Added NIST test cases for these two as well.
Additionally deprecate the public definiton of HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK in 1.2.0.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6972)
Add make clean for evp demos and remove whitespace from a line.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7072)
Add one more unit test case
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6892)
They add a single item, so the names give a false impression of what
they do, making them hard to remember. Better to give them a somewhat
better name.
Fixes#6930
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6931)
This trivial patch removes a duplicated call to ASN1_INTEGER_set.
Fixes Issue #6977
Signed-off-by: Eric Brown <browne@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6984)
Fixes#6994
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7009)
Add or update the documentation of the different man pages in relation to TLSv1.3 behaviour.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6939)
IBM POWER Open Source Ecosystem division asserts commitment to providing
more reliable service. GH#7016.
This reverts commit 275bfc56a6.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
asn1_encode has two form length octets: short form(1 byte), long form(1+n byte).
CLA: Trivial
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7027)
-path is non-portable extension, fortunately it's possible to express
.git subdirectory exclusion with -prune.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7004)
In [most common] case of p and q being of same width, it's possible to
replace CRT modulo operations with Montgomery reductions. And those are
even fixed-length Montgomery reductions...
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6915)
Add bn_{mul|sqr}_fixed_top, bn_from_mont_fixed_top, bn_mod_sub_fixed_top.
Switch to bn_{mul|sqr}_fixed_top in bn_mul_mont_fixed_top and remove
memset in bn_from_montgomery_word.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6915)
The shared libraries are now stored as members of archives, as it is usual
on AIX. To correctly address this the custom dladdr()-implementation as
well as the dlfcn_load() routine need to be able to cope with such a
construct: libname.a(libname.so).
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kraft <Matthias.Kraft@softwareag.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6872)
It was assumed that CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL is universally scalar type,
which doesn't appear to hold true.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6976)
Original could allocate nid and then bail out on malloc failure. Instead
allocate first *then* attempt to create object.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6998)
This follows on from the previous commit, and makes the same change to
ignore the digest if we are using EdDSA.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6901)
Previously you had to supply "null" as the digest to use EdDSA. This changes
things so that any digest is ignored.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6901)
We recently turned on the TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels by default.
Unfortunately we are using a very old version of the BoringSSL test
runner which uses an old draft implementation of TLSv1.3 that also
uses the downgrade sentinels by default. The two implementations do
not play well together and were causing spurious test failures. Until
such time as we update the BoringSSL test runner we disable the failing
tests:
SendFallbackSCSV
In this test the client is OpenSSL and the server is the boring test runner.
The client and server fail to negotiate TLSv1.3 because the test runner is
using an old draft TLSv1.3 version. The server does however add the
TLSv1.3->TLSv1.2 downgrade sentinel in the ServerHello random. Since we
recently turned on checking of the downgrade sentinels on the client side
this causes the connection to fail.
VersionNegotiationExtension-TLS11
In this test the test runner is the client and OpenSSL is the server. The
test modifies the supported_versions extension sent by the client to only
include TLSv1.1 (and some other spurious versions), even though the client
does actually support TLSv1.2. The server successfully selects TLSv1.1, but
adds the TLSv1.3->TLSv1.1 downgrade sentinel. This behaviour was recently
switched on by default. The test runner then checks the downgrade sentinel
and aborts the connection because it knows that it really supports TLSv1.2.
VersionNegotiationExtension-TLS1
VersionNegotiationExtension-SSL3
The same as VersionNegotiationExtension-TLS11 but for TLSv1 and SSLv3.
ConflictingVersionNegotiation
In this test the client is the test runner, and OpenSSL is the server. The
client offers TLSv1.2 in ClientHello.version, but also adds a
supported_versions extension that only offers TLSv1.1. The
supported_versions extension takes precedence and the server (correctly)
selects TLSv1.1. However it also adds the TLSv1.3->TLSv1.1 downgrade
sentinel. On the client side it knows it actually offered TLSv1.2 and so the
downgrade sentinel check fails.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7013)
We need to ensure that the min-max version range we use when constructing
the ClientHello is the same range we use when we validate the version
selected by the ServerHello. Otherwise this may appear as a fallback or
downgrade.
Fixes#6964
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7013)
Fixes#7022
In pull request #6432 a change was made to keep the handles to the
random devices opened in order to avoid reseeding problems for
applications in chroot environments.
As a consequence, the handles of the random devices were leaked at exit
if the random generator was not used by the application. This happened,
because the call to RAND_set_rand_method(NULL) in rand_cleanup_int()
triggered a call to the call_once function do_rand_init, which opened
the random devices via rand_pool_init().
Thanks to GitHub user @bwelling for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7023)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7021)
The TLS-1.3 ciphersuites must not be blocked by @SECLEVEL=3 even
though they are not explicitly marked as using DH/ECDH.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6959)
This commit destroys the free list pointers which would otherwise be
present in the returned memory blocks. This in turn helps prevent
information leakage from the secure memory area.
Note: CRYPTO_secure_malloc is not guaranteed to return zeroed memory:
before the secure memory system is initialised or if it isn't implemented.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7011)
The EFD database does not state that the "ladd-2002-it-3" algorithm
assumes X1 != 0.
Consequently the current implementation, based on it, fails to compute
correctly if the affine x coordinate of the scalar multiplication input
point is 0.
We replace this implementation using the alternative algorithm based on
Eq. (9) and (10) from the same paper, which being derived from the
additive relation of (6) does not incur in this problem, but costs one
extra field multiplication.
The EFD entry for this algorithm is at
https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-4
and the code to implement it was generated with tooling.
Regression tests add one positive test for each named curve that has
such a point. The `SharedSecret` was generated independently from the
OpenSSL codebase with sage.
This bug was originally reported by Dmitry Belyavsky on the
openssl-users maling list:
https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/2018-August/008540.html
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7000)
