Previous commit f73c737c7 attempted to "fix" a problem with the way
SSL_shutdown() behaved whilst in mid-handshake. The original behaviour had
SSL_shutdown() return immediately having taken no action if called mid-
handshake with a return value of 1 (meaning everything was shutdown
successfully). In fact the shutdown has not been successful.
Commit f73c737c7 changed that to send a close_notify anyway and then
return. This seems to be causing some problems for some applications so
perhaps a better (much simpler) approach is revert to the previous
behaviour (no attempt at a shutdown), but return -1 (meaning the shutdown
was not successful).
This also fixes a bug where SSL_shutdown always returns 0 when shutdown
*very* early in the handshake (i.e. we are still using SSLv23_method).
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Modified version of the commit ffaef3f15 in the master branch by Stephen
Henson. This makes the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option a no-op and always
generates a new DH key for every handshake regardless.
CVE-2016-0701 (fix part 2 or 2)
Issue reported by Antonio Sanso
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Calling SSL_shutdown while in init previously gave a "1" response, meaning
everything was successfully closed down (even though it wasn't). Better is
to send our close_notify, but fail when trying to receive one.
The problem with doing a shutdown while in the middle of a handshake is
that once our close_notify is sent we shouldn't really do anything else
(including process handshake/CCS messages) until we've received a
close_notify back from the peer. However the peer might send a CCS before
acting on our close_notify - so we won't be able to read it because we're
not acting on CCS messages!
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
If somewhere in SSL_new() there is a memory allocation failure, ssl3_free() can
get called with s->s3 still being NULL.
Patch also provided by Willy Tarreau <wtarreau@haproxy.com>
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3e7bd2ce0b16f8611298175d6dc7cb35ee06ea6d)
Remove support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites. These two
ciphersuites were newly added (along with a number of other static DH
ciphersuites) to 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked
since they were introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new
export ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to
fix them.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 13f8eb4730)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
Since sanity checks are performed for all custom extensions the
serverinfo checks are no longer needed.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 707b026d78)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:
A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f5a8805b82d1ae81168b11b7f1506db9e047dec)
SRP ciphersuites do not have no authentication. They have authentication
based on SRP. Add new SRP authentication flag and cipher string.
(cherry picked from commit a86b88acc373ac1fb0ca709a5fb8a8fa74683f67)
If multiple TLS extensions are expected but not received, the TLS extension and supplemental data 'generate' callbacks are the only chance for the receive-side to trigger a specific TLS alert during the handshake.
Removed logic which no-op'd TLS extension generate callbacks (as the generate callbacks need to always be called in order to trigger alerts), and updated the serverinfo-specific custom TLS extension callbacks to track which custom TLS extensions were received by the client, where no-ops for 'generate' callbacks are appropriate.
(cherry picked from commit ac20719d99)
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
Removed prior audit proof logic - audit proof support was implemented using the generic TLS extension API
Tests exercising the new supplemental data registration and callback api can be found in ssltest.c.
Implemented changes to s_server and s_client to exercise supplemental data callbacks via the -auth argument, as well as additional flags to exercise supplemental data being sent only during renegotiation.
(cherry picked from commit 36086186a9)
Conflicts:
Configure
apps/s_client.c
apps/s_server.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/ssltest.c
If an application calls the macro SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs
return either the old "shared" extra certificates or those associated
with the current certificate.
This means applications which call SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file
and retrieve the additional chain using SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs
will still work. An application which only wants to check the shared
extra certificates can call the new macro
SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs_only
(cherry picked from commit a51f767645)
New ctrl sets current certificate based on certain criteria. Currently
two options: set the first valid certificate as current and set the
next valid certificate as current. Using these an application can
iterate over all certificates in an SSL_CTX or SSL structure.
(cherry picked from commit 0f78819c8c)
PR#3169
This patch, which currently applies successfully against master and
1_0_2, adds the following functions:
SSL_[CTX_]select_current_cert() - set the current certificate without
disturbing the existing structure.
SSL_[CTX_]get0_chain_certs() - get the current certificate's chain.
SSL_[CTX_]clear_chain_certs() - clear the current certificate's chain.
The patch also adds these functions to, and fixes some existing errors
in, SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod.
(cherry picked from commit 2f56c9c015dbca45379c9a725915b3b8e765a119)
Use the enc_flags field to determine whether we should use explicit IV,
signature algorithms or SHA256 default PRF instead of hard coding which
versions support each requirement.
(cherry picked from commit cbd64894ec)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Revise DTLS code. There was a *lot* of code duplication in the
DTLS code that generates records. This makes it harder to maintain and
sometimes a TLS update is omitted by accident from the DTLS code.
Specifically almost all of the record generation functions have code like
this:
some_pointer = buffer + HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LENGTH;
... Record creation stuff ...
set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL_MT_SOMETHING, message_len);
...
write_handshake_message(ssl);
Where the "Record creation stuff" is identical between SSL/TLS and DTLS or
in some cases has very minor differences.
By adding a few fields to SSL3_ENC to include the header length, some flags
and function pointers for handshake header setting and handshake writing the
code can cope with both cases.
(cherry picked from commit 173e72e64c)
client hello message. Previously this could only be retrieved on an initial
connection and it was impossible to determine the cipher IDs of any uknown
ciphersuites.
(backport from HEAD)
possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
to test if a chain is correctly configured.
Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
(backport from HEAD)
details in s_client.
Also add ctrl to set client certificate types. If not used sensible values
will be included based on supported signature algorithms: for example if
we don't include any DSA signing algorithms the DSA certificate type is
omitted.
Fix restriction in old code where certificate types would be truncated
if it exceeded TLS_CT_NUMBER.
(backport from HEAD)
the permitted signature algorithms for server and client authentication
are the same but it is now possible to set different algorithms for client
authentication only.
(backport from HEAD)
the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
to have similar checks in it.
Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
(backport from HEAD)
TLS v1.2. These are sent as an extension for clients and during a certificate
request for servers.
TODO: add support for shared signature algorithms, respect shared algorithms
when deciding which ciphersuites and certificates to permit.
(backport from HEAD)
