Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6870)
This commit leverages the Montgomery ladder scaffold introduced in #6690
(alongside a specialized Lopez-Dahab ladder for binary curves) to
provide a specialized differential addition-and-double implementation to
speedup prime curves, while keeping all the features of
`ec_scalar_mul_ladder` against SCA attacks.
The arithmetic in ladder_pre, ladder_step and ladder_post is auto
generated with tooling, from the following formulae:
- `ladder_pre`: Formula 3 for doubling from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel
elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks",
as described at
https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#doubling-dbl-2002-it-2
- `ladder_step`: differential addition-and-doubling Eq. (8) and (10)
from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication
resistant against side channel attacks", as described at
https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-3
- `ladder_post`: y-coordinate recovery using Eq. (8) from Brier-Joye
"Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks", modified to
work in projective coordinates.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6772)
The old numbers where all generated for an 80 bit security level. But
the number should depend on security level you want to reach. For bigger
primes we want a higher security level and so need to do more tests.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #6075Fixes: #6012
This changes the security level from 100 to 128 bit.
We only have 1 define, this sets it to the highest level supported for
DSA, and needed for keys larger than 3072 bit.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #6075
The result is that we don't have to produce different names on
different platforms, and we won't have confusion on Windows depending
on if the script was built with mingw or with MSVC.
Partial fix for #3254
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6764)
This commit uses the new ladder scaffold to implement a specialized
ladder step based on differential addition-and-doubling in mixed
Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates, modified to independently blind the
operands.
The arithmetic in `ladder_pre`, `ladder_step` and `ladder_post` is
auto generated with tooling:
- see, e.g., "Guide to ECC" Alg 3.40 for reference about the
`ladder_pre` implementation;
- see https://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g12o/auto-code/shortw/xz/ladder/mladd-2003-s.op3
for the differential addition-and-doubling formulas implemented in
`ladder_step`;
- see, e.g., "Fast Multiplication on Elliptic Curves over GF(2**m)
without Precomputation" (Lopez and Dahab, CHES 1999) Appendix Alg Mxy
for the `ladder_post` implementation to recover the `(x,y)` result in
affine coordinates.
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations
PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for
prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation
with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret
scalar is feed to the point multiplication).
The newly introduced default implementation directly used
EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop.
The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a
specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking
advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling
and different coordinate systems.
- `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by
default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R.
Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition
to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling;
- `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it
computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could,
e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential
addition-and-doubling;
- `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default
it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this
hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing
the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of
the result point.
This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`,
as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be
truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this
function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily
constant-time themselves.
What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of
operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given
EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar.
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
This allows operation inside a chroot environment without having the
random device present.
A new call, RAND_keep_random_devices_open(), has been introduced that can
be used to control file descriptor use by the random seed sources. Some
seed sources maintain open file descriptors by default, which allows
such sources to operate in a chroot(2) jail without the associated device
nodes being available.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6432)
This extends the recently added ECDSA signature blinding to blind DSA too.
This is based on side channel attacks demonstrated by Keegan Ryan (NCC
Group) for ECDSA which are likely to be able to be applied to DSA.
Normally, as in ECDSA, during signing the signer calculates:
s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
In ECDSA, the addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
operations.
As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
the operation so that:
s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
This commit also tweaks the previous ECDSA blinding so that blinding is
only removed at the last possible step.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6522)
This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the
representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for
prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method,
EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method.
This commit is derived from the patch
https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley.
Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure
and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field
multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a
scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way,
it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an
algorithm state) unpredictable.
For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for
settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the
aforementioned curves.
For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit
does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be
easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6501)
Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
operations.
As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
the operation so that:
s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
When signing or verifying a file using pkeyutl the input is supposed to
be a hash. Some algorithms sanity check the length of the input, while
others don't and silently truncate. To avoid accidents we check that the
length of the input looks sane.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6284)
Because TLS 1.3 sends more non-application data records some clients run
into problems because they don't expect SSL_read() to return and set
SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ after processing it.
This can cause problems for clients that use blocking I/O and use
select() to see if data is available. It can be cleared using
SSL_CTX_clear_mode().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #6260
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6070)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6070)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6070)
* EC_POINT_mul is now responsible for constant time point multiplication
(for single fixed or variable point multiplication, when the scalar is
in the range [0,group_order), so we need to strip the nonce padding
from ECDSA.
* Entry added to CHANGES
* Updated EC_POINT_mul documentation
- Integrate existing EC_POINT_mul and EC_POINTs_mul entries in the
manpage to reflect the shift in constant-time expectations when
performing a single fixed or variable point multiplication;
- Add documentation to ec_method_st to reflect the updated "contract"
between callers and implementations of ec_method_st.mul.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6070)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5801)
Where a CMS detached signature is used with text content the text goes
through a canonicalisation process first prior to signing or verifying a
signature. This process strips trailing space at the end of lines, converts
line terminators to CRLF and removes additional trailing line terminators
at the end of a file. A bug in the canonicalisation process meant that
some characters, such as form-feed, were incorrectly treated as whitespace
and removed. This is contrary to the specification (RFC5485). This fix
could mean that detached text data signed with an earlier version of
OpenSSL 1.1.0 may fail to verify using the fixed version, or text data
signed with a fixed OpenSSL may fail to verify with an earlier version of
OpenSSL 1.1.0. A workaround is to only verify the canonicalised text data
and use the "-binary" flag (for the "cms" command line application) or set
the SMIME_BINARY/PKCS7_BINARY/CMS_BINARY flags (if using CMS_verify()).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5790)
The RAND_DRBG API was added in PR #5462 and modified by PR #5547.
This commit adds the corresponding documention.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5461)
With "-multi" the OCSP responder forks multiple child processes,
and respawns them as needed. This can be used as a long-running
service, not just a demo program. Therefore the index file is
automatically re-read when changed. The responder also now optionally
times out client requests.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Support added for these two digests, available only via the EVP interface.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5093)
Similar to commit 17b602802114d53017ff7894319498934a580b17(
"Remove extra `the` in SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod"), this commit removes
typos where additional 'the' have been added.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4999)
* Introduce RSA_generate_multi_prime_key to generate multi-prime
RSA private key. As well as the following functions:
RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count
RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors
RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params
RSA_set0_multi_prime_params
RSA_get_version
* Support EVP operations for multi-prime RSA
* Support ASN.1 operations for multi-prime RSA
* Support multi-prime check in RSA_check_key_ex
* Support multi-prime RSA in apps/genrsa and apps/speed
* Support multi-prime RSA manipulation functions
* Test cases and documentation are added
* CHANGES is updated
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4241)
Around 138 distinct errors found and fixed; thanks!
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3459)
SM3 is a secure hash function which is part of the Chinese
"Commercial Cryptography" suite of algorithms which use is
required for certain commercial applications in China.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4616)
Rewrite the -req-nodes flag from CA.pl (idea from Andy)
Rewrite ERR_string_error_n
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4478)
This allows callers to set a mark, and then clear it without removing
the errors. Useful in case an error is encountered that should be
returned up the call stack.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4094)
Use atfork to count child forks, and reseed DRBG when the counts don't
match.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4101)
Instead, make it possible to disable the console reader that's part of
the UI module. This makes it possible to use the UI API and other UI
methods in environments where the console reader isn't useful.
To disable the console reader, configure with 'no-ui-console' /
'disable-ui-console'.
'no-ui' / 'disable-ui' is now an alias for 'no-ui-console' /
'disable-ui-console'.
Fixes#3806
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3820)
To make sure that our symbols don't clash with other libraries, we
claim the namespaces OSSL and OPENSSL. Because C doesn't provide
namespaces, the only solution is to have them as prefixes on symbols,
thus we allow OSSL_ and OPENSSL_ as prefixes.
These namespace prefixes are optional for the foreseeable future, and
will only be used for new modules as needed on a case by case basis,
until further notice.
For extra safety, there's an added requirement that module names -
apart from the namespace prefix - be at least 2 characters long.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3781)
This new target is used to build all generated files and only that.
This can be used to prepare everything that requires things like perl
for a system that lacks perl and then move everything to that system
and do the rest of the build there.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3695)
This can be used by engines that need to retain the data for a longer time
than just the call where this user data is passed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3575)
An alert message is 2 bytes long. In theory it is permissible in SSLv3 -
TLSv1.2 to fragment such alerts across multiple records (some of which
could be empty). In practice it make no sense to send an empty alert
record, or to fragment one. TLSv1.3 prohibts this altogether and other
libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not support this at all. Supporting it adds
significant complexity to the record layer, and its removal is unlikely
to cause inter-operability issues.
The DTLS code for this never worked anyway and it is not supported at a
protocol level for DTLS. Similarly fragmented DTLS handshake records only
work at a protocol level where at least the handshake message header
exists within the record. DTLS code existed for trying to handle fragmented
handshake records smaller than this size. This code didn't work either so
has also been removed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3476)
Enforcement of an SNI extension in the initial ClientHello is becoming
increasingly common (e.g. see GitHub issue #2580). This commit changes
s_client so that it adds SNI be default, unless explicitly told not to via
the new "-noservername" option.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2614)
X509_STORE_add_cert and X509_STORE_add_crl are changed to return
success if the object to be added was already found in the store, rather
than returning an error.
Raise errors if empty or malformed files are read when loading certificates
and CRLs.
Remove NULL checks and allow a segv to occur.
Add error handing for all calls to X509_STORE_add_c{ert|tl}
Refactor these two routines into one.
Bring the unit test for duplicate certificates up to date using the test
framework.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2830)
'j' is specified as modifier for "greatest-width integer type", which in
practice means 64 bits on both 32- and 64-bit platforms. Since we rely
on __attribute__((__format__(__printf__,...))) to sanitize BIO_print
format, we can use it to denote [u]int64_t-s in platform-neutral manner.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3083)
Fix some comments too
[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3069)
Just as for DH, DSA and RSA, this gives the engine associated with the
key.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2960)
This reimplementation was necessary before VMS C V7.1. Since that's
the minimum version we support in this OpenSSL version, the
reimplementation is no longer needed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2762)
The core SipHash supports either 8 or 16-byte output and a configurable
number of rounds.
The default behavior, as added to EVP, is to use 16-byte output and
2,4 rounds, which matches the behavior of most implementations.
There is an EVP_PKEY_CTRL that can control the output size.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2216)
Verify that the encrypt-then-mac negotiation is handled
correctly. Additionally, when compiled with no-asm, this test ensures
coverage for the constant-time MAC copying code in
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac. The proxy-based CBC padding test covers that as
well but it's nevertheless better to have an explicit handshake test
for mac-then-encrypt.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
