Add ranged checked OSSL_PARAM conversions between the native types. A
conversion is legal only if the given value can be exactly represented
by the target type.
Includes a test case that reads a stanza test case file and verified that param
conversions are processed properly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8733)
In the development of the CRMF sub-system, there seems to have been
some confusion as to what configuration option should be used.
'no-crmf' was added, but the C macro guards were using OPENSSL_NO_CMP
rather than OPENSSL_NO_CRMF...
In fact, we want 'no-cmp', but since the CRMF code is part of CMP, we
need 'no-crmf' to depend on 'no-cmp'. We do this by making 'crmf' a
silent "option" that get affected by 'cmp' by way of %disable_cascades.
This allows options to be "aliases" for a set of other ones, silent or
not.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8897)
The kernel self-tests picked up an issue with CTR mode. The issue was
detected with a test vector with an IV of
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFD: after 3 increments it should wrap
around to 0.
There are two paths that increment IVs: the bulk (8 at a time) path,
and the individual path which is used when there are fewer than 8 AES
blocks to process.
In the bulk path, the IV is incremented with vadduqm: "Vector Add
Unsigned Quadword Modulo", which does 128-bit addition.
In the individual path, however, the IV is incremented with vadduwm:
"Vector Add Unsigned Word Modulo", which instead does 4 32-bit
additions. Thus the IV would instead become
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF00000000, throwing off the result.
Use vadduqm.
This was probably a typo originally, what with q and w being
adjacent.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8942)
X963 KDF is used for CMS ec keyagree Recipient Info.
The X963 KDF that is used by CMS EC Key Agreement has been moved
into a EVP_KDF object. This KDF is almost identical to the the SSKDF
hash variant, so it has been implemented inside the SSKDF code with
its own method table.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8902)
Now that the legacy NID isn't used as a main index for fetched
algorithms, the legacy NID was just transported around unnecessarily.
This is removed, and the legacy NID is simply set by EVP_{API}_fetch()
after the construction process is done.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8878)
We didn't deal very well with names that didn't have pre-defined NIDs,
as the NID zero travelled through the full process and resulted in an
inaccessible method. By consequence, we need to refactor the method
construction callbacks to rely more on algorithm names.
We must, however, still store the legacy NID with the method, for the
sake of other code that depend on it (for example, CMS).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8878)
This avoids using the ASN1_OBJECT database, which is bloated for the
purpose of a simple number <-> name database.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8878)
The functions RAND_add() and RAND_seed() provide a legacy API which
enables the application to seed the CSPRNG.
But NIST SP-800-90A clearly mandates that entropy *shall not* be provided
by the consuming application, neither for instantiation, nor for reseeding.
The provided random data will be mixed into the DRBG state as additional
data only, and no entropy will accounted for it.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8722)
OBJ_bsearch_ and OBJ_bsearch_ex_ are generic functions that don't
really belong with the OBJ API, but should rather be generic utility
functions. The ending underscore indicates that they are considered
internal, even though they are declared publicly.
Since crypto/stack/stack.c uses OBJ_bsearch_ex_, the stack API ends up
depending on the OBJ API, which is unnecessary, and carries along
other dependencies.
Therefor, a generic internal function is created, ossl_bsearch().
This removes the unecessary dependencies.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8899)
This change allows to pass the authentication tag after specifying
the AAD in CCM mode. This is already true for the other two supported
AEAD modes (GCM and OCB) and it seems appropriate to match the
behavior.
GCM and OCB also support to set the tag at any point before the call
to `EVP_*Final`, but this won't work for CCM due to a restriction
imposed by section 2.6 of RFC3610: The tag must be set before
actually decrypting data.
This commit also adds a test case for setting the tag after supplying
plaintext length and AAD.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7243)
If ctx->cipher->cupdate/ctx->cipher->cfinal failed, 'soutl' is left
uninitialized.
This patch incorporates the same logic as present in EVP_DecryptUpdate and
EVP_DecryptFinal_ex: only branch on 'soutl' if the preceding call succeeded.
Bug found by OSS-Fuzz.
Signed-off-by: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8874)
This commit adds the SSL_sendfile call, which allows KTLS sockets to
transmit file using zero-copy semantics.
Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8727)
Conform to other modules which were changed at the last minute and this
discrepancy was not noticed.
Retain "md" as an alias so not to break 3rd party backports/tests scripts.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8783)
We should be seeking to move the OPENSSL_init_crypto and OPENSSL_cleanup
processing into OPENSSL_CTX instead.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8857)
Various core and property related code files used global data. We should
store all of that in an OPENSSL_CTX instead.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8857)
Introduce a macro that allows all structure alignment tricks to be rolled up
into a single place.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8845)
OSSL_provider_init() gets another output parameter, holding a pointer
to a provider side context. It's entirely up to the provider to
define the context and what it's being used for. This pointer is
passed back to other provider functions, typically the provider global
get_params and set_params functions, and also the diverse algorithm
context creators, and of course, the teardown function.
With this, a provider can be instantiated more than once, or be
re-loaded as the case may be, while maintaining instance state.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8848)
The OP_cipher_final function takes a return output size and an output
buffer size argument. The oneshot OP_cipher_cipher function should do
the same.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8849)
Digest stored entropy for CRNG test.
Via the FIPS lab, NIST confirmed:
The CMVP had a chance to discuss this inquiry and we agree that
hashing the NDRNG block does meet the spirit and letter of AS09.42.
However, the CMVP did have a few questions: what hash algorithm would
be used in this application? Is it approved? Is it CAVs tested?
SHA256 is being used here and it will be both approved and CAVs tested.
This means that no raw entropy needs to be kept between RNG seedings, preventing
a potential attack vector aganst the randomness source and the DRBG chains.
It also means the block of secure memory allocated for this purpose is no longer
required.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8790)
pkey_rsa_copy was missing a field. Test this by repeating the operation
through an EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup copy in evp_test.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8759)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8181)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8181)
Add non-base instructions which are used by the chacha20 and
poly1305 modules.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8181)
z14 introduced alignment hints to help vector load/store
performance. For its predecessors, alignment hint defaults
to 0 (no alignment indicated).
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8181)
Return error if the output tag buffer size doesn't match
the tag size exactly. This prevents the caller from
using that portion of the tag buffer that remains
uninitialized after an otherwise succesfull call to
CRYPTO_ccm128_tag.
Bug found by OSS-Fuzz.
Fix suggested by Kurt Roeckx.
Signed-off-by: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8810)
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_DIR) gives you a nicely formatted string for
display, but if all you really want is the directory itself, you were
forced to parsed the string.
This introduces a new function to get diverse configuration data from
the library, OPENSSL_info(). This works the same way as
OpenSSL_version(), but has its own series of types, currently
including:
OPENSSL_INFO_CONFIG_DIR returns OPENSSLDIR
OPENSSL_INFO_ENGINES_DIR returns ENGINESDIR
OPENSSL_INFO_MODULES_DIR returns MODULESDIR
OPENSSL_INFO_DSO_EXTENSION returns DSO_EXTENSION
OPENSSL_INFO_DIR_FILENAME_SEPARATOR returns directory/filename separator
OPENSSL_INFO_LIST_SEPARATOR returns list separator
For scripting purposes, this also adds the command 'openssl info'.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8709)
This adds the flag OPENSSL_MODULES_DIR for OpenSSL_version(), and the
flag '-m' for 'openssl version'.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8709)
