The most likely explanation for us ending up at this point in the code
is that we were called by the user application incorrectly - so use an
appropriate error code.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
Follow up from the conversion to use SSLfatal() in the state machine to
clean things up a bit more.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
We shouldn't call SSLfatal() multiple times for the same error condition.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
Sometimes at the top level of the state machine code we know we are
supposed to be in a fatal error condition. This commit adds some sanity
checks to ensure that SSLfatal() has been called.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
This is an initial step towards using SSLfatal() everywhere. Initially in
this commit and in subsequent commits we focus on the state machine code.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
Typically if a fatal error occurs three things need to happen:
- Put an error on the error queue
- Send an alert
- Put the state machine into the error state
Although all 3 of these things need to be done every time we hit a fatal
error the responsibilities for doing this are distributed throughout the
code. The place where the error goes on the queue, where the alert gets
sent and where the state machine goes into the error state are almost
invariably different. It has been a common pattern to pass alert codes up
and down the stack to get the alert information from the point in the code
where the error is detected to the point in the code where the alert gets
sent.
This commit provides an SSLfatal() macro (backed by an ossl_statem_fatal
function) that does all 3 of the above error tasks. This is largely a drop
in replacement for SSLerr, but takes a couple of extra parameters (the SSL
object, and an alert code).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
SNI needs to be consistent before we accept early_data. However a
server may choose to not acknowledge SNI. In that case we have to
expect that a client may send it anyway. We change the consistency
checks so that not acknowledging is treated more a like a "wild card",
accepting any SNI as being consistent.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4738)
We can only send early_data if the SNI is consistent. However it is valid
for the client to set SNI and the server to not use it. This would still be
counted as consistent. OpenSSL client was being overzealous in this check
and disallowing this scenario.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4738)
It's argued that /WX allows to keep better focus on new code, which
motivates its comeback...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4721)
We currently increment the SSL_CTX stats.sess_accept field in
tls_setup_handshake(), which is invoked from the state machine well
before ClientHello processing would have had a chance to switch
the SSL_CTX attached to the SSL object due to a provided SNI value.
However, stats.sess_accept_good is incremented in tls_finish_handshake(),
and uses the s->ctx.stats field (i.e., the new SSL_CTX that was switched
to as a result of SNI processing). This leads to the confusing
(nonsensical) situation where stats.sess_accept_good is larger than
stats.sess_accept, as the "sess_accept" value was counted on the
s->session_ctx.
In order to provide some more useful numbers, increment
s->ctx.stats.sess_accept after SNI processing if the SNI processing
changed s->ctx to differ from s->session_ctx. To preserve the
property that any given accept is counted only once, make the
corresponding decrement to s->session_ctx.stats.sess_accept when
doing so.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4549)
For client SSL objects and before any callbacks have had a chance
to be called, we can write the stats accesses using the session_ctx,
which makes sense given that these values are all prefixed with
"sess_".
For servers after a client_hello or servername callback has been
called, retain the existing behavior of modifying the statistics
for the current (non-session) context. This has some value,
in that it allows the statistics to be viewed on a per-vhost level.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4549)
It is expected that SSL_CTX objects are shared across threads,
and as such we are responsible for ensuring coherent data accesses.
Aligned integer accesses ought to be atomic already on all supported
architectures, but we can be formally correct.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4549)
Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4541)
The previous commit removed version negotiation on an HRR. However we should
still sanity check the contents of the version field.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4527)
Previously if a client received an HRR then we would do version negotiation
immediately - because we know we are going to get TLSv1.3. However this
causes a problem when we emit the 2nd ClientHello because we start changing
a whole load of stuff to ommit things that aren't relevant for < TLSv1.3.
The spec requires that the 2nd ClientHello is the same except for changes
required from the HRR. Therefore the simplest thing to do is to defer the
version negotiation until we receive the ServerHello.
Fixes#4292
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4527)
The function tls_check_curve is only called on clients and contains
almost identical functionaity to tls1_check_group_id when called from
a client. Merge the two.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4475)
When an SSL's context is swtiched from a ticket-enabled context to
a ticket-disabled context in the servername callback, no session-id
is generated, so the session can't be resumed.
If a servername callback changes the SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option, check
to see if it's changed to disable, and whether a session ticket is
expected (i.e. the client indicated ticket support and the SSL had
tickets enabled at the time), and whether we already have a previous
session (i.e. s->hit is set).
In this case, clear the ticket-expected flag, remove any ticket data
and generate a session-id in the session.
If the SSL hit (resumed) and switched to a ticket-disabled context,
assume that the resumption was via session-id, and don't bother to
update the session.
Before this fix, the updated unit-tests in 06-sni-ticket.conf would
fail test #4 (server1 = SNI, server2 = no SNI).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1529)
Rename tls1_get_curvelist to tls1_get_grouplist, change to void as
it can never fail and remove unnecessary return value checks. Clean
up the code.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/=4412)
Setup EVP_PKEY structure from a group ID in ssl_generate_param_group,
replace duplicate code with this function.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/=4412)
Replace tls1_ec_curve_id2nid() with tls_group_id_lookup() which returns
the TLS_GROUP_INFO for the group.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/=4412)
Instead of storing supported groups in on-the-wire format store
them as parsed uint16_t values. This simplifies handling of groups
as the values can be directly used instead of being converted.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4406)
It is otherwise unclear what all the magic numbers mean.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4349)
"Early callback" is a little ambiguous now that early data exists.
Perhaps "ClientHello callback"?
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4349)
In OpenSSL 1.1.0, when there were no extensions added to the ServerHello,
we did not write the extension data length bytes to the end of the
ServerHello; this is needed for compatibility with old client implementations
that do not support TLS extensions (such as the default configuration of
OpenSSL 0.9.8). When ServerHello extension construction was converted
to the new extensions framework in commit
7da160b0f4, this behavior was inadvertently
limited to cases when SSLv3 was negotiated (and similarly for ClientHellos),
presumably since extensions are not defined at all for SSLv3. However,
extensions for TLS prior to TLS 1.3 have been defined in separate
RFCs (6066, 4366, and 3546) from the TLS protocol specifications, and as such
should be considered an optional protocol feature in those cases.
Accordingly, be conservative in what we send, and skip the extensions block
when there are no extensions to be sent, regardless of the TLS/SSL version.
(TLS 1.3 requires extensions and can safely be treated differently.)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4296)
This is actually not all warnings, only return values.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4297)
SNI and ALPN must be set to be consistent with the PSK. Otherwise this is
an error.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3926)
