We already did this for ServerHello and EncryptedExtensions. We should be
doing it for Certificate and HelloRetryRequest as well.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3298)
This enables us to know what messages the extensions are relevant for in
TLSv1.3. The new file format is not compatible with the previous one so
we call it SERVERINFOV2.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3298)
Add padding callback for application control
Standard block_size callback
Documentation and tests included
Configuration file/s_client/s_srver option
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3130)
This fixes a segfault if a NULL parse_cb is passed to
SSL_CTX_add_{client,server}_custom_ext, which was supported in the
pre-1.1.1 implementation.
This behaviour is consistent with the other custom_ext_*_old_cb_wrap
functions, and with the new SSL_CTX_add_custom_ext function.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3310)
Previously, init and finalization function for extensions are called
per extension block, rather than per message. This commit changes
that behaviour, and now they are called per message. The parse
function is still called per extension block.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3244)
Because NST messages arrive post-handshake, the session may have already
gone into the cache. Once in the cache a session must be immutable -
otherwise you could get multi-thread issues.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3008)
Provide a way to test whether the SSL_SESSION object can be used to resume a
sesion or not.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3008)
TLSv1.3 will do the same thing as TLSv1.2 with tickets with regards to session
ids, i.e. it will create a synthetic session id when the session is established,
so it is reasonable to check the session id length, even in TLSv1.3.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3008)
Ensure that there are ciphersuites enabled for the maximum supported
version we will accept in a ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3316)
Ensure that there are ciphersuites enabled for the maximum supported
version we are claiming in the ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3316)
The function tls_early_post_process_client_hello() was overwriting the
passed "al" parameter even if it was successful. The caller of that
function, tls_post_process_client_hello(), sets "al" to a sensible default
(HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), but this was being overwritten to be INTERNAL_ERROR.
The result is a "no shared cipher" error (and probably other similar errors)
were being reported back to the client with an incorrect INTERNAL_ERROR
alert.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3314)
We were allocating the write buffer based on the size of max_send_fragment,
but ignoring it when writing data. We should fragment handshake messages
if they exceed max_send_fragment and reject application data writes that
are too large.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3286)
There was code existing which attempted to handle the case where application
data is received after a reneg handshake has started in SCTP. In normal DTLS
we just fail the connection if this occurs, so there doesn't seem any reason
to try and work around it for SCTP. In practice it didn't work properly
anyway and is probably a bad idea to start with.
Fixes#3251
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3286)
ECDHE is not properly defined for SSLv3. Commit fe55c4a2 prevented ECDHE
from being selected in that protocol. However, historically, servers do
still select ECDHE anyway so that commit causes interoperability problems.
Clients that previously worked when talking to an SSLv3 server could now
fail.
This commit introduces an exception which enables a client to continue in
SSLv3 if the server selected ECDHE.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3204)
doing the pms assignment after log is successful
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3278)
X509_STORE_add_cert and X509_STORE_add_crl are changed to return
success if the object to be added was already found in the store, rather
than returning an error.
Raise errors if empty or malformed files are read when loading certificates
and CRLs.
Remove NULL checks and allow a segv to occur.
Add error handing for all calls to X509_STORE_add_c{ert|tl}
Refactor these two routines into one.
Bring the unit test for duplicate certificates up to date using the test
framework.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2830)
This resulted in the SCT timestamp check always failing, because the
timestamp appeared to be in the future.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3138)
SSLv3 does not support TLS extensions, and thus, cannot provide any
curves for ECDH(E). With the removal of the default (all) list of curves
being used for connections that didn't provide any curves, ECDHE is no
longer possible.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3181)
RFC 7301 mandates that the server SHALL respond with a fatal
"no_application_protocol" alert when there is no overlap between
the client's supplied list and the server's list of supported protocols.
In commit 062178678f we changed from
ignoring non-success returns from the supplied alpn_select_cb() to
treating such non-success returns as indicative of non-overlap and
sending the fatal alert.
In effect, this is using the presence of an alpn_select_cb() as a proxy
to attempt to determine whether the application has configured a list
of supported protocols. However, there may be cases in which an
application's architecture leads it to supply an alpn_select_cb() but
have that callback be configured to take no action on connections that
do not have ALPN configured; returning SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK from
the callback would be the natural way to do so. Unfortunately, the
aforementioned behavior change also treated SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK as
indicative of no overlap and terminated the connection; this change
supplies special handling for SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK returns from the
callback. In effect, it provides a way for a callback to obtain the
behavior that would have occurred if no callback was registered at
all, which was not possible prior to this change.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2570)
The old custom extensions API was not TLSv1.3 aware. Extensions are used
extensively in TLSv1.3 and they can appear in many different types of
messages. Therefore we need a new API to be able to cope with that.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3139)
This move prepares for the later addition of the new custom extensions
API. The context codes have an additional "SSL_" added to their name to
ensure we don't have name clashes with other applications.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3139)
This increases portability of SSL_SESSION files between architectures
where the size of |long| may vary. Before this, SSL_SESSION files
produced on a 64-bit long architecture may break on a 32-bit long
architecture.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3088)
Add functions to add/retrieve the certificate_authorities. The older
client_CA functions mainly just call the new versions now.
Rename fields sice new extension can be generated by client and server.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3015)
The macro SSL_get_server_tmp_key() returns information about the temp key
used by the server during a handshake. This was returning NULL for TLSv1.3
and causing s_client to omit this information in its connection summary.
Fixes#3081
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3114)
If we have received the EoED message but not yet had the CF then we are
"in init". Despite that we still want to write application data, so suppress
the "in init" check in ssl3_write_bytes() in that scenario.
Fixes#3041
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3091)
SSL_get_max_early_data() recently added by 3fc8d85610 ("Construct the
ticket_early_data_info extension", 2017-02-17) is supposed to take an
SSL, but it doesn't.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3113)
Numerous changes have been made to the supported built-in extensions and
SSL_extension_supported() has not kept up.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3097)
If the server received EoED then SSL_read_early_data() will return
SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH. However if the CF has not yet been processed
then SSL_is_init_finished() will still return 0. Therefore we should still
be able to write early data.
Fixes#3041
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3089)
If read_ahead is set, or SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY is used then if
SSL_read_early_data() hits an EndOfEarlyData message then it will
immediately retry automatically, but this time read normal data instead
of early data!
Fixes#3041
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3077)
Variable 'pktype' was set but not used under OPENSSL_NO_GOST. This change
will fix the build warning under [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable].
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2961)
A similar change that probably should have been wrapped into
commit e0926ef49d.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3010)
Fix some comments too
[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3069)
Commit 6b1bb98fa moved the processing of ClientHello extensions into the
state machine post-processing stage. After processing s->init_num is reset
to 0, so by post-processing we cannot rely on its value. Unfortunately we
were using it to handle the PSK extension. This causes the handshake to
fail.
We were using init_num to figure out the length of ClientHello2 so we can
remove it from the handshake_buffer. The handshake_buffer holds the
transcript of all the messages sent so far. For PSK processing though we
only want to add in a partial ClientHello2. This commit changes things so
we just work out where ClientHello2 starts, working forward from the
beginning of handshake_buffer.
Fixes#2983
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2996)
This label for this derivation was incorrectly "derived" or "der" depending
on the pointer size of the build(!). The correct string is "derived secret".
(cherry picked from commit 936dcf272033c1bf59a5e859ec63e2557194f191)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2989)
In OpenSSL 1.1.0 the padding extension MUST be last because it calculates
the length of everything that has been written into the ClientHello to
determine whether it needs to be padded or not. With TLSv1.3 that isn't
possible because the specification requires that the PSK extension is last.
Therefore we need to fix the padding extension to take account of any PSK
extension that will be later added.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2968)
Choose a new ciphersuite for the HRR. Don't just use the one from the
session.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2895)
Don't include a PSK that does not have the right hash for the selected
ciphersuite following an HRR.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2895)
Draft-19 changes the HRR transcript hash so that the initial ClientHello
is replaced in the transcript with a special synthetic message_hash message
that just contains a hash of ClientHello1 as its message body.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2895)
The end of early data is now indicated by a new handshake message rather
than an alert.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2895)
tls1_get_curvelist() does not read from its third parameter, so
the assignments prior to function call were dead code and can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2952)
Instead of making a positive comparison against the invalid value
that our server would send, make a negative check against the only
value that is not an error.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2953)
Zero out the length alongside the NULLing of the pointer, to
bring parity between the selected and proposed fields..
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2954)
No need to break out of the loop and repeat the loop termination
condition when we can just return.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2949)
Found using various (old-ish) versions of gcc.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2940)
... in functions dealing with the SSL object rather than the context.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2870)
that refers to space
deallocated by a call to the free function in tls_decrypt_ticket.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2897)
(cherry picked from commit 13ed1afa92)
The value of SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH normally includes the compression
overhead (even if no compression is negotiated for a connection). Except in
a build where no-comp is used the value of SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH does
not include the compression overhead.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2872)
In TLSv1.3 the above messages signal a key change. The spec requires that
the end of these messages must align with a record boundary. We can detect
this by checking for decrypted but as yet unread record data sitting in
OpenSSL buffers at the point where we process the messages.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2875)
Also updates SSL_has_pending() to use it. This actually fixes a bug in
SSL_has_pending() which is supposed to return 1 if we have any processed
or unprocessed data sitting in OpenSSL buffers. However it failed to return
1 if we had processed non-application data pending.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2875)
Also, restore 1.0.2 behavior of looping over all BIO's in the chain.
Thanks to Joseph Bester for finding this and suggesting a fix to the
crash.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2651)
If early data is sent to a server, but ALPN is not used then memcmp is
called with a NULL pointer which is undefined behaviour.
Fixes#2841
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2845)
We do not allow the generation of TLSv1.3 cookies. But if we receive one
in an HRR we will echo it back in the ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2839)
A leak of an SSL_SESSION object can occur when decoding a psk extension on
an error path when using TLSv1.3
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2843)
Change tls12_sigalg_allowed() so it is passed a SIGALG_LOOKUP parameter,
this avoids multiple lookups.
When we copy signature algorithms return an error if no valid TLS message
signing algorithm is present. For TLS 1.3 this means we need at least one
signature algorithm other than RSA PKCS#1 or SHA1 both of which can only be
used to sign certificates and not TLS messages.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2840)
Change the early data API so that the server must use
SSL_write_early_data() to write to an unauthenticated client.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
This is for consistency with the rest of the API where all the functions
are called *early_data*.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
This is for consistency with the rest of the API where all the functions
are called *early_data*.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
Check that we actually resumed the session, and that we selected the first
identity.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
If the ticket age calcualtions do not check out then we must not accept
early data (it could be a replay).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
We also skip any early_data that subsequently gets sent. Later commits will
process it if we can.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
We provide SSL_write_early() which *must* be called first on a connection
(prior to any other IO function including SSL_connect()/SSL_do_handshake()).
Also SSL_write_early_finish() which signals the end of early data.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
do_ssl3_write() was crashing when compression was enabled. We calculate
the maximum length that a record will be after compression and reserve
those bytes in the WPACKET. Unfortunately we were adding the maximum
compression overhead onto the wrong variable resulting in a corrupted
record.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2814)
- FLAT_INC
- PKCS1_CHECK (the SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK options have been
no-oped)
- PKCS_TESTVECT (debugging leftovers)
- SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME (unfinished feature)
- DTLS_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE (unfinished feature)
- USE_OBJ_MAC (note this removes a define from the public header but
very unlikely someone would be depending on it)
- SSL_FORBID_ENULL
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
This removes the fips configure option. This option is broken as the
required FIPS code is not available.
FIPS_mode() and FIPS_mode_set() are retained for compatibility, but
FIPS_mode() always returns 0, and FIPS_mode_set() can only be used to
turn FIPS mode off.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
the uninitialized session_id now.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2608)
There are a small number of functions in libssl that are internal only
and never used by anything.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2770)
This adds partial support for TLS 1.3 certificate request message.
The request context and extensions are currently ignored on receive
and set to zero length on send.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2728)
The certificate types used to be held in a fixed length array or (if
it was too long) a malloced buffer. This was done to retain binary
compatibility. The code can be simplified now SSL is opaque by always
using a malloced buffer.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2733)
Provide a callback interface that gives the application the ability
to adjust the nascent SSL object at the earliest stage of ClientHello
processing, immediately after extensions have been collected but
before they have been processed.
This is akin to BoringSSL's "select_certificate_cb" (though it is not
API compatible), and as the name indicates, one major use is to examine
the supplied server name indication and select what certificate to
present to the client. However, it can also be used to make more
sweeping configuration changes to the SSL object according to the
selected server identity and configuration. That may include adjusting
the permitted TLS versions, swapping out the SSL_CTX object (as is
traditionally done in a tlsext_servername_callback), changing the
server's cipher list, and more.
We also wish to allow an early callback to indicate that it needs to perform
additional work asynchronously and resume processing later. To that effect,
refactor the second half of tls_process_client_hello() into a subroutine to be
called at the post-processing stage (including the early callback itself), to
allow the callback to result in remaining in the same work stage for a later
call to succeed. This requires allocating for and storing the CLIENTHELLO_MSG
in the SSL object to be preserved across such calls, but the storage is
reclaimed after ClientHello processing finishes.
Information about the CliehtHello is available to the callback by means of
accessor functions that can only be used from the early callback. This allows
extensions to make use of the existing internal parsing machinery without
exposing structure internals (e.g., of PACKET), so that applications do not
have to write fragile parsing code.
Applications are encouraged to utilize an early callback and not use
a servername_callback, in order to avoid unexpected behavior that
occurs due to the relative order of processing between things like
session resumption and the historical servername callback.
Also tidy up nearby style by removing unnecessary braces around one-line
conditional bodies.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
Add the new enum value and case statements as appropriate.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
Split off the portions that mutate the SSL object into a separate
function that the state machine calls, so that the public API can
be a pure function. (It still needs the SSL parameter in order
to determine what SSL_METHOD's get_cipher_by_char() routine to use,
though.)
Instead of returning the stack of ciphers (functionality that was
not used internally), require using the output parameter, and add
a separate output parameter for the SCSVs contained in the supplied
octets, if desired. This lets us move to the standard return value
convention. Also make both output stacks optional parameters.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
Move ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list() to ssl_lib.c and create a public
wrapper around it. This lets application early callbacks easily get
SSL_CIPHER objects from the raw ciphers bytes without having to
reimplement the parsing code. In particular, they do not need to
know the details of the sslv2 format ClientHello's ciphersuite
specifications.
Document the new public function, including the arguably buggy behavior
of modifying the supplied SSL object. On the face of it, such a function
should be able to be pure, just a direct translation of wire octets to
internal data structures.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
Now that we have made SCSVs into more of a first-class object, provide
a way for the bytes-to-SSL_CIPHER conversion to actually return them.
Add a flag 'all' to ssl_get_cipher_by_char to indicate that we want
all the known ciphers, not just the ones valid for encryption. This will,
in practice, let the caller retrieve the SCSVs.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
Just as we have a table of ssl3_ciphers, add a table of ssl3_scsvs, to contain
SSL_CIPHER objects for these non-valid ciphers. This will allow for unified
handling of such indicators, especially as we are preparing to pass them around
between functions.
Since the 'valid' field is not set for the SCSVs, they should not be used
for anything requiring a cryptographic cipher (as opposed to something
being stuck in a cipher-shaped hole in the TLS wire protocol).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
We'll be adding a field of this type to struct ssl_st in a subsequent
commit, and need the type definition to be in scope already.
Also move up the RAW_EXTENSION definition that it depends on.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
Keep track of the length of the pre_proc_exts array.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
Modify the API of tls_collect_extensions() to be able to output the number of
extensions that are known (i.e., the length of its 'res' output). This number
can never be zero on a successful return due to the builtin extensions list,
but use a separate output variable so as to not overload the return value
semantics.
Having this value easily available will give consumers a way to avoid repeating
the calculation.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2607)
Set default validity flags if signature algorithms extension
is not present. Preserve flags when checking chains.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2679)
This implementation is written in endian agnostic C code. No attempt
at providing machine specific assembly code has been made. This
implementation expands the evptests by including the test cases from
RFC 5794 and ARIA official site rather than providing an individual
test case. Support for ARIA has been integrated into the command line
applications, but not TLS. Implemented modes are CBC, CFB1, CFB8,
CFB128, CTR, ECB and OFB128.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2337)
We use an int instead. That means SSL_key_update() also should use an int.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2609)
Too many KeyUpdate message could be inicative of a problem (e.g. an
infinite KeyUpdate loop if the peer always responds to a KeyUpdate message
with an "update_requested" KeyUpdate response), or (conceivably) an attack.
Either way we limit the number of KeyUpdate messages we are prepared to
handle.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2609)
For client auth call tls_choose_sigalg to select the certificate
and signature algorithm. Use the selected algorithm in
tls_construct_cert_verify.
Remove obsolete tls12_get_sigandhash.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2643)
Select appropriate signature algorithm and certificate for client
authentication using tls_choose_sigalg.
A lot of selection logic is very similar except not finding a
certificate is not a fatal error: we just do not present a
certificate.
For TLS 1.2 and earlier we only check the current certificate
is suitable (for compatibility with previous logic) for TLS 1.3
(where there are no compatibility issues) we support multiple
client certificates for different algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2643)
Following on from CVE-2017-3733, this removes the OPENSSL_assert() check
that failed and replaces it with a soft assert, and an explicit check of
value with an error return if it fails.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
In 1.1.0 changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in
a crash leading to a DoS attack. In master this does not occur with TLS
(instead you get an internal error, which is still wrong but not a security
issue) - but the problem still exists in the DTLS code.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Use negotiated signature algorithm and certificate index in
tls_construct_key_exchange instead of recalculating it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2623)
Now the certificate and signature algorithm is set in one place we
can use it directly insetad of recalculating it. The old functions
ssl_get_server_send_pkey() and ssl_get_server_cert_index() are no
longer required.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2623)
