The __DragonFly__ macros were introduced in issue #1546 along with a
function naming fix, but it was decided they should be handled
separately.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1765)
The prevailing style seems to not have trailing whitespace, but a few
lines do. This is mostly in the perlasm files, but a few C files got
them after the reformat. This is the result of:
find . -name '*.pl' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/( |'$'\t'')*$//'
find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/( |'$'\t'')*$//'
find . -name '*.h' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/( |'$'\t'')*$//'
Then bn_prime.h was excluded since this is a generated file.
Note mkerr.pl has some changes in a heredoc for some help output, but
other lines there lack trailing whitespace too.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
OCSP_RESPID was made opaque in 1.1.0, but no accessors were provided for
setting the name/key value for the OCSP_RESPID.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Certain warning alerts are ignored if they are received. This can mean that
no progress will be made if one peer continually sends those warning alerts.
Implement a count so that we abort the connection if we receive too many.
Issue reported by Shi Lei.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The DSO API was picky about casing of symbol names on VMS.
There's really no reason to be that picky, it's mostly just annoying.
Therefore, we take away the possibility to flag for a choice, and will
instead first try to find a symbol with exact case, and failing that,
we try to find it in upper case.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CTLOG_new_null() has been removed from the code, so it has also been
removed from this POD.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
They may return if an SCT_signature struct is added in the future that
allows them to be refactored to conform to the i2d/d2i function signature
conventions.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
SCT_verify is impossible to call through the public API (SCT_CTX_new() is
not part of the public API), so rename it to SCT_CTX_verify and move it
out of the public API.
SCT_verify_v1 is redundant, since SCT_validate does the same verification
(by calling SCT_verify) and more. The API is less confusing with a single
verification function (SCT_validate).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Declare EC{PK,}PARAMETERS_{new,free} functions in public headers. The
free functions are necessary because EC_GROUP_get_ec{pk,}parameters()
was made public by commit 60b350a3ef ("RT3676: Expose ECgroup i2d
functions").
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Originally PKCS#12 subroutines treated password strings as ASCII.
It worked as long as they were pure ASCII, but if there were some
none-ASCII characters result was non-interoperable. But fixing it
poses problem accessing data protected with broken password. In
order to make asscess to old data possible add retry with old-style
password.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Add mutable versions of X509_get0_notBefore and X509_get0_notAfter.
Rename X509_SIG_get0_mutable to X509_SIG_getm.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks
in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6.
A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with
the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we
have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand
edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked
against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then
we also reject the new record.
If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off
the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record.
If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark
the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge
of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge
is in line with the newly received sequence number.
Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being
sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we
have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or
validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an
unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately,
even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if
currently in a handshake/renegotiation.
This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next
epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very
large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is
moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are
dropped causing a denial of service.
A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this
case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a
message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code
will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number
(as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about
so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be
handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent
legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a
security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the
initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g.
injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and
the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying
to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet.
Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That
issue isn't addressed here though.
This addressed an OCAP Audit issue.
CVE-2016-2181
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Since dasync isn't installed, and is only ever used as a dynamic
engine, there's no reason to consider it for initialization when
building static engines.
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
