The supported signature algorithms extension needs to be processed before
the certificate to use is decided and before a cipher is selected (as the
set of shared signature algorithms supported may impact the choice).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
see RT #3203
Future versions of OpenSSL use the canonical terms "ECDHE" and "DHE"
as configuration strings and compilation constants. This patch
introduces aliases so that the stable 1.0.2 branch can be
forward-compatible with code and configuration scripts that use the
normalized terms, while avoiding changing any library output for
stable users.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
announced in the initial ServerHello.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d663df2399)
SSL_set_SSL_CTX is used to change the SSL_CTX for SNI, keep the
supported signature algorithms and raw cipherlist.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 14e14bf696)
Since SNI will typically switch the SSL_CTX structure to the one
corresponding to the appopriate server we need to parse custom
extensions using the switched SSL_CTX not the original one. This
is done by parsing custom extensions *after* SNI.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set
the method to NULL. We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things. This is a
regression introduced in 62f45cc27d. Keep the old
method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time.
CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 392fa7a952)
Related to CVE-2014-3513
This fix was developed by the OpenSSL Team
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
util/mkdef.pl
util/ssleay.num
Conflicts:
util/mkdef.pl
CVE-2014-3513
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th September 2014, based on an original
issue and patch developed by the LibreSSL project. Further analysis of the issue
was performed by the OpenSSL team.
The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Original commit adb46dbc6d)
Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 455b65dfab)
that bad encryptions are treated like random session keys in constant
time.
(cherry picked from commit adb46dbc6d)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Also tweak s3_cbc.c to use new constant-time methods.
Also fix memory leaks from internal errors in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1
This patch is based on the original RT submission by Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>,
as well as code from BoringSSL and OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
ssl/s3_cbc.c
that fixed PR#3450 where an existing cast masked an issue when i was changed
from int to long in that commit
Picked up on z/linux (s390) where sizeof(int)!=sizeof(long)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b5ff559ff9)
Fix a bug in handling of 128 byte long PSK identity in
psk_client_callback.
OpenSSL supports PSK identities of up to (and including) 128 bytes in
length. PSK identity is obtained via the psk_client_callback,
implementors of which are expected to provide a NULL-terminated
identity. However, the callback is invoked with only 128 bytes of
storage thus making it impossible to return a 128 byte long identity and
the required additional NULL byte.
This CL fixes the issue by passing in a 129 byte long buffer into the
psk_client_callback. As a safety precaution, this CL also zeroes out the
buffer before passing it into the callback, uses strnlen for obtaining
the length of the identity returned by the callback, and aborts the
handshake if the identity (without the NULL terminator) is longer than
128 bytes.
(Original patch amended to achieve strnlen in a different way.)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be0d851732)
Fix comments in ssltest.c: return value of 0 now means extension is
omitted and add_cb is not called for servers if the corresponding
extension is absent in ClientHello.
Test add_cb is not called if extension is not received.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f47e203975)
Instead of SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext and SSL_CTX_set_custom_srv_ext
use SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext and SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8cafe9e8bf)
Support separate parse and add callback arguments.
Add new callback so an application can free extension data.
Change return value for send functions so < 0 is an error 0
omits extension and > 0 includes it. This is more consistent
with the behaviour of other functions in OpenSSL.
Modify parse_cb handling so <= 0 is an error.
Make SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext and SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext argument
order consistent.
NOTE: these changes WILL break existing code.
Remove (now inaccurate) in line documentation.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 33f653adf3)
Use "parse" and "add" for function and callback names instead of
"first" and "second".
Change arguments to callback so the extension type is unsigned int
and the buffer length is size_t. Note: this *will* break existing code.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit de2a9e38f3)
Since sanity checks are performed for all custom extensions the
serverinfo checks are no longer needed.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 707b026d78)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
Reject attempts to use extensions handled internally.
Add flags to each extension structure to indicate if an extension
has been sent or received. Enforce RFC5246 compliance by rejecting
duplicate extensions and unsolicited extensions and only send a
server extension if we have sent the corresponding client extension.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 28ea0a0c6a)
Use the same structure for client and server custom extensions.
Add utility functions in new file t1_ext.c.
Use new utility functions to handle custom server and client extensions
and remove a lot of code duplication.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ecf4d66090)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_lib.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
Move custom extension structures from SSL_CTX to CERT structure.
This change means the form can be revised in future without binary
compatibility issues. Also since CERT is part of SSL structures
so per-SSL custom extensions could be supported in future as well as
per SSL_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b83294fe30)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_cert.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Pull constant-time methods out to a separate header, add tests.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5a3d21c058)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_cbc.c
test/Makefile
Extra SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile() declaration in ssl/srtp.h
causes -Werror builds to fail.
Cherry-picked from 3609b02305
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Limit the number of empty records that will be processed consecutively
in order to prevent ssl3_get_record from never returning.
Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed" and George Kadianakis.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:
A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f5a8805b82d1ae81168b11b7f1506db9e047dec)
If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been
set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious
server could exploit this in a DoS attack.
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon
for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-2970
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice.
Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
