Configure creates an empty crypto/include which
gets not cleaned up with make distclean.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10893)
Move .cfi_startproc to the right place for RC4. Add missing
.cfi_startproc and .cfi_endproc to RC4_options.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10872)
(cherry picked from commit 967ef73013becef2aec3439f8c45204b24121018)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10794)
(cherry picked from commit 6a165fab239ec5b00b3cd68169a63b509207177d)
This reverts commit 7b18d1a53f, which moved the
DEVRANDOM and DEVRANDOM_EGD defines into rand_unix.c. That change introduced
the regression that the compiler complains about missing declarations in
apps/version.c when OpenSSL is configured using `--with-rand-seed=devrandom`
(resp. `--with-rand-seed=egd`):
apps/version.c:173:42: error: 'DEVRANDOM' undeclared
static const char *dev[] = { DEVRANDOM, NULL };
^~~~~~~~~
Fixes#10759
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10764)
The HMAC_CTX structure stores the original key in case the ctx is reused
without changing the key.
However, HMAC_Init_ex() checks its parameters such that the only code path
where the stored key is ever used is in the case where HMAC_Init_ex is
called with a NULL key and an explicit md is provided which is the same as
the md that was provided previously. But in that case we can actually reuse
the pre-digested key that we calculated last time, so we can refactor the
code not to use the stored key at all.
With that refactor done it is no longer necessary to store the key in the
ctx at all. This means that long running ctx's will not keep the key in
memory for any longer than required. Note though that the digested key
*is* still kept in memory for the duration of the life of the ctx.
Fixes#10743
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10763)
ECDSA_do_verify() is a function that verifies a ECDSA signature given a hash and a public EC key. The function is supposed to return 1 on valid signature, 0 on invalid signature and -1 on error. Previously, we returned 0 if the key did not have a verify_sig method. This is actually an error case and not an invalid signature. Consequently, this patch updates the return code to -1.
Fixes#8766
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10693)
(cherry picked from commit 26583f6aa8dc28e3598e61db66e54e2fdf8b195f)
This change addresses a potential side-channel vulnerability in
the internals of nistz256 low level operations for armv8.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239)
(cherry picked from commit f5a659b6dfcc735a62c712dcca64d116d2289b97)
This is only used if configured with
./config -DECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239)
(cherry picked from commit 7d4716648e8348dea862e198b9395478fae01907)
This commit addresses a potential side-channel vulnerability in the
internals of some elliptic curve low level operations.
The side-channel leakage appears to be tiny, so the severity of this
issue is rather low.
The issue was reported by David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239)
(cherry picked from commit 3cb914c463ed1c9e32cfb773d816139a61b6ad5f)
The New Year has caused various files to appear out of date to "make
update". This causes Travis to fail. Therefore we update those files.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10739)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10676)
(cherry picked from commit 9d079f2744b9b624c6fe75f95fc0f766ef88ffcf)
We store a secondary frame pointer info for the debugger
in the red zone. This fixes a crash in the unwinder when
this function is interrupted.
Additionally the missing cfi function annotation is added
to aesni_cbc_sha256_enc_shaext.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10674)
(cherry picked from commit 665de4d48aef2507022a7d74f5c7f6e339d5e6bc)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10642)
(cherry picked from commit 6b913be708f98b1d971586d38e608218ee6de6fa)
While stack unwinding works with gdb here, the
function _Unwind_Backtrace gives up when something outside
.cfi_startproc/.cfi_endproc is found in the call stack, like
OPENSSL_cleanse, OPENSSL_atomic_add, OPENSSL_rdtsc, CRYPTO_memcmp
and other trivial functions which don't save anything in the stack.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10635)
(cherry picked from commit 8913378a552e470c66277c47b19699f20b84aa3b)
This is a missing accessor in order to obtain PSS parameters from an
RSA key, which should also be available in 1.1.1.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10568)
OpenSSL supports both PKCS#3 and X9.42 DH keys. By default we use PKCS#3
keys. The function `EVP_PKEY_set1_DH` was assuming that the supplied DH
key was a PKCS#3 key. It should detect what type of key it is and assign
the correct type as appropriate.
Fixes#10592
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10593)
(cherry picked from commit 32c869ffaba67822602ea9fec611272ff8e8db58)
RAND_get_rand_method() can return a NULL method pointer in the case of a
malloc failure, so don't dereference it without a check.
Reported-by: Zu-Ming Jiang (detected by FIFUZZ)
Fixes#10480
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10490)
We have always a carry in %rcx or %rbx in range 0..2
from the previous stage, that is added to the result
of the 64-bit square, but the low nibble of any square
can only be 0, 1, 4, 9.
Therefore one "adcq $0, %rdx" can be removed.
Likewise in the ADX code we can remove one
"adcx %rbp, $out" since %rbp is always 0, and carry is
also zero, therefore that is a no-op.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10575)
There is an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure used in
exponentiation with 512-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis
suggests that attacks against 2-prime RSA1024, 3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a
result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed
likely. Attacks against DH512 are considered just feasible. However, for an
attack the target would have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not
recommended anyway. Also applications directly using the low level API
BN_mod_exp may be affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
CVE-2019-1551
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10575)
Even with custom ciphers, the combination in == NULL && inl == 0
should not be passed down to the backend cipher function. The reason
is that these are the values passed by EVP_*Final, and some of the
backend cipher functions do check for these to see if a "final" call
is made.
An exception is made for CCM mode which has special handling for the case
where inl == 0: this may mean the total plaintext or ciphertext length is 0.
This is based on an original commit by Richard Levitte.
Fixes#8675
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9057)
We used EVP_EncryptInit_ex() to initialise, but EVP_DecryptUpdate()
and EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() to actually perform encryption. This worked
long ago, when the Encrypt and Decrypt variants were the same, but
doesn't now (actually haven't for a very long time).
This shows how seldom PVK is actually used.
Fixes#9338
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10521)
Check for NULL and return error if so.
This can possibly be called from apps/ca.c with a NULL argument.
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10474)
(cherry picked from commit ab5c77b4766e0992751d86560193ca42b49cf316)
Add NULL check for return from pkey_asn1_meths.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10473)
(cherry picked from commit 9bada854de16bcc1a9dc199b4b352b19ab6897fc)
Verifications are public, there is no need to clear the used storage before
freeing it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10475)
(cherry picked from commit cff7d199e0dc51ae939de5fb7702aab2a9ef30fc)
We store a secondary frame pointer info for the debugger
in the red zone.
Fixes#8853
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9624)
(cherry picked from commit 9ce91035bcf7d74fe15c94650f3bc1f89b7c0f07)
In addition to 67c81ec3 which introduced this behavior in CCM mode
docs but only implemented it for AES-CCM.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10331)
(cherry picked from commit f7382fbbd846dd3bdea6b8c03b6af22faf0ab94f)
Conflicts:
test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10454)
(cherry picked from commit 97a986f78289fef71bf8778dc4763458e983750c)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10388)
(cherry picked from commit 2555285fa5e4248ad4a5a0bc14ae4606443856c2)
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10417)
(cherry picked from commit c31950b964a2f3f7b9e6ad98076954178ee1e77d)
EC_POINT_bn2point() rejected BIGNUMs with a zero value.
This behavior indirectly caused failures when converting a point
at infinity through EC_POINT_point2hex() and then back to a point with
EC_POINT_hex2point().
With this change such BIGNUMs are treated like any other and exported to
an octet buffer filled with zero.
It is then EC_POINT_oct2point() (either the default implementation or
the custom one in group->meth->oct2point) to determine if such encoding
maps to a valid point (generally the point at infinity is encoded as
0x00).
Fixes#10258
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10329)
(cherry picked from commit d47c10875656790d146f62ac3c437db54c58dbf7)
'__builtin_strncpy' offset [275, 4095] from the object at
'direntry' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'd_name'
with type 'char[256]' at offset 19
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10343)
(cherry picked from commit db5cf86535b305378308c58c52596994e1ece1e6)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10361)
(cherry picked from commit d1c1fb2d41a627293483d832aaffcb6eca9075f9)
If no connection could be made, addr_iter will eventually end up being
NULL, and if the user didn't check the returned error value, the
BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT code will be performed again and will crash.
So instead, we add a state BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT_ERROR that we enter into
when we run out of addresses to try. That state will just simply say
"error" back, until the user does something better with the BIO, such
as free it or reset it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10333)
