation macros to something that has a
better chance of being unique, like prepending them with OPENSSL_.
This change includes all the name changes needed throughout all C files.
as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c.
Submitted by: Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>
Modified by Ulf Möller
returns int (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). New function RAND_add() is the
same as RAND_seed() but takes an estimate of the entropy as an additional
argument.
In case of a restart, v[0] and v[1] were incorrectly initialised.
This was interpreted by ssl3_get_client_key_exchange as an RSA decryption
failure (don't ask me why) and caused it to create a _random_ master key
instead (even weirder), which obviously led to incorrect input to
ssl3_generate_master_secret and thus caused "block cipher pad is
wrong" error messages from ssl3_enc for the client's Finished message.
Arrgh.
