ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable
authentication-only ciphersuites.
Also, change ssl_create_cipher_list() so that it no longer
starts with an arbitrary ciphersuite ordering, but instead
uses the logic that we previously had in SSL_DEFEAULT_CIPHER_LIST.
SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST simplifies into just "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL".
This change resolves a number of problems and obviates multiple kludges.
A new feature is that you can now say "AES256" or "AES128" (not just
"AES", which enables both).
In some cases the ciphersuite list generated from a given string is
affected by this change. I hope this is just in those cases where the
previous behaviour did not make sense.
This tidies up verify parameters and adds support for integrated policy
checking.
Add support for policy related command line options. Currently only in smime
application.
WARNING: experimental code subject to change.
functions and macros.
This change has associated tags: LEVITTE_before_const and
LEVITTE_after_const. Those will be removed when this change has been
properly reviewed.
compression identity is already present among the registered
compression methods, and if so, reject the addition request.
Declare SSL_COMP_get_compression_method() so it can be used properly.
Change ssltest.c so it checks what compression methods are available
and enumerates them. As a side-effect, built-in compression methods
will be automagically loaded that way. Additionally, change the
identities for ZLIB and RLE to be conformant to
draft-ietf-tls-compression-05.txt.
Finally, make update.
Next on my list: have the built-in compression methods added
"automatically" instead of requiring that the author call
SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() or
SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods().
relates to SSL_CTX flags and the use of "external" session caching. The
existing flag, "SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP" remains but is
supplemented with a complimentary flag, "SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE".
The bitwise OR of the two flags is also defined as
"SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL" and is the flag that should be used by most
applications wanting to implement session caching *entirely* by its own
provided callbacks. As the documented behaviour contradicted actual
behaviour up until recently, and since that point behaviour has itself been
inconsistent anyway, this change should not introduce any compatibility
problems. I've adjusted the relevant documentation to elaborate about how
this works.
Kudos to "Nadav Har'El" <nyh@math.technion.ac.il> for diagnosing these
anomalies and testing this patch for correctness.
PR: 311
Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory,
Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number
F30602-01-2-0537.
New macros SSL[_CTX]_set_msg_callback_arg().
Message callback imlementation for SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 (no SSL 2.0 yet).
New '-msg' option for 'openssl s_client' and 'openssl s_server'
that enable a message callback that displays all protocol messages.
In ssl3_get_client_hello (ssl/s3_srvr.c), generate a fatal alert if
client_version is smaller than the protocol version in use.
Also change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0
if the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then the
client will at least see that alert.
Fix SSL[_CTX]_ctrl prototype (void * instead of char * for generic
pointer).
Add/update some OpenSSL copyright notices.
Both have per-SSL_CTX defaults.
These new values can be set by calling SSL[_CTX]_[callback_]ctrl
with codes SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK and SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG.
So far, the callback is never actually called.
Also rearrange some SSL_CTX struct members (some exist just in
SSL_CTXs, others are defaults for SSLs and are either copied
during SSL_new, or used if the value in the SSL is not set;
these three classes of members were not in a logical order),
and add some missing assignments to SSL_dup.
'Handshake' protocol structures are kept in memory, including
'msg_type' and 'length'.
(This is in preparation of future support for callbacks that get to
peek at handshake messages and the like.)
reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC
verification error occured.
In ssl/s2_pkt.c, verify that the purported number of padding bytes is in
the legal range.
His comments are:
First, it corrects a problem introduced in the last patch where the
kssl_map_enc() would intentionally return NULL for valid ENCTYPE
values. This was done to prevent verification of the kerberos 5
authenticator from being performed when Derived Key ciphers were
in use. Unfortunately, the authenticator verification routine was
not the only place that function was used. And it caused core dumps.
Second, it attempt to add to SSL_SESSION the Kerberos 5 Client
Principal Name.
SSL according to RFC 2712. His comment is:
This is a patch to openssl-SNAP-20010702 to support Kerberized SSL
authentication. I'm expecting to have the full kssl-0.5 kit up on
sourceforge by the end of the week. The full kit includes patches
for mod-ssl, apache, and a few text clients. The sourceforge URL
is http://sourceforge.net/projects/kssl/ .
Thanks to a note from Simon Wilkinson I've replaced my KRB5 AP_REQ
message with a real KerberosWrapper struct. I think this is fully
RFC 2712 compliant now, including support for the optional
authenticator field. I also added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for
a few Kerberos structs; see crypto/krb5/ if you're interested.
an SSL_CTX's session cache, it is necessary to compare the ssl_version at
the same time (a conflict is defined, courtesy of SSL_SESSION_cmp(), as a
matching id/id_length pair and a matching ssl_version). However, the
SSL_SESSION that will result from the current negotiation does not
necessarily have the same ssl version as the "SSL_METHOD" in use by the
SSL_CTX - part of the work in a handshake is to agree on an ssl version!
This is fixed by having the check function accept an SSL pointer rather
than the SSL_CTX it belongs to.
[Thanks to Lutz for illuminating the full extent of my stupidity]
SSL/TLS session IDs in a server. According to RFC2246, the session ID is an
arbitrary value chosen by the server. It can be useful to have some control
over this "arbitrary value" so as to choose it in ways that can aid in
things like external session caching and balancing (eg. clustering). The
default session ID generation is to fill the ID with random data.
The callback used by default is built in to ssl_sess.c, but registering a
callback in an SSL_CTX or in a particular SSL overrides this. BTW: SSL
callbacks will override SSL_CTX callbacks, and a new SSL structure inherits
any callback set in its 'parent' SSL_CTX. The header comments describe how
this mechanism ticks, and source code comments describe (hopefully) why it
ticks the way it does.
Man pages are on the way ...
[NB: Lutz was also hacking away and helping me to figure out how best to do
this.]
sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting
with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making
sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with
opensslconf.h.
I've checked fairly well that nothing breaks with this (apart from
external software that will adapt if they have used something like
NO_KRB5), but I can't guarantee it completely, so a review of this
change would be a good thing.
After some messing around this seems to work but needs
a few more tests. Working out the syntax for sk_set_cmp_func()
(cast it to a function that itself returns a function pointer)
was painful :-(
Needs some testing to see what other compilers think of this
syntax.
Also needs similar stuff for ASN1_SET_OF etc etc.
was a really bad idea. For example, the following:
#include <x509.h>
#include <bio.h>
#include <asn1.h>
would make sure that things like ASN1_UTCTIME_print() wasn't defined
unless you moved the inclusion of bio.h to above the inclusion of
x509.h. The reason is that x509.h includes asn1.h, and the
declaration of ASN1_UTCTIME_print() depended on the definition of
HEADER_BIO_H. That's what I call an obscure bug.
Instead, this change makes sure that whatever header files are needed
for the correct process of one header file are included automagically,
and that the definitions of, for example, BIO-related things are
dependent on the absence of the NO_{foo} macros. This is also
consistent with the way parts of OpenSSL can be excluded at will.
"Jan Mikkelsen" <janm@transactionsite.com> correctly states that the
OpenSSL header files have #include's and extern "C"'s in an incorrect
order. Thusly fixed.
designed for that. This removes the potential error to mix data and
function pointers.
Please note that I'm a little unsure how incorrect calls to the old
ctrl functions should be handled, in som cases. I currently return 0
and that's it, but it may be more correct to generate a genuine error
in those cases.
as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c.
Submitted by: Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>
Modified by Ulf Möller
returns int (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). New function RAND_add() is the
same as RAND_seed() but takes an estimate of the entropy as an additional
argument.
yet.
Add a function X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() which implements the logic
of "inheriting" purpose and trust from a parent structure and using a default:
this will be used in the SSL code and possibly future S/MIME.
Partial documentation of the 'verify' utility. Still need to document how all
the extension checking works and the various error messages.
In case of a restart, v[0] and v[1] were incorrectly initialised.
This was interpreted by ssl3_get_client_key_exchange as an RSA decryption
failure (don't ask me why) and caused it to create a _random_ master key
instead (even weirder), which obviously led to incorrect input to
ssl3_generate_master_secret and thus caused "block cipher pad is
wrong" error messages from ssl3_enc for the client's Finished message.
Arrgh.
