Deprecate the function ASN1_STRING_data() and replace with a new function
ASN1_STRING_get0_data() which returns a constant pointer. Update library
to use new function.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Multiple digest options to the ocsp utility are allowed: e.g. to use
different digests for different certificate IDs. A digest option without
a following certificate is however illegal.
RT#4215
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Link errors were occurring on Windows because the header files were not
correctly guarding some functions with OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
enc:
- typo in -base64 option
- missing help opt text
ocsp, req, rsautl, s_client:
- missing help opt text
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
On some platforms, the implementation is such that a signed char
triggers a warning when used with is*() functions. On others, the
behavior is outright buggy when presented with a char that happens
to get promoted to a negative integer.
The safest thing is to cast the char that's used to an unsigned char.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
The ocsp utility is something of a jack-of-all-trades; most anything
related to the OCSP can be done with it. In particular, the manual
page calls out that it can be used as either a client or a server
of the protocol, but there are also a few things that it can do
which do not quite fit into either role, such as encoding an OCSP
request but not sending it, printing out a text form of an OCSP
response (or request) from a file akin to the asn1parse utility,
or performing a lookup into the server-side revocation database
without actually sending a request or response. All three of these
are documented as examples in the manual page, but the documentation
prior to this commit is somewhat misleading, in that when printing
the text form of an OCSP response, the code also attempts to
verify the response, displaying an error message and returning
failure if the response does not verify. (It is possible that
the response would be able to verify with the given example, since
the default trust roots are used for that verification, but OCSP
responses frequently have alternate certification authorities
that would require passing -CAfile or -CApath for verification.)
Tidy up the documentation by passing -noverify for the case of
converting from binary to textual representation, and also
change a few instances of -respin to -reqin as appropriate, note
that the -url option provides the same functionality as the -host
and -path options, clarify that the example that saves an OCSP
response to a file will also perform verification on that response,
and fix a couple grammar nits in the manual page.
Also remove an always-true conditional for rdb != NULL -- there
are no codepaths in which it could be initialized at the time of
this check.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Rename BUF_{strdup,strlcat,strlcpy,memdup,strndup,strnlen}
to OPENSSL_{strdup,strlcat,strlcpy,memdup,strndup,strnlen}
Add #define's for the old names.
Add CRYPTO_{memdup,strndup}, called by OPENSSL_{memdup,strndup} macros.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Check for Host header in query_responder instead of process_responder. This
also fixes a memory leak in the old code if the headers was NULL.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Loading the config file after processing command line options can
cause problems, e.g. where an engine provides new ciphers/digests
these are not then recoginised on the command line. Move the
default config file loading to before the command line option
processing. Whilst we're doing this we might as well centralise
this instead of doing it individually for each application. Finally
if we do it before the OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() call then
ciphersuites provided by an engine (e.g. GOST) can be available to
the apps.
RT#4085
RT#4086
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
For those command line options that take the verification options
-CApath and -CAfile, if those options are absent then the default path or
file is used instead. It is not currently possible to specify *no* path or
file at all. This change adds the options -no-CApath and -no-CAfile to
specify that the default locations should not be used to all relevant
applications.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
The different apps had the liberty to decide whether they would open their
input and output files in binary mode or not, which could be confusing if
two different apps were handling the same type of file in different ways.
The solution is to centralise the decision of low level file organisation,
and that the apps would use a selection of formats to state the intent of
the file.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Add Host Header in OCSP query if no host header is set via -header
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
The module loading feature got broken a while ago, so restore it, but
have it a bit more explicit this time around.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Continuing from the previous commit this changes the way we do client side
version negotiation. Similarly all of the s23* "up front" state machine code
has been avoided and again things now work much the same way as they already
did for DTLS, i.e. we just do most of the work in the
ssl3_get_server_hello() function.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
After the finale, the "real" final part. :) Do a recursive grep with
"-B1 -w [a-zA-Z0-9_]*_free" to see if any of the preceeding lines are
an "if NULL" check that can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Don't check for NULL before calling a free routine. This gets X509_.*free:
x509_name_ex_free X509_policy_tree_free X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free
X509_STORE_free X509_STORE_CTX_free X509_PKEY_free
X509_OBJECT_free_contents X509_LOOKUP_free X509_INFO_free
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
A variable declaration got dropped during a merge.
And if a compiler inlines strcmp() and you put a strcmp in an
assert message, the resultant stringification exceeds ANSI string
limits.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
This is merges the old "rsalz-monolith" branch over to master. The biggest
change is that option parsing switch from cascasding 'else if strcmp("-foo")'
to a utility routine and somethin akin to getopt. Also, an error in the
command line no longer prints the full summary; use -help (or --help :)
for that. There have been many other changes and code-cleanup, see
bullet list below.
Special thanks to Matt for the long and detailed code review.
TEMPORARY:
For now, comment out CRYPTO_mem_leaks() at end of main
Tickets closed:
RT3515: Use 3DES in pkcs12 if built with no-rc2
RT1766: s_client -reconnect and -starttls broke
RT2932: Catch write errors
RT2604: port should be 'unsigned short'
RT2983: total_bytes undeclared #ifdef RENEG
RT1523: Add -nocert to fix output in x509 app
RT3508: Remove unused variable introduced by b09eb24
RT3511: doc fix; req default serial is random
RT1325,2973: Add more extensions to c_rehash
RT2119,3407: Updated to dgst.pod
RT2379: Additional typo fix
RT2693: Extra include of string.h
RT2880: HFS is case-insensitive filenames
RT3246: req command prints version number wrong
Other changes; incompatibilities marked with *:
Add SCSV support
Add -misalign to speed command
Make dhparam, dsaparam, ecparam, x509 output C in proper style
Make some internal ocsp.c functions void
Only display cert usages with -help in verify
Use global bio_err, remove "BIO*err" parameter from functions
For filenames, - always means stdin (or stdout as appropriate)
Add aliases for -des/aes "wrap" ciphers.
*Remove support for IISSGC (server gated crypto)
*The undocumented OCSP -header flag is now "-header name=value"
*Documented the OCSP -header flag
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag. Using this option means that when building
certificate chains, the first chain found will be the one used. Without this
flag, if the first chain found is not trusted then we will keep looking to
see if we can build an alternative chain instead.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
