If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
c0bf69a791
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 27c76b9b80)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_err.c
This is a backport of commit e83ee04bb7 from
the master branch (and this has also been applied to 1.0.2). In 1.0.2 this
was CVE-2015-0207. For other branches there is no known security issue, but
this is being backported as a precautionary measure.
The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes
the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to
loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received
with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen
means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invokation to the
next.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
dtls1_get_message has an |mt| variable which is the type of the message that
is being requested. If it is negative then any message type is allowed.
However the value of |mt| is not checked in one of the main code paths, so a
peer can send a message of a completely different type and it will be
processed as if it was the message type that we were expecting. This has
very little practical consequences because the current behaviour will still
fail when the format of the message isn't as expected.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c2b1d872b)
The size of the SRP extension can never be negative (the variable
|size| is unsigned). Therefore don't check if it is less than zero.
RT#3862
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9c89d29083)
If the record received is for a version that we don't support, previously we
were sending an alert back. However if the incoming record already looks
like an alert then probably we shouldn't do that. So suppress an outgoing
alert if it looks like we've got one incoming.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
We had updates of certain header files in both Makefile.org and the
Makefile in the directory the header file lived in. This is error
prone and also sometimes generates slightly different results (usually
just a comment that differs) depending on which way the update was
done.
This removes the file update targets from the top level Makefile, adds
an update: target in all Makefiles and has it depend on the depend: or
local_depend: targets, whichever is appropriate, so we don't get a
double run through the whole file tree.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0f539dc1a2)
Conflicts:
Makefile.org
apps/Makefile
test/Makefile
If a client receives a bad hello request in DTLS then the alert is not
sent correctly.
RT#2801
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4dc1aa0436)
40 bit ciphers are limited to 512 bit RSA, 56 bit ciphers to 1024 bit.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ac38115c1a)
Since the client has no way of communicating her supported parameter
range to the server, connections to servers that choose weak DH will
simply fail.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Currently we set change_cipher_spec_ok to 1 before calling
ssl3_get_cert_verify(). This is because this message is optional and if it
is not sent then the next thing we would expect to get is the CCS. However,
although it is optional, we do actually know whether we should be receiving
one in advance. If we have received a client cert then we should expect
a CertificateVerify message. By the time we get to this point we will
already have bombed out if we didn't get a Certificate when we should have
done, so it is safe just to check whether |peer| is NULL or not. If it is
we won't get a CertificateVerify, otherwise we will. Therefore we should
change the logic so that we only attempt to get the CertificateVerify if
we are expecting one, and not allow a CCS in this scenario.
Whilst this is good practice for TLS it is even more important for DTLS.
In DTLS messages can be lost. Therefore we may be in a situation where a
CertificateVerify message does not arrive even though one was sent. In that
case the next message the server will receive will be the CCS. This could
also happen if messages get re-ordered in-flight. In DTLS if
|change_cipher_spec_ok| is not set and a CCS is received it is ignored.
However if |change_cipher_spec_ok| *is* set then a CCS arrival will
immediately move the server into the next epoch. Any messages arriving for
the previous epoch will be ignored. This means that, in this scenario, the
handshake can never complete. The client will attempt to retransmit
missing messages, but the server will ignore them because they are the wrong
epoch. The server meanwhile will still be waiting for the CertificateVerify
which is never going to arrive.
RT#2958
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0bd649336)
If sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null() returns NULL then ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list()
should also return NULL.
Based on an original patch by mrpre <mrpre@163.com>.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 14def5f537)
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state for DTLS.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cefc93910c)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_srvr.c
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_srvr.c
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the client
side.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cc273a9361)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the server
side.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cf9b0b6fb2)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Reusing an SSL object when it has encountered a fatal error can
have bad consequences. This is a bug in application code not libssl
but libssl should be more forgiving and not crash.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a89db885e0)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl_stat.c
Sanity check the |len| parameter to ensure it is positive. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb0f400b0c)
The return value is checked for 0. This is currently safe but we should
really check for <= 0 since -1 is frequently used for error conditions.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c427570e50)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
For SSLv3 the code assumes that |header_length| > |md_block_size|. Whilst
this is true for all SSLv3 ciphersuites, this fact is far from obvious by
looking at the code. If this were not the case then an integer overflow
would occur, leading to a subsequent buffer overflow. Therefore I have
added an explicit sanity check to ensure header_length is always valid.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 29b0a15a48)
The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at
least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at
least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to
represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c826988109)
Conflicts:
ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
Conflicts:
apps/speed.c
crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
crypto/evp/evp.h
Fortify flagged up a problem in n_do_ssl_write() in SSLv2. Analysing the
code I do not believe there is a real problem here. However the logic flows
are complicated enough that a sanity check of |len| is probably worthwhile.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c5f8cd7bc6)
EAP-FAST session resumption relies on handshake message lookahead
to determine server intentions. Commits
980bc1ec61
and
7b3ba508af
removed the lookahead so broke session resumption.
This change partially reverts the commits and brings the lookahead back
in reduced capacity for TLS + EAP-FAST only. Since EAP-FAST does not
support regular session tickets, the lookahead now only checks for a
Finished message.
Regular handshakes are unaffected by this change.
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6e3d015363)
A 0-length ciphers list is never permitted. The old code only used to
reject an empty ciphers list for connections with a session ID. It
would later error out on a NULL structure, so this change just moves
the alert closer to the problem source.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3ae91cfb32)
If OpenSSL is configured with no-tlsext then ssl_get_prev_session can read
past the end of the ClientHello message if the session_id length in the
ClientHello is invalid. This should not cause any security issues since the
underlying buffer is 16k in size. It should never be possible to overrun by
that many bytes.
This is probably made redundant by the previous commit - but you can never be
too careful.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e0a80c1c9)
The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make
sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have
security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still
needs to be fixed.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c9642eb1ff79a30e2c7632ef8267cc34cc2b0d79)
There is no indication that the timing differences are exploitable in
OpenSSL, and indeed there is some indication (Usenix '14) that they
are too small to be exploitable. Nevertheless, be careful and apply
the same countermeasures as in s3_srvr.c
Thanks to Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel and Yuval Shavitt for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ae50d82700)
Ensure all calls to RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes have their return
value checked correctly
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f8e4e4f52)
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/e_des3.c
The certificate already contains the DH parameters in that case.
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() would fail in that case anyway.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 93f1c13619)
Fix some unsigned/signed warnings introduced as part of the fix
for CVE-2015-0293
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This assert is reachable for servers that support SSLv2 and export ciphers.
Therefore, such servers can be DoSed by sending a specially crafted
SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY.
Also fix s2_srvr.c to error out early if the key lengths are malformed.
These lengths are sent unencrypted, so this does not introduce an oracle.
CVE-2015-0293
This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper of
the OpenSSL development team.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The function tls1_PRF counts the number of digests in use and partitions
security evenly between them. There always needs to be at least one digest
in use, otherwise this is an internal error. Add a sanity check for this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 668f6f08c6)
Cleanse various intermediate buffers used by the PRF (backported version
from master).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 35fafc4dbc)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_enc.c
Ensure all malloc failures return -1.
Reported by Adam Langley (Google).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06c6a2b4a3)
They are moved to the COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT instead.
This also fixes SSLv2 to be part of COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f417997a32)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_ciph.c
This patch uses warning/fatal constants instead of numbers with comments for
warning/alerts in d1_pkt.c and s3_pkt.c
RT#3725
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fd865cadcb)
Some Cisco appliances use a pre-standard version number for DTLS. We support
this as DTLS1_BAD_VER within the code.
This change fixes d2i_SSL_SESSION for that DTLS version.
Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
RT#3704
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_asn1.c
Conflicts:
ssl/dtls1.h
Fixed various missing return value checks in ssl3_send_newsession_ticket.
Also a mem leak on error.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the
script should not move them)
This commit is for the 1.0.1 changes
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>