The function CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey() is a "set0" and therefore
memory management passes to OpenSSL. If the same function is called again
then we should ensure that any previous value that was set is freed first
before we set it again.
Fixes#5052
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6142)
Make X509_OBJECT, X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP,
and X509_LOOKUP_METHOD opaque.
Remove unused X509_CERT_FILE_CTX
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
There are header files in crypto/ that are used by a number of crypto/
submodules. Move those to crypto/include/internal and adapt the
affected source code and Makefiles.
The header files that got moved are:
crypto/cryptolib.h
crypto/md32_common.h
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
After the finale, the "real" final part. :) Do a recursive grep with
"-B1 -w [a-zA-Z0-9_]*_free" to see if any of the preceeding lines are
an "if NULL" check that can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Don't check for NULL before calling a free routine. This gets X509_.*free:
x509_name_ex_free X509_policy_tree_free X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free
X509_STORE_free X509_STORE_CTX_free X509_PKEY_free
X509_OBJECT_free_contents X509_LOOKUP_free X509_INFO_free
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Move ASN.1 internals used across multiple directories into new internal
header file asn1_int.h remove crypto/Makefile hack which allowed other
directories to include "asn1_locl.h"
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
If the key type does not match any CMS recipient type return
an error instead of using a random key (MMA mitigation). This
does not leak any useful information to an attacker.
PR#3348
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
continue with symmetric decryption process to avoid leaking timing
information to an attacker.
Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
