On Windows OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION is defined and in a sense
this modification simply harmonizes it with "VAR_AS_VAR".
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
RFC 5077 section 3.3 says:
If the server determines that it does not want to include a
ticket after it has included the SessionTicket extension in the
ServerHello, then it sends a zero-length ticket in the
NewSessionTicket handshake message.
Previously the client would fail upon attempting to allocate a
zero-length buffer. Now, we have the client ignore the empty ticket and
keep the existing session.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The ossltest engine wraps the built-in implementation of aes128-cbc.
Normally in an engine the cipher_data structure is automatically allocated
by the EVP layer. However this relies on the engine specifying up front
the size of that cipher_data structure. In the case of ossltest this value
isn't available at compile time. This change makes the ossltest engine
allocate its own cipher_data structure instead of leaving it to the EVP
layer.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Otherwise the ./config script fails with errors like:
> Operating system: x86_64-whatever-linux2
> This system (linux-x86_64) is not supported. See file INSTALL for details.
The failure was introduced by a93d3e0.
RT#4062
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The windows test uses the pseudo file "nul" to indicate no file for the
-CApath option. This does not work on all versions of Windows. Instead use
the new -no-CApath option.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
For those command line options that take the verification options
-CApath and -CAfile, if those options are absent then the default path or
file is used instead. It is not currently possible to specify *no* path or
file at all. This change adds the options -no-CApath and -no-CAfile to
specify that the default locations should not be used to all relevant
applications.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Previously you could only set both the default path and file locations
together. This adds the ability to set one without the other.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
As some of ARM processors, more specifically Cortex-Mx series, are
Thumb2-only, we need to support Thumb2-only builds even in assembly.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Clarify that user code is required to allocate sufficient space for the
addressing scheme in use in the call to DTLSv1_listen.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Use sockaddr_storage not sockaddr for the client IP address to allow for
IPv6.
Also fixed a section of code which was conditional on OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
which should not have been.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
This commit adds documentation for the new -listen option to s_server. Along
the way it also adds documentation for -dtls, -dtls1 and -dtls1_2 which was
missing.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
DTLSv1_listen is a commonly used function within DTLS solutions for
listening for new incoming connections. This commit adds support to s_server
for using it.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
The old implementation of DTLSv1_listen which has now been replaced still
had a few vestiges scattered throughout the code. This commit removes them.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
The existing implementation of DTLSv1_listen() is fundamentally flawed. This
function is used in DTLS solutions to listen for new incoming connections
from DTLS clients. A client will send an initial ClientHello. The server
will respond with a HelloVerifyRequest containing a unique cookie. The
client the responds with a second ClientHello - which this time contains the
cookie.
Once the cookie has been verified then DTLSv1_listen() returns to user code,
which is typically expected to continue the handshake with a call to (for
example) SSL_accept().
Whilst listening for incoming ClientHellos, the underlying BIO is usually in
an unconnected state. Therefore ClientHellos can come in from *any* peer.
The arrival of the first ClientHello without the cookie, and the second one
with it, could be interspersed with other intervening messages from
different clients.
The whole purpose of this mechanism is as a defence against DoS attacks. The
idea is to avoid allocating state on the server until the client has
verified that it is capable of receiving messages at the address it claims
to come from. However the existing DTLSv1_listen() implementation completely
fails to do this. It attempts to super-impose itself on the standard state
machine and reuses all of this code. However the standard state machine
expects to operate in a stateful manner with a single client, and this can
cause various problems.
A second more minor issue is that the return codes from this function are
quite confused, with no distinction made between fatal and non-fatal errors.
Most user code treats all errors as non-fatal, and simply retries the call
to DTLSv1_listen().
This commit completely rewrites the implementation of DTLSv1_listen() and
provides a stand alone implementation that does not rely on the existing
state machine. It also provides more consistent return codes.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Add the ability to peek at a message from the DTLS read BIO. This is needed
for the DTLSv1_listen rewrite.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
The openssl rehash command is not available on some platforms including
Windows. This change skips the associated tests if rehash is not available.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
