Around 138 distinct errors found and fixed; thanks!
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3459)
This guards against the name constraints check consuming large amounts
of CPU time when certificates in the presented chain contain an
excessive number of names (specifically subject email names or subject
alternative DNS names) and/or name constraints.
Name constraints checking compares the names presented in a certificate
against the name constraints included in a certificate higher up in the
chain using two nested for loops.
Move the name constraints check so that it happens after signature
verification so peers cannot exploit this using a chain with invalid
signatures. Also impose a hard limit on the number of name constraints
check loop iterations to further mitigate the issue.
Thanks to NCC for finding this issue. Fix written by Martin Kreichgauer.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4393)
Add Ed25519 certificate verify test using certificate from
draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-04 and custom generated root certificate.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3503)
subject alternate names.
Add nameConstraints tests incluing DNS, IP and email tests both in
subject alt name extension and subject name.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
A new X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() function sets the
authentication security level. For verification of SSL peers, this
is automatically set from the SSL security level. Otherwise, for
now, the authentication security level remains at (effectively) 0
by default.
The new "-auth_level" verify(1) option is available in all the
command-line tools that support the standard verify(1) options.
New verify(1) tests added to check enforcement of chain signature
and public key security levels. Also added new tests of enforcement
of the verify_depth limit.
Updated documentation.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Previously, it was sufficient to have certSign in keyUsage when the
basicConstraints extension was missing. That is still accepted in
a trust anchor, but is no longer accepted in an intermediate CA.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
To be able to run tests when we've built in a directory other than
the source tree, the testing framework needs a few adjustments.
test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test.pm needs to know where it can find
shlib_wrap.sh, and a number of other tests need to be told a different
place to find engines than what they may be able to figure out on
their own. Relying to $TOP is not enough, $SRCTOP and $BLDTOP can be
used as an alternative.
As part of this change, top_file and top_dir are removed and
srctop_file, bldtop_file, srctop_dir and bldtop_dir take their place.
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
When auxiliary data contains only reject entries, continue to trust
self-signed objects just as when no auxiliary data is present.
This makes it possible to reject specific uses without changing
what's accepted (and thus overring the underlying EKU).
Added new supported certs and doubled test count from 38 to 76.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This includes basic constraints, key usages, issuer EKUs and auxiliary
trust OIDs (given a trust suitably related to the intended purpose).
Added tests and updated documentation.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
top_dir() are used to create directory names, top_file() should be
used for files. In a Unixly environment, that doesn't matter, but...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
It is sometimes useful (especially in automated tests) to supply
multiple trusted or untrusted certificates via separate files rather
than have to prepare a single file containing them all.
To that end, change verify(1) to accept these options zero or more
times. Also automatically set -no-CAfile and -no-CApath when
-trusted is specified.
Improve verify(1) documentation, which could still use some work.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
It became tedious as well as error prone to have all recipes use
Test::More as well as OpenSSL::Test. The easier way is to make
OpenSSL::Test an extension of Test::More, thereby having all version
checks as well as future checks firmly there. Additionally, that
allows us to extend existing Test::More functions if the need would
arise.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
