An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777)
(cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)
The check is redundant, because <openssl/x509v3.h> is included.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9365)
Fixes#8923
Found using the openssl cms -resign option.
This uses an alternate path to do the signing which was not adding the required signed attribute
content type. The content type attribute should always exist since it is required is there are
any signed attributes.
As the signing time attribute is always added in code, the content type attribute is also required.
The CMS_si_check_attributes() method adds validity checks for signed and unsigned attributes
e.g. The message digest attribute is a signed attribute that must exist if any signed attributes
exist, it cannot be an unsigned attribute and there must only be one instance containing a single
value.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8944)
(cherry picked from commit 19e512a824)
These headers are internal and never exposed to a cpp compiler, hence no
need for the preamble.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6554)
Replace all remaining uses of LONG and ZLONG with INT32 / ZINT32.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3126)
This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Applications wishing to include their own stacks now just need to include
DEFINE_STACK_OF(foo)
in a header file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Add support for customisation of CMS handling of signed and enveloped
data from custom public key parameters.
This will provide support for RSA-PSS and RSA-OAEP but could also be
applied to other algorithms.
continue with symmetric decryption process to avoid leaking timing
information to an attacker.
Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
