If the call the ERR_set_error_data() in ERR_add_error_vdata() fails then
a mem leak can occur. This commit checks that we successfully added the
error data, and if not frees the buffer.
Fixes#8085
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8105)
(cherry picked from commit fa6b1ee111)
1. In addition to overriding the default application name,
one can now also override the configuration file name
and flags passed to CONF_modules_load_file().
2. By default we still keep going when configuration file
processing fails. But, applications that want to be
strict about initialization errors can now make explicit
flag choices via non-null OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS that omit
the CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_RETURN_CODES flag (which had so far
been both undocumented and unused).
3. In OPENSSL_init_ssl() do not request OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG
if the options already include OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG.
4. Don't set up atexit() handlers when called with opts equal to
OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY (this flag should only be used alone).
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7969)
It turns out that intialization may change the error number, so we
need to preserve the system error number in functions where
initialization is called for.
These are ERR_get_state() and err_shelve_state()
Fixes#7897
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7902)
(cherry picked from commit 91c5473035)
This function can end up being called during ERR_get_error() if we are
initialising. ERR_get_error() must preserve errno since it gets called via
SSL_get_error(). If that function returns SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL then you are
supposed to inspect errno.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7680)
(cherry picked from commit 71b1ceffc4)
Expected usage pattern is to unconditionally set error and then
wipe it if there was no actual error.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f658a3b64d)
It turns out that on VMS, strerror() returns messages with added
spaces at the end.
We wouldn't had noticed if it wasn't for perl trimming those spaces
off for its own sake and thereby having test/recipes/02-test_errstr.t
fail on VMS.
The safe fix is to do the same trimming ourselves.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7701)
(cherry picked from commit 9f15e5b911)
We stored copies of the system error texts in a fixed line size array,
which is a huge waste. Instead, use a static memory pool and pack all
the string in there. The wasted space at the end, if any, gives us
some leeway for longer strings than we have measured so far.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7681)
(cherry picked from commit 2c5b6bbb67)
In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed()
was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is
picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer
was limited to the size of 4096 bytes.
When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG,
the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored
by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code.
As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively
ignored.
This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which
does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit
to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits
but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems
like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion.
Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to
pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state,
which forces a reinstantiation on next call.
Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the
openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue
has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG
reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional
randomness provided by the application.
Fixes#7381
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382)
(cherry picked from commit 3064b55134)
zero-length ID is allowed, but it's not allowed to skip the ID.
Fixes: #6534
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
Since 0.9.7, all i2d_ functions were documented to allocate an output
buffer if the user didn't provide one, under these conditions (from
the 1.0.2 documentation):
For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if B<*out> is B<NULL> memory will be
allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this
case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the
data just written.
i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was found not to do this, and would crash if a NULL
output buffer was provided.
Fixes#6914
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6918)
Ensure that the certificate required alert actually gets sent (and doesn't
get translated into handshake failure in TLSv1.3).
Ensure that proper reason codes are given for the new TLSv1.3 alerts.
Remove an out of date macro for TLS13_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA. This is a left
over from an earlier TLSv1.3 draft that is no longer used.
Fixes#6804
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6809)
Some EC functions exist in *_GFp and *_GF2m forms, in spite of the
implementations between the two curve types being identical. This
commit provides equivalent generic functions with the *_GFp and *_GF2m
forms just calling the generic functions.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6815)
The spec says that a client MUST set legacy_version to TLSv1.2, and
requires servers to verify that it isn't SSLv3.
Fixes#6600
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6747)
By default `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` (which uses the Lopez-Dahab ladder
implementation) is used only for (k * Generator) or (k * VariablePoint).
ECDSA verification uses (a * Generator + b * VariablePoint): this commit
forces the use of `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` also for the ECDSA verification
path, while using the default wNAF implementation for any other case.
With this commit `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` loses the static attribute, and
is added to ec_lcl.h so EC_METHODs can directly use it.
While working on a new custom EC_POINTs_mul implementation, I realized
that many checks (e.g. all the points being compatible with the given
EC_GROUP, creating a temporary BN_CTX if `ctx == NULL`, check for the
corner case `scalar == NULL && num == 0`) were duplicated again and
again in every single implementation (and actually some
implementations lacked some of the tests).
I thought that it makes way more sense for those checks that are
independent from the actual implementation and should always be done, to
be moved in the EC_POINTs_mul wrapper: so this commit also includes
these changes.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
This commit uses the new ladder scaffold to implement a specialized
ladder step based on differential addition-and-doubling in mixed
Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates, modified to independently blind the
operands.
The arithmetic in `ladder_pre`, `ladder_step` and `ladder_post` is
auto generated with tooling:
- see, e.g., "Guide to ECC" Alg 3.40 for reference about the
`ladder_pre` implementation;
- see https://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g12o/auto-code/shortw/xz/ladder/mladd-2003-s.op3
for the differential addition-and-doubling formulas implemented in
`ladder_step`;
- see, e.g., "Fast Multiplication on Elliptic Curves over GF(2**m)
without Precomputation" (Lopez and Dahab, CHES 1999) Appendix Alg Mxy
for the `ladder_post` implementation to recover the `(x,y)` result in
affine coordinates.
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations
PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for
prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation
with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret
scalar is feed to the point multiplication).
The newly introduced default implementation directly used
EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop.
The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a
specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking
advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling
and different coordinate systems.
- `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by
default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R.
Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition
to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling;
- `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it
computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could,
e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential
addition-and-doubling;
- `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default
it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this
hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing
the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of
the result point.
This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`,
as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be
truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this
function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily
constant-time themselves.
What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of
operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given
EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar.
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
Fix the NULL check lack in a different way that is more compatible with
non-NULL branch. Refer #6632
Also mark and pop the error stack instead of clearing all errors when something
goes awry in CONF_get_number.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6643)
Currently if you encounter application data while waiting for a
close_notify from the peer, and you have called SSL_shutdown() then
you will get a -1 return (fatal error) and SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL from
SSL_get_error(). This isn't accurate (it should be SSL_ERROR_SSL) and
isn't persistent (you can call SSL_shutdown() again and it might then work).
We change this into a proper fatal error that is persistent.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340)
Implement support for stateful TLSv1.3 tickets, and use them if
SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6563)
This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the
representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for
prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method,
EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method.
This commit is derived from the patch
https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley.
Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure
and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field
multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a
scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way,
it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an
algorithm state) unpredictable.
For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for
settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the
aforementioned curves.
For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit
does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be
easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6501)
Use EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type to access
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6443)
Only applies to algorithms that support it. Both raw private and public
keys can be obtained for X25519, Ed25519, X448, Ed448. Raw private keys
only can be obtained for HMAC, Poly1305 and SipHash
Fixes#6259
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6394)
There were a large number of error codes that were unused (probably a
copy&paste from somewhere else). Since these have never been made public
we should remove then and rebuild the error codes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6386)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 made the X509_LOOKUP_METHOD structure opaque, so
applications that were previously able to define a custom lookup method
are not able to be ported.
This commit adds getters and setters for each of the current fields of
X509_LOOKUP_METHOD, along with getters and setters on several associated
opaque types (such as X509_LOOKUP and X509_OBJECT).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6152)
This reverts commit a6f5b11634.
The EVP_PKEY_sign() function is intended for pre-hashed input which is
not supported by our EdDSA implementation.
See the discussion in PR 5880
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6284)
which is used for ASN1_STRING_print_ex*() and X509_NAME_print_ex*().
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6105)
Adding support for these operations for the EdDSA implementations
makes pkeyutl usable for signing/verifying for these algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5880)
There are two undocumented DSA parameter generation options available in
the genpkey command line app:
dsa_paramgen_md and dsa_paramgen_q_bits.
These can also be accessed via the EVP API but only by using
EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() or EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str() directly. There are no
helper macros for these options.
dsa_paramgen_q_bits sets the length of q in bits (default 160 bits).
dsa_paramgen_md sets the digest that is used during the parameter
generation (default SHA1). In particular the output length of the digest
used must be equal to or greater than the number of bits in q because of
this code:
if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
goto err;
if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++)
md[i] ^= buf2[i];
/* step 3 */
md[0] |= 0x80;
md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q))
goto err;
qsize here is the number of bits in q and evpmd is the digest set via
dsa_paramgen_md. md and buf2 are buffers of length SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH.
buf2 has been filled with qsize bits of random seed data, and md is
uninitialised.
If the output size of evpmd is less than qsize then the line "md[i] ^=
buf2[i]" will be xoring an uninitialised value and the random seed data
together to form the least significant bits of q (and not using the
output of the digest at all for those bits) - which is probably not what
was intended. The same seed is then used as an input to generating p. If
the uninitialised data is actually all zeros (as seems quite likely)
then the least significant bits of q will exactly match the least
significant bits of the seed.
This problem only occurs if you use these undocumented and difficult to
find options and you set the size of q to be greater than the message
digest output size. This is for parameter generation only not key
generation. This scenario is considered highly unlikely and
therefore the security risk of this is considered negligible.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5800)
The GOST engine needs to be loaded before we initialise libssl. Otherwise
the GOST ciphersuites are not enabled. However the SSL conf module must
be loaded before we initialise libcrypto. Otherwise we will fail to read
the SSL config from a config file properly.
Another problem is that an application may make use of both libcrypto and
libssl. If it performs libcrypto stuff first and OPENSSL_init_crypto()
is called and loads a config file it will fail if that config file has
any libssl stuff in it.
This commit separates out the loading of the SSL conf module from the
interpretation of its contents. The loading piece doesn't know anything
about SSL so this can be moved to libcrypto. The interpretation of what it
means remains in libssl. This means we can load the SSL conf data before
libssl is there and interpret it when it later becomes available.
Fixes#5809
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5818)
Fail harshly (in debug builds) when rand_pool_acquire_entropy isn't
delivering the required amount of entropy. In release builds, this
produces an error with details.
We also take the opportunity to modernise the types used.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5857)
