Commit graph

57 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Dr. Stephen Henson
300b9f0b70 Extension checking fixes.
When looking for an extension we need to set the last found
position to -1 to properly search all extensions.

PR#3309.
2014-04-15 18:50:53 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e9754726d2 Check chain is not NULL before assuming we have a validated chain.
The modification to the OCSP helper purpose breaks normal OCSP verification.
It is no longer needed now we can trust partial chains.
2012-12-15 02:58:00 +00:00
Ben Laurie
30c278aa6b Fix OCSP checking. 2012-12-07 18:47:47 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
abd2ed012b Fix two bugs which affect delta CRL handling:
Use -1 to check all extensions in CRLs.
Always set flag for freshest CRL.
2012-12-06 18:24:28 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7568d15acd allow key agreement for SSL/TLS certificates 2012-01-26 14:57:45 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b1efb7161f Include self-signed flag in certificates by checking SKID/AKID as well
as issuer and subject names. Although this is an incompatible change
it should have little impact in pratice because self-issued certificates
that are not self-signed are rarely encountered.
2010-02-25 00:01:38 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
df4c395c6d add anyExtendedKeyUsage OID 2010-02-24 15:53:58 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2e5975285e Update obsolete email address... 2008-11-05 18:39:08 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e19106f5fb Create function of the form OBJ_bsearch_xxx() in bsearch typesafe macros
with the appropriate parameters which calls OBJ_bsearch(). A compiler will
typically inline this.

This avoids the need for cmp_xxx variables and fixes unchecked const issues
with CHECKED_PTR_OF()
2008-10-22 15:43:01 +00:00
Ben Laurie
babb379849 Type-checked (and modern C compliant) OBJ_bsearch. 2008-10-12 14:32:47 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d43c4497ce Initial support for delta CRLs. If "use deltas" flag is set attempt to find
a delta CRL in addition to a full CRL. Check and search delta in addition to
the base.
2008-09-01 15:15:16 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4b96839f06 Add support for CRLs partitioned by reason code.
Tidy CRL scoring system.

Add new CRL path validation error.
2008-08-29 11:37:21 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
002e66c0e8 Support for policy mappings extension.
Delete X509_POLICY_REF code.

Fix handling of invalid policy extensions to return the correct error.

Add command line option to inhibit policy mappings.
2008-08-12 10:32:56 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e9746e03ee Initial support for name constraints certificate extension.
TODO: robustness checking on name forms.
2008-08-08 15:35:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3e727a3b37 Add support for nameRelativeToCRLIssuer field in distribution point name
fields.
2008-08-04 15:34:27 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
dcc0c29876 We support inhibit any policy extension, add to table. 2008-07-13 15:55:37 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
db50661fce X509 verification fixes.
Ignore self issued certificates when checking path length constraints.

Duplicate OIDs in policy tree in case they are allocated.

Use anyPolicy from certificate cache and not current tree level.
2008-07-13 14:25:36 +00:00
Nils Larsch
360ff3cf58 fix order 2006-12-18 22:20:27 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
10ca15f3fa Fix change to OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 2006-12-06 13:36:48 +00:00
Ben Laurie
96ea4ae91c Add RFC 3779 support. 2006-11-27 14:18:05 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bc7535bc7f Support for AKID in CRLs and partial support for IDP. Overhaul of CRL
handling to support this.
2006-09-14 17:25:02 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
edc540211c Cache some CRL related extensions. 2006-07-24 12:39:22 +00:00
Ulf Möller
c7235be6e3 RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
and response verification.

Submitted by: Zoltan Glozik <zglozik@opentsa.org>
Reviewed by: Ulf Moeller
2006-02-12 23:11:56 +00:00
Richard Levitte
d9bfe4f97c Added restrictions on the use of proxy certificates, as they may pose
a security threat on unexpecting applications.  Document and test.
2005-04-09 16:07:12 +00:00
Richard Levitte
6951c23afd Add functionality needed to process proxy certificates. 2004-12-28 00:21:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8f284faaec V1 certificates that aren't self signed can't be accepted as CAs. 2004-12-03 00:10:34 +00:00
Richard Levitte
5073ff0346 Split X509_check_ca() into a small self and an internal function
check_ca(), to resolve constness issue.  check_ca() is called from the
purpose checkers instead of X509_check_ca(), since the stuff done by
the latter (except for calling check_ca()) is also done by
X509_check_purpose().
2004-11-30 12:18:55 +00:00
Richard Levitte
30b415b076 Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that the
CA setting in each certificate on the chain is correct.  As a side-
effect always do the following basic checks on extensions, not just
when there's an associated purpose to the check:
- if there is an unhandled critical extension (unless the user has
  chosen to ignore this fault)
- if the path length has been exceeded (if one is set at all)
- that certain extensions fit the associated purpose (if one has been
  given)
2004-11-29 11:28:08 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bc50157010 Various X509 fixes. Disable broken certificate workarounds
when X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is set. Check for CRLSign in
CRL issuer certificates. Reject CRLs with unhandled (any)
critical extensions.
2004-03-05 17:16:35 +00:00
Geoff Thorpe
2754597013 A general spring-cleaning (in autumn) to fix up signed/unsigned warnings.
I have tried to convert 'len' type variable declarations to unsigned as a
means to address these warnings when appropriate, but when in doubt I have
used casts in the comparisons instead. The better solution (that would get
us all lynched by API users) would be to go through and convert all the
function prototypes and structure definitions to use unsigned variables
except when signed is necessary. The proliferation of (signed) "int" for
strictly non-negative uses is unfortunate.
2003-10-29 20:24:15 +00:00
Richard Levitte
b637670f03 DVCS (see RFC 3029) was missing among the possible purposes.
Notified privately to me by Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr>,
one of the authors of said RFC
2003-01-29 15:06:35 +00:00
Bodo Möller
072569e0f1 Undo previous change, X509_check_issued() was correct.
[See
     Message-ID: <3BB07999.30432AD2@celocom.com>
     Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2001 13:33:29 +0100
     From: Dr S N Henson <drh@celocom.com>
     To: openssl-dev@openssl.org
     Subject: Re: Error in v3_purp.c
]
2002-01-27 17:41:12 +00:00
Richard Levitte
63810d8566 Apply a small patch from Diego R. Lopez <diego.lopez@rediris.es>,
making X509_check_issued() properly match an issuer that's found in a
Authority Key Identifier.
2002-01-26 04:25:16 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f1558bb424 Reject certificates with unhandled critical extensions. 2001-10-21 02:09:15 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
926a56bfe3 Purpose and trust setting functions for X509_STORE.
Tidy existing code.
2001-05-10 00:13:59 +00:00
Richard Levitte
cf1b7d9664 Make all configuration macros available for application by making
sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting
with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making
sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with
opensslconf.h.

I've checked fairly well that nothing breaks with this (apart from
external software that will adapt if they have used something like
NO_KRB5), but I can't guarantee it completely, so a review of this
change would be a good thing.
2001-02-19 16:06:34 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8cff6331c9 Tolerate some "variations" used in some
certificates.

One is a valid CA which has no basicConstraints
but does have certSign keyUsage.

Other is S/MIME signer with nonRepudiation but
no digitalSignature.
2001-02-01 01:57:32 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
81f169e95c Initial OCSP certificate verify. Not complete,
it just supports a "trusted OCSP global root CA".
2001-01-17 01:31:34 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9d6b1ce644 Merge from the ASN1 branch of new ASN1 code
to main trunk.

Lets see if the makes it to openssl-cvs :-)
2000-12-08 19:09:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2f043896d1 *BIG* verify code reorganisation.
The old code was painfully primitive and couldn't handle
distinct certificates using the same subject name.

The new code performs several tests on a candidate issuer
certificate based on certificate extensions.

It also adds several callbacks to X509_VERIFY_CTX so its
behaviour can be customised.

Unfortunately some hackery was needed to persuade X509_STORE
to tolerate this. This should go away when X509_STORE is
replaced, sometime...

This must have broken something though :-(
2000-09-05 17:53:58 +00:00
Richard Levitte
26a3a48d65 There have been a number of complaints from a number of sources that names
like Malloc, Realloc and especially Free conflict with already existing names
on some operating systems or other packages.  That is reason enough to change
the names of the OpenSSL memory allocation macros to something that has a
better chance of being unique, like prepending them with OPENSSL_.

This change includes all the name changes needed throughout all C files.
2000-06-01 22:19:21 +00:00
Geoff Thorpe
ccd86b68ef The previous commit to crypto/stack/*.[ch] pulled the type-safety strings
yet tighter, and also put some heat on the rest of the library by
insisting (correctly) that compare callbacks used in stacks are prototyped
with "const" parameters. This has led to a depth-first explosion of
compiler warnings in the code where 1 constification has led to 3 or 4
more. Fortunately these have all been resolved to completion and the code
seems cleaner as a result - in particular many of the _cmp() functions
should have been prototyped with "const"s, and now are. There was one
little problem however;

X509_cmp() should by rights compare "const X509 *" pointers, and it is now
declared as such. However, it's internal workings can involve
recalculating hash values and extensions if they have not already been
setup. Someone with a more intricate understanding of the flow control of
X509 might be able to tighten this up, but for now - this seemed the
obvious place to stop the "depth-first" constification of the code by
using an evil cast (they have migrated all the way here from safestack.h).

Fortunately, this is the only place in the code where this was required
to complete these type-safety changes, and it's reasonably clear and
commented, and seemed the least unacceptable of the options. Trying to
take the constification further ends up exploding out considerably, and
indeed leads directly into generalised ASN functions which are not likely
to cooperate well with this.
2000-06-01 02:36:58 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0cb957a684 Fix for SSL server purpose checking 2000-05-04 23:03:49 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
068fdce877 New compatability trust and purpose settings. 2000-03-07 14:04:29 +00:00
Bodo Möller
6d0d5431d4 More get0 et al. changes. Also provide fgrep targets in CHANGES
where the new functions are mentioned.
2000-02-26 08:36:46 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c7cb16a8ff Rename functions for new convention. 2000-02-26 01:55:33 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ff8a4c47ce Rename the X509V3_*_d2i functions to X509_get_ext_d2i() etc.
This better reflects their behaviour.
2000-02-07 01:17:22 +00:00
Ulf Möller
731d9c5fb5 Some more ifdefs for no-xxx options. 2000-01-21 00:03:51 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6ea5314007 Fix a bug in the modified purpose code: it wasn't updated to use the
new purpose getting function.

Update the ca-cert.pem and pca-cert.pem "CA" certificates so they
really are CA certificate: that is they have the appropriate extensions.
1999-12-03 00:53:48 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
dd4134101f Change the trust and purpose code so it doesn't need init
either and has a static and dynamic mix.
1999-12-02 02:33:56 +00:00