c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING takes length as a long but uses it as an int. Check
bounds before doing so. Previously, excessively large inputs to the
function could write a single byte outside the target buffer. (This is
unreachable as asn1_ex_c2i already uses int for the length.)
Thanks to NCC for finding this issue. Fix written by Martin Kreichgauer.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4385)
This reverts commit cc9c568946 for the file
pbe_scrypt.c instead of scrypt.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4357)
A new method is added to EVP_PKEY_METH as:
int (*check) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
and to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD as:
int (*pkey_check) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
This is used to check the validity of a specific key.
The order of calls is:
EVP_PKEY_check -> pmeth.check -> ameth.pkey_check.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4337)
... script data load.
On related note an attempt was made to merge rotations with logical
operations. I mean as we know, ARM ISA has merged rotate-n-logical
instructions which can be used here. And they were used to improve
keccak1600-armv4 performance. But not here. Even though this approach
resulted in improvement on Cortex-A53 proportional to reduction of
amount of instructions, ~8%, it didn't exactly worked out on
non-Cortex cores. Presumably because they break merged instructions
to separate μ-ops, which results in higher *operations* count. X-Gene
and Denver went ~20% slower and Apple A7 - 40%. The optimization was
therefore dismissed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This allows completely arbitrary passphrases to be entered, including
NUL bytes.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3821)
This quiets down complaints about the use of uninitialised memory
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4340)
OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod discusses possibility to disable operations on
XMM register bank. This formally means that this flag has to be checked
in combination with other flags. But it customarily isn't. But instead
of chasing all the cases we can flip more bits together with FXSR one.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4303)
Move struct timeval includes into e_os.h (where the Windows ones were).
Enaure that the include is guarded canonically.
Refer #4271
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4312)
SNI and ALPN must be set to be consistent with the PSK. Otherwise this is
an error.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3926)
cryptilib.h is the second.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
Removed e_os.h from all bar three headers (apps/apps.h crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h and
ssl/ssl_locl.h).
Added e_os.h into the files that need it now.
Directly reference internal/nelem.h when required.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
The one creating the DRBG should instantiate it, it's there that we
know which parameters we should use to instantiate it.
This splits the rand init in two parts to avoid a deadlock
because when the global drbg is created it wands to call
rand_add on the global rand method.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #4268
The DRBG callbacks 'get_entropy()' and 'cleanup_entropy()' are designed
in such a way that the randomness buffer does not have to be allocated
by the calling function. It receives the address of a dynamically
allocated buffer from get_entropy() and returns this address to
cleanup_entropy(), where it is freed. If these two calls are properly
paired, the address can be stored in a stack local variable of the
calling function, so there is no need for having a 'randomness' member
(and a 'filled' member) in 'RAND_DRBG'.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
With the introduction of RAND_poll_ex(), the `RAND_add()` calls were
replaced by meaningless cb(...). This commit changes the 'cb(...)'
calls back to 'rand_add(...)' calls by changing the signature as follows:
-int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg);
+int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_cb rand_add, void *arg);
Changed the function typedef name to 'RAND_poll_cb' to emphasize the fact
that the function type represents a callback function.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
this part contains only the return (x) fix.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4223)
The C standard defines EOF as:
... an integer constant expression, with type int and a negative value...
This means a conforming implemenetation could define this as a one of the
printable characters. This won't be a problem for ASCII.
A specific test case has been added for EOF.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4240)
