Don't call the decrypt ticket callback if we've already encountered a
fatal error. Do call it if we have an empty ticket present.
Change the return code to have 5 distinct returns codes and separate it
from the input status value.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6198)
Adds application data into the encrypted session ticket
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3802)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
There's no reason to wrap this call in TEST_true() if we're not
checking the return value of TEST_true() -- all of the surrounding
similar calls do not have the macro wrapping them.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4873)
IFF the client has ChaCha first, and server cipher priority is used,
and the new SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA_FOR_MOBILE option is used,
then reprioritize ChaCha above everything else. This way, A matching
ChaCha cipher will be selected if there is a match. If no ChaCha ciphers
match, then the other ciphers are used.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4436)
It's argued that /WX allows to keep better focus on new code, which
motivates its comeback...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4721)
When an SSL's context is swtiched from a ticket-enabled context to
a ticket-disabled context in the servername callback, no session-id
is generated, so the session can't be resumed.
If a servername callback changes the SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option, check
to see if it's changed to disable, and whether a session ticket is
expected (i.e. the client indicated ticket support and the SSL had
tickets enabled at the time), and whether we already have a previous
session (i.e. s->hit is set).
In this case, clear the ticket-expected flag, remove any ticket data
and generate a session-id in the session.
If the SSL hit (resumed) and switched to a ticket-disabled context,
assume that the resumption was via session-id, and don't bother to
update the session.
Before this fix, the updated unit-tests in 06-sni-ticket.conf would
fail test #4 (server1 = SNI, server2 = no SNI).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1529)
It is otherwise unclear what all the magic numbers mean.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4349)
"Early callback" is a little ambiguous now that early data exists.
Perhaps "ClientHello callback"?
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4349)
If the server_name extension is long enough to require two bytes to
hold the length of either field, the test suite would not decode
the length properly. Using the PACKET_ APIs would have avoided this,
but it was desired to avoid using private APIs in this part of the
test suite, to keep ourselves honest.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4318)
Remove GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS and osslargused.
Move socket-related things to new file internal/sockets.h; this is now
only needed by four(!!!) files. Compiles should be a bit faster.
Remove USE_SOCKETS ifdef's
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4209)
Apart from ssltest_old.c, the test suite relied on e_os.h for the
OSSL_NELEM macro and nothing else.
The ssltest_old.c also requires EXIT and some socket macros.
Create a new header to define the OSSL_NELEM macro and use that instead.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4186)
This patch addresses the use of uninitialised data raised in Coverity
issues 1414881 and 1414882.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3929)
This macro aborted the process which stopped any later tests from running.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3838)
BIO_sock_init returns '-1' on error, not '0', so it's needed to check
explicitly istead of using '!'.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3766)
During setup of a reneg test the server can refuse to start reneg.
If that happens we should let the client continue and then fail.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3432)
RFC 7301 mandates that the server SHALL respond with a fatal
"no_application_protocol" alert when there is no overlap between
the client's supplied list and the server's list of supported protocols.
In commit 062178678f we changed from
ignoring non-success returns from the supplied alpn_select_cb() to
treating such non-success returns as indicative of non-overlap and
sending the fatal alert.
In effect, this is using the presence of an alpn_select_cb() as a proxy
to attempt to determine whether the application has configured a list
of supported protocols. However, there may be cases in which an
application's architecture leads it to supply an alpn_select_cb() but
have that callback be configured to take no action on connections that
do not have ALPN configured; returning SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK from
the callback would be the natural way to do so. Unfortunately, the
aforementioned behavior change also treated SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK as
indicative of no overlap and terminated the connection; this change
supplies special handling for SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK returns from the
callback. In effect, it provides a way for a callback to obtain the
behavior that would have occurred if no callback was registered at
all, which was not possible prior to this change.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2570)
Add ExpectedClientCANames: for client auth this checks to see if the
list of certificate authorities supplied by the server matches the
expected value.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2969)
Plumb things through in the same place as the SNI callback, since
we recommend that the early callback replace (and supplement) the
SNI callback, and add a few test cases.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
In 1.1.0 changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in
a crash leading to a DoS attack. In master this does not occur with TLS
(instead you get an internal error, which is still wrong but not a security
issue) - but the problem still exists in the DTLS code.
This commit provides a test for the issue.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Add option ExpectedTmpKeyType to test the temporary key the server
sends is of the correct type.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2191)
In some cases, both client and server end of the test can end up in
SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ and never get out of it, making the test spin.
Detect it and give up instead of waiting endlessly.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2096)
The previous commit revealed a long standing problem where CertStatus
processing was broken in DTLS. This would have been revealed by better
testing - so add some!
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Make maximum fragment length configurable and add various fragmentation
tests, in addition to the existing multi-buffer tests.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
