Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
In commit 6aca8d1a5 ("Honour mandatory digest on private key in
has_usable_cert()") I added two checks for the capabilities of the
EVP_PKEY being used. One of them was wrong, as it should only be
checking the signature of the X.509 cert (by its issuer) against the
sigalgs given in a TLS v1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension.
Remove it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9705)
The function SSL_check_chain() can be used by applications to check that
a cert and chain is compatible with the negotiated parameters. This could
be useful (for example) from the certificate callback. Unfortunately this
function was applying TLSv1.2 sig algs rules and did not work correctly if
TLSv1.3 was negotiated.
We refactor tls_choose_sigalg to split it up and create a new function
find_sig_alg which can (optionally) take a certificate and key as
parameters and find an appropriate sig alg if one exists. If the cert and
key are not supplied then we try to find a cert and key from the ones we
have available that matches the shared sig algs.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9443)
It was only ever in cert_st because ssl_st was a public structure
and could not be modified without breaking the API. However, both
structures are now opaque, and thus we can freely change their layout
without breaking applications. In this case, keeping the shared
sigalgs in the SSL object prevents complications wherein they would
inadvertently get cleared during SSL_set_SSL_CTX() (e.g., as run
during a cert_cb).
Fixes#9099
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9157)
(cherry picked from commit 29948ac80c)
The previous 2 commits moved supported groups and ciphers out of the
session object to avoid race conditions. We now also move ecpointformats
for consistency. There does not seem to be a race condition with access
to this data since it is only ever set in a non-resumption handshake.
However, there is no reason for it to be in the session.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9176)
If the private key says it can only support one specific digest, then
don't ask it to perform a different one.
Fixes: #7348
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2d263a4a73)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7609)
SSL_get_signature_nid() -- local signature algorithm
SSL_get_signature_type_nid() -- local signature algorithm key type
SSL_get_peer_tmp_key() -- Peer key-exchange public key
SSL_get_tmp_key -- local key exchange public key
Aliased pre-existing SSL_get_server_tmp_key(), which was formerly
just for clients, to SSL_get_peer_tmp_key(). Changed internal
calls to use the new name.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
TLSv1.3 is more restrictive about the curve used. There must be a matching
sig alg defined for that curve. Therefore if we are using some other curve
in our certificate then we should not negotiate TLSv1.3.
Fixes#7435
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7442)
(cherry picked from commit de4dc59802)
If we have selected a ciphersuite using RSA key exchange then we must
not attempt to use an RSA-PSS cert for that.
Fixes#7059
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7099)
We need to ensure that the min-max version range we use when constructing
the ClientHello is the same range we use when we validate the version
selected by the ServerHello. Otherwise this may appear as a fallback or
downgrade.
Fixes#6964
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7013)
Using the rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 sig alg should imply that the key OID is
rsaEncryption. Similarly rsa_pss_pss_sha256 implies the key OID is
rsassaPss. However we did not check this and incorrectly tolerated a key
OID that did not match the sig alg sent by the peer.
Fixes#6611
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6732)
Don't call the decrypt ticket callback if we've already encountered a
fatal error. Do call it if we have an empty ticket present.
Change the return code to have 5 distinct returns codes and separate it
from the input status value.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6198)
The return value from the ticket_key callback was not properly handled in
TLSv1.3, so that a ticket was *always* renewed even if the callback
requested that it should not be.
Also the ticket decrypt callback was not being called at all in TLSv1.3.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6198)
The MAX_CURVELIST macro defines the total number of in-built SSL/TLS curves
that we support. However it has not been updated as new curves are added.
Fixes#5232
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6065)
The spec does not prohib certs form using compressed points. It only
requires that points in a key share are uncompressed. It says nothing
about point compression for certs, so we should not fail if a cert uses a
compressed point.
Fixes#5743
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6055)
If a server has been configured to use an ECDSA certificate, we should
allow it regardless of whether the server's own supported groups list
includes the certificate's group.
Fixes#2033
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5601)
Place the session ticket AES and HMAC keys into secure memory.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2351)
Conceptually in TLSv1.3 there can be multiple sessions associated with a
single connection. Each NewSessionTicket issued can be considered a
separate session. We can end up issuing multiple NewSessionTickets on a
single connection at the moment (e.g. in a post-handshake auth scenario).
Each of those issued tickets should have the new_session_cb called, it
should go into the session cache separately and it should have a unique
id associated with it (so that they can be found individually in the
cache).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5644)
Adds application data into the encrypted session ticket
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3802)
This could in theory result in an overread - but due to the over allocation
of the underlying buffer does not represent a security issue.
Thanks to Fedor Indutny for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5414)
The check for a duplicate value was reading one entry past
where it was supposed to, getting an uninitialized value.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5172)
The new extension is like signature_algorithms, but only for the
signature *on* the certificate we will present to the peer (the
old signature_algorithms extension is still used for signatures that
we *generate*, i.e., those over TLS data structures).
We do not need to generate this extension, since we are the same
implementation as our X.509 stack and can handle the same types
of signatures, but we need to be prepared to receive it, and use the received
information when selecting what certificate to present.
There is a lot of interplay between signature_algorithms_cert and
signature_algorithms, since both affect what certificate we can
use, and thus the resulting signature algorithm used for TLS messages.
So, apply signature_algorithms_cert (if present) as a filter on what
certificates we can consider when choosing a certificate+sigalg
pair.
As part of this addition, we also remove the fallback code that let
keys of type EVP_PKEY_RSA be used to generate RSA-PSS signatures -- the
new rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* signature schemes have pulled
the key type into what is covered by the signature algorithm, so
we should not apply this sort of compatibility workaround.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
Our historical SSL{,_CTX}_set_sigalgs() APIs take an array of
NID pairs (hash and signature), and our parser for manually
specifying unified sigalgs (that do not necessarily correspond
to an actual signature+hash pair) was transiting via (the implementation
of) this historical API. The TLS 1.3 draft-23 has introduced
signature schemes that have identical signature type and hash type,
differing only in the (RSA) public key OID, which prevents
the rsa_pss_pss_* schemes from being properly identified and
sent on the wire.
To fix the issue, parse sigalg strings directly into SIGALG_LOOKUP
objects, and pass around an array of uint16 wire protocol values
instead of NID pairs. The old interface is retained for API
compatibility but will become less and less useful with time.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
We now have a split in the signature algorithms codepoint space for
whether the certificate's key is for rsaEncryption or a PSS-specific
key, which should let us get rid of some special-casing that we
previously needed to try to coax rsaEncryption keys into performing PSS.
(This will be done in a subsequent commit.)
Send the new PSS-with-PSS-specific key first in our list, so that
we prefer the new technology to the old one.
We need to update the expected certificate type in one test,
since the "RSA-PSS+SHA256" form now corresponds to a public key
of type rsaEncryption, so we should expect the server certificate
type to be just "RSA". If we want to get a server certificate
type of "RSA-PSS", we need to use a new signature algorithm
that cannot be represented as signature+hash, so add a test for that
as well.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
Extract the RSA key using EVP_PKEY_get0. Type is checked externally to be either EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS or EVP_PKEY_RSA.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4389)
It's argued that /WX allows to keep better focus on new code, which
motivates its comeback...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4721)
Add a check for NULL return in t1_lib.c.
Since return type of ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx is pointer and unify coding
style, I changed from zero to NULL in ssl_cert.c.
Remove unnecessary space for ++.
Fix incorrect condition
Expression is always false because 'else if' condition matches previous
condition. SInce the next line of 'else if' condition has substituted
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2, the 'else if'
condition should compare with NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4562)
The function tls_check_curve is only called on clients and contains
almost identical functionaity to tls1_check_group_id when called from
a client. Merge the two.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4475)
Rename tls1_get_curvelist to tls1_get_grouplist, change to void as
it can never fail and remove unnecessary return value checks. Clean
up the code.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/=4412)
Replace existing compression and groups check with two functions.
tls1_check_pkey_comp() checks a keys compression algorithms is consistent
with extensions.
tls1_check_group_id() checks is a group is consistent with extensions
and preferences.
Rename tls1_ec_nid2curve_id() to tls1_nid2group_id() and make it static.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/=4412)
