Commit graph

139 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Matt Caswell
b5b993b229 Use the same min-max version range on the client consistently
We need to ensure that the min-max version range we use when constructing
the ClientHello is the same range we use when we validate the version
selected by the ServerHello. Otherwise this may appear as a fallback or
downgrade.

Fixes #6964

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7013)
2018-08-22 15:15:19 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
9ef9088c15 ssl/*: switch to switch to Thread-Sanitizer-friendly primitives.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6786)
2018-08-07 09:08:23 +02:00
Benjamin Kaduk
1c4aa31d79 Normalize SNI hostname handling for SSL and SSL_SESSION
In particular, adhere to the rule that we must not modify any
property of an SSL_SESSION object once it is (or might be) in
a session cache.  Such modifications are thread-unsafe and have
been observed to cause crashes at runtime.

To effect this change, standardize on the property that
SSL_SESSION->ext.hostname is set only when that SNI value
has been negotiated by both parties for use with that session.
For session resumption this is trivially the case, so only new
handshakes are affected.

On the client, the new semantics are that the SSL->ext.hostname is
for storing the value configured by the caller, and this value is
used when constructing the ClientHello.  On the server, SSL->ext.hostname
is used to hold the value received from the client.  Only if the
SNI negotiation is successful will the hostname be stored into the
session object; the server can do this after it sends the ServerHello,
and the client after it has received and processed the ServerHello.

This obviates the need to remove the hostname from the session object
in case of failed negotiation (a change that was introduced in commit
9fb6cb810b in order to allow TLS 1.3
early data when SNI was present in the ClientHello but not the session
being resumed), which was modifying cached sessions in certain cases.
(In TLS 1.3 we always produce a new SSL_SESSION object for new
connections, even in the case of resumption, so no TLS 1.3 handshakes
were affected.)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6378)
2018-07-20 07:12:24 -05:00
Matt Caswell
c9598459b6 Add setters to set the early_data callback
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6469)
2018-07-02 15:06:12 +01:00
Matt Caswell
fb62e47c78 Don't send a warning alert in TLSv1.3
TLSv1.3 ignores the alert level, so we should suppress sending of
warning only alerts.

Fixes #6211

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6370)
2018-06-11 15:46:21 +01:00
Matt Caswell
4ff1a52666 Fix TLSv1.3 ticket nonces
All tickets on a connection need to have a unique nonce. When this was
originally implemented we only ever sent one ticket on the conneciton so
this didn't matter. We were just using the value 0. Now we can get multiple
tickets to we need to start doing the ticket nonce properly.

Fixes #6387

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6415)
2018-06-07 10:58:35 +01:00
Matt Caswell
bceae201b4 EVP_MD_size() can return an error
Fix some instances where we weren't checking the error return.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6373)
2018-05-31 10:39:13 +01:00
Matt Caswell
f929439f61 Rename EVP_PKEY_new_private_key()/EVP_PKEY_new_public_key()
Renamed to EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key()/EVP_new_raw_public_key() as per
feedback.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5520)
2018-03-15 12:47:27 +00:00
Matt Caswell
e32b52a27e Add support for setting raw private HMAC keys
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5520)
2018-03-15 12:47:27 +00:00
Matt Caswell
27e462f1b0 Only allow supported_versions in a TLSv1.3 ServerHello
As per the latest text in TLSv1.3 draft-26

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5604)
2018-03-14 09:51:20 +00:00
Benjamin Kaduk
ee36b963ae Reuse extension_is_relevant() in should_add_extension()
At the core of things is the concept that each extension is only
defined in certain context(s) -- the ClientHello, EncryptedExtensions,
etc., and sometimes only for a specific protocol or protocol range;
we want to enforce that we only parse or generate extensions in the
context(s) for which they are defined.  There is some subtlety here,
in that the protocol version in use is not known when generating the
ClientHello (but it is known when the ClientHello extensions are
being parsed!), so the SSL_IS_TLS13() macro must be used with caution.
Nonetheless, by making assertions about whether we are acting in a
server role and whether the current context is (not) a ClientHello,
we can consolidate almost all of the logic for determining whether
an extension is permitted in a given protocol message, whether we
are generating or parsing that message.

The only logic that remains separate relates to generating the ClientHello,
as it depends on an external factor (the maximum permitted TLS version) that
is not defined in the parsing context.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2945)
2018-03-09 11:17:32 -06:00
Matt Caswell
e73c6eaeff Tolerate TLSv1.3 PSKs that are a different size to the hash size
We also default to SHA256 as per the spec if we do not have an explicit
digest defined.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5554)
2018-03-09 11:22:23 +00:00
Matt Caswell
5de683d2c6 Fix status_request and SCT extensions
They are valid for use in a CertificateRequest message, but we did not
allow it. If a server sent such a message using either of those two
extensions then the handshake would abort.

This corrects that error, but does not add support for actually processing
the extensions. They are simply ignored, and a TODO is inserted to add
support at a later time.

This was found during interoperability testing with btls:
https://gitlab.com/ilari_l/btls

Prompted by these errors I reviewed the complete list of extensions and
compared them with the latest table in draft-24 to confirm there were no
other errors of a similar type. I did not find any.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5490)
2018-03-05 11:55:07 +00:00
Matt Caswell
c471521243 If s->ctx is NULL then this is an internal error
Coverity was complaining because we checked if s->ctx is NULL and then
later on in the function deref s->ctx anyway. In reality if s->ctx is
NULL then this is an internal error.

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5334)
2018-02-15 15:14:45 +00:00
Matt Caswell
6e99ae58c8 Ignore an s_client psk in TLSv1.3 if not TLSv1.3 suitable
The s_client psk_use_session_cb callback has a comment stating that we
should ignore a key that isn't suitable for TLSv1.3. However we were
actually causing the connection to fail. Changing the return value fixes
the issue.

Also related to this is that the early_data extension was not marked as
TLSv1.3 only which it should be.

Fixes #5202

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5205)
2018-02-14 15:42:36 +00:00
Todd Short
e43e6b1951 Fix some minor code nits
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2018-02-01 17:07:56 +00:00
Todd Short
9d75dce3e1 Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA

Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.

Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:

* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.

* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.

Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options

Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha

Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code

Update documentation

Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests

DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error

Update handshake context to deal with PHA.

The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.

After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.

This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2018-02-01 17:07:56 +00:00
Benjamin Kaduk
c589c34e61 Add support for the TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension
The new extension is like signature_algorithms, but only for the
signature *on* the certificate we will present to the peer (the
old signature_algorithms extension is still used for signatures that
we *generate*, i.e., those over TLS data structures).

We do not need to generate this extension, since we are the same
implementation as our X.509 stack and can handle the same types
of signatures, but we need to be prepared to receive it, and use the received
information when selecting what certificate to present.

There is a lot of interplay between signature_algorithms_cert and
signature_algorithms, since both affect what certificate we can
use, and thus the resulting signature algorithm used for TLS messages.
So, apply signature_algorithms_cert (if present) as a filter on what
certificates we can consider when choosing a certificate+sigalg
pair.

As part of this addition, we also remove the fallback code that let
keys of type EVP_PKEY_RSA be used to generate RSA-PSS signatures -- the
new rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* signature schemes have pulled
the key type into what is covered by the signature algorithm, so
we should not apply this sort of compatibility workaround.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
2018-01-25 12:57:22 -06:00
Matt Caswell
97ea1e7f42 Updates following review of SSL_stateless() code
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4435)
2018-01-24 18:02:37 +00:00
Matt Caswell
c36001c3a8 Fix logic around when to send an HRR based on cookies
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4435)
2018-01-24 18:02:36 +00:00
Matt Caswell
43054d3d73 Add support for sending TLSv1.3 cookies
This just adds the various extension functions. More changes will be
required to actually use them.

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4435)
2018-01-24 18:02:35 +00:00
Richard Levitte
3c7d0945b6 Update copyright years on all files merged since Jan 1st 2018
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5038)
2018-01-09 05:49:01 +01:00
Benjamin Kaduk
7bc2bddb14 Permit the "supported_groups" extension in ServerHellos
Although this is forbidden by all three(!) relevant specifications,
there seem to be multiple server implementations in the wild that
send it.  Since we didn't check for unexpected extensions in any
given message type until TLS 1.3 support was added, our previous
behavior was to silently accept these extensions and pass them over
to the custom extension callback (if any).  In order to avoid
regression of functionality, relax the check for "extension in
unexpected context" for this specific case, but leave the protocol
enforcment mechanism unchanged for other extensions and in other
extension contexts.

Leave a detailed comment to indicate what is going on.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4463)
2018-01-03 09:43:54 -06:00
Paul Yang
56d362881e Remove spaces at end of line in ssl/statem
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #4934
2017-12-17 23:04:41 +01:00
Matt Caswell
e7dd763e51 Make sure supported_versions appears in an HRR too
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)
2017-12-14 15:06:37 +00:00
Matt Caswell
fc7129dc37 Update state machine to send CCS based on whether we did an HRR
The CCS may be sent at different times based on whether or not we
sent an HRR earlier. In order to make that decision this commit
also updates things to make sure we remember whether an HRR was
used or not.

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)
2017-12-14 15:06:37 +00:00
Matt Caswell
88050dd196 Update ServerHello to new draft-22 format
The new ServerHello format is essentially now the same as the old TLSv1.2
one, but it must additionally include supported_versions. The version
field is fixed at TLSv1.2, and the version negotiation happens solely via
supported_versions.

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)
2017-12-14 15:06:37 +00:00
Matt Caswell
29bfd5b79a Add some more cleanups
Follow up from the conversion to use SSLfatal() in the state machine to
clean things up a bit more.

[extended tests]

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
2017-12-04 13:31:48 +00:00
Matt Caswell
635c8f7715 Fix up a few places in the state machine that got missed with SSLfatal()
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
2017-12-04 13:31:48 +00:00
Matt Caswell
f63a17d66d Convert the state machine code to use SSLfatal()
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
2017-12-04 13:31:48 +00:00
Matt Caswell
281bf2332c If a server is not acknowledging SNI then don't reject early_data
SNI needs to be consistent before we accept early_data. However a
server may choose to not acknowledge SNI. In that case we have to
expect that a client may send it anyway. We change the consistency
checks so that not acknowledging is treated more a like a "wild card",
accepting any SNI as being consistent.

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4738)
2017-11-21 17:46:22 +00:00
FdaSilvaYY
cf72c75792 Implement Maximum Fragment Length TLS extension.
Based on patch from Tomasz Moń:
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mailing.openssl.dev/fQxXvCg1uQY

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1008)
2017-11-05 17:46:48 +01:00
Benjamin Kaduk
3be08e3011 Provide SSL_CTX.stats.sess_accept for switched ctxs
We currently increment the SSL_CTX stats.sess_accept field in
tls_setup_handshake(), which is invoked from the state machine well
before ClientHello processing would have had a chance to switch
the SSL_CTX attached to the SSL object due to a provided SNI value.
However, stats.sess_accept_good is incremented in tls_finish_handshake(),
and uses the s->ctx.stats field (i.e., the new SSL_CTX that was switched
to as a result of SNI processing).  This leads to the confusing
(nonsensical) situation where stats.sess_accept_good is larger than
stats.sess_accept, as the "sess_accept" value was counted on the
s->session_ctx.

In order to provide some more useful numbers, increment
s->ctx.stats.sess_accept after SNI processing if the SNI processing
changed s->ctx to differ from s->session_ctx.  To preserve the
property that any given accept is counted only once, make the
corresponding decrement to s->session_ctx.stats.sess_accept when
doing so.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4549)
2017-10-30 10:21:10 -05:00
Matt Caswell
a2b97bdf3d Don't do version neg on an HRR
Previously if a client received an HRR then we would do version negotiation
immediately - because we know we are going to get TLSv1.3. However this
causes a problem when we emit the 2nd ClientHello because we start changing
a whole load of stuff to ommit things that aren't relevant for < TLSv1.3.
The spec requires that the 2nd ClientHello is the same except for changes
required from the HRR. Therefore the simplest thing to do is to defer the
version negotiation until we receive the ServerHello.

Fixes #4292

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4527)
2017-10-16 15:52:18 +01:00
Matt Caswell
9fb6cb810b Fix bug where early_data does not work if no SNI callback is present
Fixes #4496

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4519)
2017-10-12 15:19:49 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f48d826e33 Change curves to groups where relevant
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4475)
2017-10-06 13:23:45 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ff6d20a67b Use separate functions for supported and peer groups lists
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4475)
2017-10-06 13:23:45 +01:00
Todd Short
a84e5c9aa8 Session resume broken switching contexts
When an SSL's context is swtiched from a ticket-enabled context to
a ticket-disabled context in the servername callback, no session-id
is generated, so the session can't be resumed.

If a servername callback changes the SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option, check
to see if it's changed to disable, and whether a session ticket is
expected (i.e. the client indicated ticket support and the SSL had
tickets enabled at the time), and whether we already have a previous
session (i.e. s->hit is set).

In this case, clear the ticket-expected flag, remove any ticket data
and generate a session-id in the session.

If the SSL hit (resumed) and switched to a ticket-disabled context,
assume that the resumption was via session-id, and don't bother to
update the session.

Before this fix, the updated unit-tests in 06-sni-ticket.conf would
fail test #4 (server1 = SNI, server2 = no SNI).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1529)
2017-10-04 10:21:08 +10:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
34e5292c57 Rename tls1_get_curvelist.
Rename tls1_get_curvelist to tls1_get_grouplist, change to void as
it can never fail and remove unnecessary return value checks. Clean
up the code.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/=4412)
2017-09-26 13:00:26 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9e84a42db4 Store groups as uint16_t
Instead of storing supported groups in on-the-wire format store
them as parsed uint16_t values. This simplifies handling of groups
as the values can be directly used instead of being converted.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4406)
2017-09-22 22:59:42 +01:00
Benjamin Kaduk
1c259bb518 Restore historical behavior for absent ServerHello extensions
In OpenSSL 1.1.0, when there were no extensions added to the ServerHello,
we did not write the extension data length bytes to the end of the
ServerHello; this is needed for compatibility with old client implementations
that do not support TLS extensions (such as the default configuration of
OpenSSL 0.9.8).  When ServerHello extension construction was converted
to the new extensions framework in commit
7da160b0f4, this behavior was inadvertently
limited to cases when SSLv3 was negotiated (and similarly for ClientHellos),
presumably since extensions are not defined at all for SSLv3.  However,
extensions for TLS prior to TLS 1.3 have been defined in separate
RFCs (6066, 4366, and 3546) from the TLS protocol specifications, and as such
should be considered an optional protocol feature in those cases.

Accordingly, be conservative in what we send, and skip the extensions block
when there are no extensions to be sent, regardless of the TLS/SSL version.
(TLS 1.3 requires extensions and can safely be treated differently.)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4296)
2017-09-07 09:53:21 -05:00
Matt Caswell
4be3a7c7aa Client side sanity check of ALPN after server has accepted early_data
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3926)
2017-08-31 15:03:35 +01:00
Matt Caswell
630369d9ce Add server side sanity checks of SNI/ALPN for use with early_data
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3926)
2017-08-31 15:03:35 +01:00
Matt Caswell
add8d0e9e0 Enable the ability to use an external PSK for sending early_data
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3926)
2017-08-31 15:02:22 +01:00
Pauli
677963e5a4 e_os.h removal from other headers and source files.
Removed e_os.h from all bar three headers (apps/apps.h crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h and
ssl/ssl_locl.h).

Added e_os.h into the files that need it now.

Directly reference internal/nelem.h when required.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
2017-08-30 07:20:43 +10:00
Todd Short
10ed1b7239 Reorder extensions to put SigAlgs last
Force non-empty padding extension.
When enabled, force the padding extension to be at least 1 byte long.
WebSphere application server cannot handle having an empty
extension (e.g. EMS/EtM) as the last extension in a client hello.
This moves the SigAlgs extension last for TLSv1.2 to avoid this
issue.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3921)
2017-08-18 09:52:17 -04:00
Benjamin Kaduk
5626f634c3 Move ALPN handling from finalizer to delayed call
Commit 02f0274e8c moved ALPN processing
into an extension finalization function, as the only documented ordering
requirement from previous commits was that ALPN processing occur after
SNI processing, and SNI processing is performed before the extension
finalization step.  However, it is useful for applications'
alpn_select callbacks to run after ciphersuite selection as well -- at
least one application protocol specification (HTTP/2) imposes restrictions
on which ciphersuites are usable with that protocol.  Since it is generally
more preferrable to have a successful TLS connection with a default application
protocol than to fail the TLS connection and not be able to have the preferred
application protocol, it is good to give the alpn_select callback information
about the ciphersuite to be used, so that appropriate restrctions can be
enforced in application code.

Accordingly, split the ALPN handling out into a separate tls_handl_alpn()
function akin to tls_handle_status_request(), called from
tls_post_process_client_hello().  This is an alternative to resuscitating
ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(), something of an awkwward name itself.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4070)
2017-08-15 10:52:21 -05:00
FdaSilvaYY
44e6995155 Fix some Typos and indents
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4108)
2017-08-11 10:16:33 -04:00
Todd Short
b93a295a36 Fix SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback/-tlsextdebug
Some extensions were being displayed twice, before they were parsed, and
again after they were parsed.
The supported_versions extension was not being fully displayed, as it
was processed differently than other extensions.

Move the debug callback to where the extensions are first collected, to
catch all the extensions as they come in, so they are ordered correctly.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3911)
2017-07-31 13:38:05 -04:00
Matt Caswell
00848ea842 Tolerate a zero length ticket nonce
TLSv1.3 draft-21 requires the ticket nonce to be at least 1 byte in length.
However NSS sends a zero length nonce. This is actually ok because the next
draft will allow zero length nonces anyway, so we should tolerate this.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3957)
2017-07-18 16:59:37 +01:00