Clarify the intended use of EVP_PKEY_sign. Make the code example compile.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d64c533a20)
In Visual Studio, inline is available in C++ only, however __inline is available for C, see
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f511b25a73)
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:
A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f5a8805b82d1ae81168b11b7f1506db9e047dec)
Invalid parameters passed to the SRP code can be overrun an internal
buffer. Add sanity check that g, A, B < N to SRP code.
Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
Group for reporting this issue.
If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been
set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious
server could exploit this in a DoS attack.
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon
for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-2970
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.
CVE-2014-3508
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice.
Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.
I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
|dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
return value, leaking the fragment.
This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.
Fixes CVE-2014-3507
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
connection.
In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
check was applied.
Fixes CVE-2014-3506
Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
freed.
Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).
Fixes CVE-2014-3505
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
We can't rename ssleay_rand_bytes to md_rand_bytes_lock as this will cause
an error code discrepancy. Instead keep ssleay_rand_bytes and add an
extra parameter: since ssleay_rand_bytes is not part of the public API
this wont cause any binary compatibility issues.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org >
Don't call internal functions directly call them through
SSL_test_functions(). This also makes unit testing work on
Windows and platforms that don't export internal functions
from shared libraries.
By default unit testing is not enabled: it requires the compile
time option "enable-unit-test".
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fc7961c4)
Conflicts:
ssl/heartbeat_test.c
ssl/ssl.h
util/mkdef.pl
statement of opinion rather than a fact.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8d133e4b6)
