Since the public and private DRBG are per thread we don't need one
per ssl object anymore. It could also try to get entropy from a DRBG
that's really from an other thread because the SSL object moved to an
other thread.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5547)
Fixes#4403
This commit moves the internal header file "internal/rand.h" to
<openssl/rand_drbg.h>, making the RAND_DRBG API public.
The RAND_POOL API remains private, its function prototypes were
moved to "internal/rand_int.h" and converted to lowercase.
Documentation for the new API is work in progress on GitHub #5461.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5462)
Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4541)
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS flag for CFB1 has been broken with the
introduction of the is_partially_overlapping() check that did not take
it into the account (treating number of bits passed as bytes). This
remedies that and allows this flag to work as intended.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1942)
or EVP_CTRL_INIT/EVP_CTRL_COPY was not called or failed.
If that happens in EVP_CipherInit_ex/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy set cipher = NULL,
aes_gcm_cleanup should check that gctx != NULL before calling OPENSSL_cleanse.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2562)
This function is used to validate application supplied parameters. An
assert should be used to check for an error that is internal to OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2275)
When doing in place encryption the overlapping buffer check can fail
incorrectly where we have done a partial block "Update" operation. This
fixes things to take account of any pending partial blocks.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2275)
in EVP_EncryptUpdate and EVP_DecryptUpdate. It is argued that in
general case it's impossible to provide guarantee that partially[!]
overlapping buffers can be tolerated.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is
able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow
resulting in a heap corruption.
Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the
EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms.
The first form is like this:
EVP_EncryptInit()
EVP_EncryptUpdate()
i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called
function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call
must be safe.
The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be
seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no
possibility of an overflow.
Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can
be no overflows in internal code due to this problem.
It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate()
in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for
EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these
calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances
in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls
this function directly.
CVE-2016-2106
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Don't have #error statements in header files, but instead wrap
the contents of that file in #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx
This means it is now always safe to include the header file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Simplifies calling code. Also fixed up any !ptr tests that were
nearby, turning them into NULL tests.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags was returning the flags of its associated
EVP_CIPHER. However, EVP_CIPHER_CTX has flags of its own, so this
function is quite confusing and therefore error prone.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Following the method used for EVP_MD_CTX and HMAC_CTX,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup are joined together
into one function, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset, with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init kept
as an alias.
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup fills no purpose of its own any more and is
therefore removed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
There are many places (nearly 50) where we malloc and then memset.
Add an OPENSSL_zalloc routine to encapsulate that.
(Missed one conversion; thanks Richard)
Also fixes GH328
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
There are header files in crypto/ that are used by a number of crypto/
submodules. Move those to crypto/include/internal and adapt the
affected source code and Makefiles.
The header files that got moved are:
crypto/cryptolib.h
crypto/md32_common.h
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
If an EVP implementation (such as an engine) fails out early, it's
possible to call EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() which will call
ctx->cipher->cleanup() before the cipher_data has been initialized
via ctx->cipher->init(). Guarantee it's all-bytes-zero as soon as
it is allocated.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Just as with the OPENSSL_malloc calls, consistently use sizeof(*ptr)
for memset and memcpy. Remove needless casts for those functions.
For memset, replace alternative forms of zero with 0.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
For a local variable:
TYPE *p;
Allocations like this are "risky":
p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TYPE));
if the type of p changes, and the malloc call isn't updated, you
could get memory corruption. Instead do this:
p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*p));
Also fixed a few memset() calls that I noticed while doing this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
EVP_.*free; this gets:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_asn1_free
EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free EVP_PKEY_free EVP_PKEY_free_it
EVP_PKEY_meth_free; and also EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Causes more problems than it fixes: even though error codes
are not part of the stable API, several users rely on the
specific error code, and the change breaks them. Conversely,
we don't have any concrete use-cases for constant-time behaviour here.
This reverts commit 4aac102f75.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
The different -I compiler parameters will take care of the rest...
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
Do the final padding check in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex in constant time to
avoid a timing leak from padding failure.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Add support for key wrap algorithms via EVP interface.
Generalise AES wrap algorithm and add to modes, making existing
AES wrap algorithm a special case.
Move test code to evptests.txt
