While travelling up the certificate chain, the internal
proxy_path_length must be updated with the pCPathLengthConstraint
value, or verification will not work properly. This corresponds to
RFC 3820, 4.1.4 (a).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
The subject name MUST be the same as the issuer name, with a single CN
entry added.
RT#1852
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1074)
Since with SSL_VERIFY_NONE, the connection may continue and the
session may even be cached, we should save some evidence that the
chain was not sufficiently verified and would have been rejected
with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. To that end when a CT callback returs failure
we set the verify result to X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS.
Note: We only run the CT callback in the first place if the verify
result is still X509_V_OK prior to start of the callback.
RT #4502
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Set ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM when verificaiton cannot
continue due to malloc failure. Also, when X509_verify_cert()
returns <= 0 make sure that the verification status does not remain
X509_V_OK, as a last resort set it it to X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED,
just in case some code path returns an error without setting an
appropriate value of ctx->error.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
An if checks the value of |type| to see if it is V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING
twice. We only need to do it once.
GitHub Issue #656
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Add a status return value instead of void.
Add some sanity checks on reference counter value.
Update the docs.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The name length limit check in x509_name_ex_d2i() includes
the containing structure as well as the actual X509_NAME. This will
cause large CRLs to be rejected.
Fix by limiting the length passed to ASN1_item_ex_d2i() which will
then return an error if the passed X509_NAME exceeds the length.
RT#4531
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in
applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems.
This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2176
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some
part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to
restrictions on certificate size.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The length is a long, so returning the difference does not quite work.
Thanks to Torbjörn Granlund for noticing.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
OpenSSL 1.1.0-pre5 has made some additional structs opaque. Python's ssl
module requires access to some of the struct members. Three new getters
are added:
int X509_OBJECT_get_type(X509_OBJECT *a);
STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *X509_STORE_get0_objects(X509_STORE *v);
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_get0_param(X509_STORE *ctx);
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Coverity reports a potential NULL deref when "2 0 0" DANE trust-anchors
from DNS are configured via SSL_dane_tlsa_add() and X509_STORE_CTX_init()
is called with a NULL stack of untrusted certificates.
Since ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provideds a non-NULL stack of
untrusted certs, and no other code path enables DANE, the problem
can only happen in applications that use SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback()
to implement their own wrappers around X509_verify_cert() passing
only the leaf certificate to the latter.
Regardless of the "improbability" of the problem, we do need to
ensure that build_chain() handles this case correctly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Add X509_STORE_{set,get}_ex_data() function and
X509_STORE_get_ex_new_index() macro.
X509_STORE has ex_data and the documentation also mentions them but they
are not actually implemented.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The i2d_X509() function can return a negative value on error. Therefore
we should make sure we check it.
Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
The Unix build was the last to retain the classic build scheme. The
new unified scheme has matured enough, even though some details may
need polishing.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Make OBJ_name_cmp internal
Rename idea_xxx to IDEA_xxx
Rename get_rfc_xxx to BN_get_rfc_xxx
Rename v3_addr and v3_asid functions to X509v3_...
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Make X509_OBJECT, X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP,
and X509_LOOKUP_METHOD opaque.
Remove unused X509_CERT_FILE_CTX
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
A new X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() function sets the
authentication security level. For verification of SSL peers, this
is automatically set from the SSL security level. Otherwise, for
now, the authentication security level remains at (effectively) 0
by default.
The new "-auth_level" verify(1) option is available in all the
command-line tools that support the standard verify(1) options.
New verify(1) tests added to check enforcement of chain signature
and public key security levels. Also added new tests of enforcement
of the verify_depth limit.
Updated documentation.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Don't decode a public key in X509_PUBKEY_get0(): that is handled when
the key is parsed using x509_pubkey_decode() instead.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Cache the decoded public key when an X509_PUBKEY structure is initially
parsed so no locking is required. Ignore any decode errors.
When an application calls X509_PUBKEY_get0() subsequently it will either
get the cached key or the decode operation will be repeated which will
return an appropriate error.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Previously, it was sufficient to have certSign in keyUsage when the
basicConstraints extension was missing. That is still accepted in
a trust anchor, but is no longer accepted in an intermediate CA.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Don't have #error statements in header files, but instead wrap
the contents of that file in #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx
This means it is now always safe to include the header file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The locking here is a bit strange and unclear. Rather than refactor
anything and possibly break stuff I have just moved to using the new
thread API following as closely as possible what was there previously.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This takes us away from the idea that we know exactly how our static
libraries are going to get used. Instead, we make them available to
build shareable things with, be it other shared libraries or DSOs.
On the other hand, we also have greater control of when the shared
library cflags. They will never be used with object files meant got
binaries, such as apps/openssl or test/test*.
With unified, we take this a bit further and prepare for having to
deal with extra cflags specifically to be used with DSOs (dynamic
engines), libraries and binaries (applications).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
All those flags existed because we had all the dependencies versioned
in the repository, and wanted to have it be consistent, no matter what
the local configuration was. Now that the dependencies are gone from
the versioned Makefile.ins, it makes much more sense to use the exact
same flags as when compiling the object files.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This was a developer debugging feature and was never a useful public
interface.
Added all missing X509 error codes to the verify(1) manpage, but
many still need a description beyond the associated text string.
Sorted the errors in x509_txt.c by error number.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
As documented both SSL_get0_dane_authority() and SSL_get0_dane_tlsa()
are expected to return a negative match depth and nothing else when
verification fails. However, this only happened when verification
failed during chain construction. Errors in verification of the
constructed chain did not have the intended effect on these functions.
This commit updates the functions to check for verify_result ==
X509_V_OK, and no longer erases any accumulated match information
when chain construction fails. Sophisticated developers can, with
care, use SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK) to "peek" at TLSA
info even when verification fail. They must of course first check
and save the real error, and restore the original error as quickly
as possible. Hiding by default seems to be the safer interface.
Introduced X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH code to signal failure to find
matching TLSA records. Previously reported via X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED.
This also changes the "-brief" output from s_client to include
verification results and TLSA match information.
Mentioned session resumption in code example in SSL_CTX_dane_enable(3).
Also mentioned that depths returned are relative to the verified chain
which is now available via SSL_get0_verified_chain(3).
Added a few more test-cases to danetest, that exercise the new
code.
Resolved thread safety issue in use of static buffer in
X509_verify_cert_error_string().
Fixed long-stating issue in apps/s_cb.c which always sets verify_error
to either X509_V_OK or "chain to long", code elsewhere (e.g.
s_time.c), seems to expect the actual error. [ The new chain
construction code is expected to correctly generate "chain
too long" errors, so at some point we need to drop the
work-arounds, once SSL_set_verify_depth() is also fixed to
propagate the depth to X509_STORE_CTX reliably. ]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Replace all magic numbers with #defined constants except in boolean
functions that return 0 for failure and 1 for success. Avoid a
couple memory leaks in error recovery code paths. Code style
improvements.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Now that we have the foundation for the "unified" build scheme in
place, we add build.info files. They have been generated from the
Makefiles in the same directories. Things that are platform specific
will appear in later commits.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
When auxiliary data contains only reject entries, continue to trust
self-signed objects just as when no auxiliary data is present.
This makes it possible to reject specific uses without changing
what's accepted (and thus overring the underlying EKU).
Added new supported certs and doubled test count from 38 to 76.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This includes basic constraints, key usages, issuer EKUs and auxiliary
trust OIDs (given a trust suitably related to the intended purpose).
Added tests and updated documentation.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
By default X509_check_trust() trusts self-signed certificates from
the trust store that have no explicit local trust/reject oids
encapsulated as a "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" object. (See the -addtrust
and -trustout options of x509(1)).
This commit adds a flag that makes it possible to distinguish between
that implicit trust, and explicit auxiliary settings.
With flags |= X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT, a certificate is only trusted
via explicit trust settings.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in
self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it
suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects.
But for partial chains, this is not enough, because absent a similar
trust-self-signed policy, non matching EKUs are indistinguishable
from lack of EKU constraints.
Therefore, failure to match any trusted purpose must trigger an
explicit reject.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
When DANE-EE(3) matches or either of DANE-EE/PKIX-EE fails, we don't
build a chain at all, but rather succeed or fail with just the leaf
certificate. In either case also check for Suite-B violations.
As unlikely as it may seem that anyone would enable both DANE and
Suite-B, we should do what the application asks.
Took the opportunity to eliminate the "cb" variables in x509_vfy.c,
just call ctx->verify_cb(ok, ctx)
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
It seems risky in the context of cross-signed certificates when the
same certificate might have multiple potential issuers. Also rarely
used, since chains in OpenSSL typically only employ self-signed
trust-anchors, whose self-signatures are not checked, while untrusted
certificates are generally ephemeral.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Remove lint, tags, dclean, tests.
This is prep for a new makedepend scheme.
This is temporary pending unified makefile, and might help it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Create Makefile's from Makefile.in
Rename Makefile.org to Makefile.in
Rename Makefiles to Makefile.in
Address review feedback from Viktor and Richard
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Only two macros CRYPTO_MDEBUG and CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT to control this.
If CRYPTO_MDEBUG is not set, #ifdef out the whole debug machinery.
(Thanks to Jakob Bohm for the suggestion!)
Make the "change wrapper functions" be the only paradigm.
Wrote documentation!
Format the 'set func' functions so their paramlists are legible.
Format some multi-line comments.
Remove ability to get/set the "memory debug" functions at runtme.
Remove MemCheck_* and CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init macros.
Add CRYPTO_mem_debug(int flag) function.
Add test/memleaktest.
Rename CRYPTO_malloc_init to OPENSSL_malloc_init; remove needless calls.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Applications wishing to include their own stacks now just need to include
DEFINE_STACK_OF(foo)
in a header file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Also tweak some of the code in demos/bio, to enable interactive
testing of BIO_s_accept's use of SSL_dup. Changed the sconnect
client to authenticate the server, which now exercises the new
SSL_set1_host() function.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Rename BUF_{strdup,strlcat,strlcpy,memdup,strndup,strnlen}
to OPENSSL_{strdup,strlcat,strlcpy,memdup,strndup,strnlen}
Add #define's for the old names.
Add CRYPTO_{memdup,strndup}, called by OPENSSL_{memdup,strndup} macros.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Add CRYPTO_free_ex_index (for shared libraries)
Unify and complete the documentation for all "ex_data" API's and objects.
Replace xxx_get_ex_new_index functions with a macro.
Added an exdata test.
Renamed the ex_data internal datatypes.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This patch contains the necessary changes to provide GOST 2012
ciphersuites in TLS. It requires the use of an external GOST 2012 engine.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Print certificate details using accessor functions.
Since X509_CERT_AUX_print is only used in one place and can't
be used by applications (it uses an internal X509_CERT_AUX structure)
this has been removed and replaced by a function X509_aux_print which
takes an X509 pointer instead.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Rebuild error source files: the new mkerr.pl functionality will now
pick up and translate static function names properly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Much related/similar work also done by
Ivan Nestlerode <ivan.nestlerode@sonos.com>
+Replace FILE BIO's with dummy ops that fail.
+Include <stdio.h> for sscanf() even with no-stdio (since the declaration
is there). We rely on sscanf() to parse the OPENSSL_ia32cap environment
variable, since it can be larger than a 'long'. And we don't rely on the
availability of strtoull().
+Remove OPENSSL_stderr(); not used.
+Make OPENSSL_showfatal() do nothing (currently without stdio there's
nothing we can do).
+Remove file-based functionality from ssl/. The function
prototypes were already gone, but not the functions themselves.
+Remove unviable conf functionality via SYS_UEFI
+Add fallback definition of BUFSIZ.
+Remove functions taking FILE * from header files.
+Add missing DECLARE_PEM_write_fp_const
+Disable X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir(). X509_LOOKUP_file() was already compiled out,
so remove its prototype.
+Use OPENSSL_showfatal() in CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid().
+Eliminate SRP_VBASE_init() and supporting functions. Users will need to
build the verifier manually instead.
+Eliminate compiler warning for unused do_pk8pkey_fp().
+Disable TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY.
+Disable GOST engine as is uses [f]printf all over the place.
+Eliminate compiler warning for unused send_fp_chars().
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
In some environments, such as firmware, the current system time is entirely
meaningless. Provide a clean mechanism to suppress the checks against it.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This reverts the non-cleanup parts of commit c73ad69017. We do actually
have a reasonable use case for OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 in the EDK2 UEFI
build, since we don't have a strspn() function in our runtime environment
and we don't want the RFC3779 functionality anyway.
In addition, it changes the default behaviour of the Configure script so
that RFC3779 support isn't disabled by default. It was always disabled
from when it was first added in 2006, right up until the point where
OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 was turned into a no-op, and the code in the
Configure script was left *trying* to disable it, but not actually
working.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
There are many places (nearly 50) where we malloc and then memset.
Add an OPENSSL_zalloc routine to encapsulate that.
(Missed one conversion; thanks Richard)
Also fixes GH328
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Initialize pointers in param id by the book (explicit NULL assignment,
rather than just memset 0).
In x509_verify_param_zero() set peername to NULL after freeing it.
In x509_vfy.c's internal check_hosts(), avoid potential leak of
possibly already non-NULL peername. This is only set when a check
succeeds, so don't need to do this repeatedly in the loop.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Fix more potential leaks in X509_verify_cert()
Fix memory leak in ClientHello test
Fix memory leak in gost2814789 test
Fix potential memory leak in PKCS7_verify()
Fix potential memory leaks in X509_add1_reject_object()
Refactor to use "goto err" in cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
This was obsolete in 2001. This is not the same as Gost94 digest.
Thanks to Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> for review and advice.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The -show_chain flag to the verify command line app shows information about
the chain that has been built. This commit adds the text "untrusted" against
those certificates that have been used from the untrusted list.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
|ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where
|ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
in between.
2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
the value of |ctx->chain| directly.
With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
not be supported to allow this.
With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.
Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
|ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the
trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case
ctx->last_untrusted is decremented in error.
Patch provided by the BoringSSL project.
CVE-2015-1793
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.
CVE-2015-1789
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Using an enum with -Wswitch means all lookup routines handle
all cases. Remove X509_LU_PKEY which was never used.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
We had updates of certain header files in both Makefile.org and the
Makefile in the directory the header file lived in. This is error
prone and also sometimes generates slightly different results (usually
just a comment that differs) depending on which way the update was
done.
This removes the file update targets from the top level Makefile, adds
an update: target in all Makefiles and has it depend on the depend: or
local_depend: targets, whichever is appropriate, so we don't get a
double run through the whole file tree.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
There are header files in crypto/ that are used by a number of crypto/
submodules. Move those to crypto/include/internal and adapt the
affected source code and Makefiles.
The header files that got moved are:
crypto/cryptolib.h
crypto/md32_common.h
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Compiling OpenSSL code with MSVC and /W4 results in a number of warnings.
One category of warnings is particularly interesting - C4701 (potentially
uninitialized local variable 'name' used). This warning pretty much means
that there's a code path which results in uninitialized variables being used
or returned. Depending on compiler, its options, OS, values in registers
and/or stack, the results can be nondeterministic. Cases like this are very
hard to debug so it's rational to fix these issues.
This patch contains a set of trivial fixes for all the C4701 warnings (just
initializing variables to 0 or NULL or appropriate error code) to make sure
that deterministic values will be returned from all the execution paths.
RT#3835
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Matt's note: All of these appear to be bogus warnings, i.e. there isn't
actually a code path where an unitialised variable could be used - its just
that the compiler hasn't been able to figure that out from the logic. So
this commit is just about silencing spurious warnings.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Just as with the OPENSSL_malloc calls, consistently use sizeof(*ptr)
for memset and memcpy. Remove needless casts for those functions.
For memset, replace alternative forms of zero with 0.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
For a local variable:
TYPE *p;
Allocations like this are "risky":
p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TYPE));
if the type of p changes, and the malloc call isn't updated, you
could get memory corruption. Instead do this:
p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*p));
Also fixed a few memset() calls that I noticed while doing this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
After the finale, the "real" final part. :) Do a recursive grep with
"-B1 -w [a-zA-Z0-9_]*_free" to see if any of the preceeding lines are
an "if NULL" check that can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Don't check for NULL before calling a free routine. This gets X509_.*free:
x509_name_ex_free X509_policy_tree_free X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free
X509_STORE_free X509_STORE_CTX_free X509_PKEY_free
X509_OBJECT_free_contents X509_LOOKUP_free X509_INFO_free
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Do not check for NULL before calling a free routine. This addresses:
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free ASN1_INTEGER_free
ASN1_OBJECT_free ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free ASN1_PCTX_free ASN1_SCTX_free
ASN1_STRING_clear_free ASN1_STRING_free ASN1_TYPE_free
ASN1_UTCTIME_free M_ASN1_free_of
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
With no more symlinks, there's no need for those variables, or the links
target. This also goes for all install: and uninstall: targets that do
nothing but copy $(EXHEADER) files, since that's now taken care of by the
top Makefile.
Also, removed METHTEST from test/Makefile. It looks like an old test that's
forgotten...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Rather than making include/openssl/foo.h a symlink to
crypto/foo/foo.h, this change moves the file to include/openssl/foo.h
once and for all.
Likewise, move crypto/foo/footest.c to test/footest.c, instead of
symlinking it there.
Originally-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Remove partially implemented d2i_X509_PKEY and i2d_X509_PKEY: nothing
uses them and they don't work properly. Update ordinals.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
EVP_.*free; this gets:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_asn1_free
EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free EVP_PKEY_free EVP_PKEY_free_it
EVP_PKEY_meth_free; and also EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
The X509_ATTRIBUTE structure includes a hack to tolerate malformed
attributes that encode as the type instead of SET OF type. This form
is never created by OpenSSL and shouldn't be needed any more.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Disable loop checking when we retry verification with an alternative path.
This fixes the case where an intermediate CA is explicitly trusted and part
of the untrusted certificate list. By disabling loop checking for this case
the untrusted CA can be replaced by the explicitly trusted case and
verification will succeed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Remove old M_ASN1_ macros and replace any occurences with the corresponding
function.
Remove d2i_ASN1_bytes, d2i_ASN1_SET, i2d_ASN1_SET: no longer used internally.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Remove DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF and DECLARE_PKCS12_STACK_OF these haven't been
used internally in OpenSSL for some time.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
