By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 684400ce19)
This change documents the world as-is, by turning all warnings on,
and then turning warnings that trigger off again.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Since SGC has been removed from OpenSSL 1.0.2 the
SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is no longer used. However the #define is
retained for compatibility.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MS Server gated cryptography is obsolete and dates from the time of export
restrictions on strong encryption and is only used by ancient versions of
MSIE.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 63eab8a620)
When parsing ClientHello clear any existing extension state from
SRP login and SRTP profile.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4f605ccb77)
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
We need this for the freebsd kernel with glibc as used in the Debian kfreebsd
ports. There shouldn't be a problem defining this on systems not using glibc.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* adds links to various related documents.
* fixes a few typos.
* rewords a few sentences.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 67472bd82b)
Return an error code for I/O errors instead of an assertion failure.
PR#3470
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2521fcd852)
According to X6.90 null, object identifier, boolean, integer and enumerated
types can only have primitive encodings: return an error if any of
these are received with a constructed encoding.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Causes more problems than it fixes: even though error codes
are not part of the stable API, several users rely on the
specific error code, and the change breaks them. Conversely,
we don't have any concrete use-cases for constant-time behaviour here.
This reverts commit 738911cde6.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
From BoringSSL
- Send an alert when the client key exchange isn't correctly formatted.
- Reject overly short RSA ciphertexts to avoid a (benign) out-of-bounds memory access.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4aecfd4d9f)
master branch has a specific regression test for a bug in x86_64-mont5 code,
see commit cdfe0fdde6.
This code is now in 1.0.2/1.0.1, so also backport the test.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The client_version needs to be preserved for the RSA key exchange.
This change also means that renegotiation will, like TLS, repeat the old
client_version rather than advertise only the final version. (Either way,
version change on renego is not allowed.) This is necessary in TLS to work
around an SChannel bug, but it's not strictly necessary in DTLS.
(From BoringSSL)
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ec1af3c419)
The temporary variable causes unused variable warnings in opt mode with clang,
because the subsequent assert is compiled out.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Odd-length lists should be rejected everywhere upon parsing. Nevertheless,
be extra careful and add guards against off-by-one reads.
Also, drive-by replace inexplicable double-negation with an explicit comparison.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The Supported Elliptic Curves extension contains a vector of NamedCurves
of 2 bytes each, so the total length must be even. Accepting odd-length
lists was observed to lead to a non-exploitable one-byte out-of-bounds
read in the latest development branches (1.0.2 and master). Released
versions of OpenSSL are not affected.
Thanks to Felix Groebert of the Google Security Team for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 33d5ba8629)
