Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/rsa/rsa.h
demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
ssl/tls1.h
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
crypto/evp/evp.h
ssl/d1_both.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_lib.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 684400ce19)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
According to X6.90 null, object identifier, boolean, integer and enumerated
types can only have primitive encodings: return an error if any of
these are received with a constructed encoding.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f5e4b6b5b5)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.
CVE-2014-3508
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
If an ASN1_INTEGER structure is allocated but not explicitly set encode
it as zero: don't generate an invalid zero length INTEGER.
(cherry picked from commit 1643edc63c)
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110)
Reported by: Remi Gacogne <rgacogne-bugs@coredump.fr>
Preserve unused bits value in non-canonicalised ASN1_STRING structures
by using ASN1_STRING_copy which preseves flags.
Reported by: Daniel Marschall <daniel-marschall@viathinksoft.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Fix OID routines.
Check on encoding leading zero rejection should start at beginning of
encoding.
Allow for initial digit when testing when to use BIGNUMs which can increase
first value by 2 * 40.
this means that some implementations will be used automatically, e.g. aesni,
we do this for cryptodev anyway.
Setup cpuid in ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() too as some ENGINEs use it.
Submitted by: steve@openssl.org
Fix to make DHparams_dup() et al work in C++.
For 1.0 fix the final argument to ASN1_dup() so it is void *. Replace some
*_dup macros with functions.
