Replace manual ASN.1 decoder with ASN1_get object. This
will decode the tag and length properly and check against
it does not exceed the supplied buffer length.
PR#3335
(cherry picked from commit b0308dddd1cc6a8e1de803ef29ba6da25ee072c2)
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.
Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
The flag SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING hasn't done anything since OpenSSL
0.9.7h but deleting it will break source compatibility with any software
that references it. Restore it but #define to zero.
(cherry picked from commit b17d6b8d1d)
When sending an invalid version number alert don't change the
version number to the client version if a session is already
established.
Thanks to Marek Majkowski for additional analysis of this issue.
PR#3191
For DTLS we might need to retransmit messages from the previous session
so keep a copy of write context in DTLS retransmission buffers instead
of replacing it after sending CCS. CVE-2013-6450.
When deciding whether to use TLS 1.2 PRF and record hash algorithms
use the version number in the corresponding SSL_METHOD structure
instead of the SSL structure. The SSL structure version is sometimes
inaccurate. Note: OpenSSL 1.0.2 and later effectively do this already.
(CVE-2013-6449)
PR: 2808
With DTLS/SCTP the SCTP extension SCTP-AUTH is used to protect DATA and
FORWARD-TSN chunks. The key for this extension is derived from the
master secret and changed with the next ChangeCipherSpec, whenever a new
key has been negotiated. The following Finished then already uses the
new key. Unfortunately, the ChangeCipherSpec and Finished are part of
the same flight as the ClientKeyExchange, which is necessary for the
computation of the new secret. Hence, these messages are sent
immediately following each other, leaving the server very little time to
compute the new secret and pass it to SCTP before the finished arrives.
So the Finished is likely to be discarded by SCTP and a retransmission
becomes necessary. To prevent this issue, the Finished of the client is
still sent with the old key.
(cherry picked from commit 9fb523adce)
(cherry picked from commit b9ef52b078)
Since the TLS 1.2 supported signature algorithms extension is less
sophisticaed in OpenSSL 1.0.1 this has to be done in two stages.
RSA+MD5 is removed from supported signature algorithms extension:
any compliant implementation should never use RSA+MD5 as a result.
To cover the case of a broken implementation using RSA+MD5 anyway
disable lookup of MD5 algorithm in TLS 1.2.
(I'd rather use an option, but it appears that the options field is
full.)
Now, we send the time in the gmt_unix_time field if the appropriate
one of these mode options is set, but randomize the field if the flag
is not set.
Instead, send random bytes.
While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear. This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:
* It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.
* If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
* handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.
This fix ensures that
* A HelloRequest is retransmitted if not responded by a ClientHello
* The HelloRequest "consumes" the sequence number 0. The subsequent
ServerHello uses the sequence number 1.
* The client also expects the sequence number of the ServerHello to
be 1 if a HelloRequest was received earlier.
This patch fixes the RFC violation.
(cherry picked from commit b62f4daac0)
The version check for DTLS1_VERSION was redundant as
DTLS1_VERSION > TLS1_1_VERSION, however we do need to
check for DTLS1_BAD_VER for compatibility.
PR:2984
(cherry picked from commit d980abb22e)
Now we set the current certificate to the one used by a server
there is no need to call ssl_get_server_send_cert which will
fail if we haven't sent a certificate yet.
Fix the calculation that checks there is enough room in a record
after removing padding and optional explicit IV. (by Steve)
For AEAD remove the correct number of padding bytes (by Andy)
MD5 should use little endian order. Fortunately the only ciphersuite
affected is EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 (TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5) which
is a rarely used export grade ciphersuite.
We have to use EVP in FIPS mode so we can only partially mitigate
timing differences.
Make an extra call to EVP_DigestSignUpdate to hash additonal blocks
to cover any timing differences caused by removal of padding.
The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
This patch makes the decoding of SSLv3 and TLS CBC records constant
time. Without this, a timing side-channel can be used to build a padding
oracle and mount Vaudenay's attack.
This patch also disables the stitched AESNI+SHA mode pending a similar
fix to that code.
In order to be easy to backport, this change is implemented in ssl/,
rather than as a generic AEAD mode. In the future this should be changed
around so that HMAC isn't in ssl/, but crypto/ as FIPS expects.
This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
change the current certificate (in s->cert->key) to the one used and then
SSL_get_certificate and SSL_get_privatekey will automatically work.
Note for 1.0.1 and earlier also includes backport of the function
ssl_get_server_send_pkey.
Reported by: Phil Pennock <openssl-dev@spodhuis.org>
Make renegotiation work for TLS 1.2, 1.1 by not using a lower record
version client hello workaround if renegotiating.
If OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH is set then limit the size of client
ciphersuites to this value. A value of 50 should be sufficient.
Document workarounds in CHANGES.
Some servers hang when presented with a client hello record length exceeding
255 bytes but will work with longer client hellos if the TLS record version
in client hello does not exceed TLS v1.0. Unfortunately this doesn't fix all
cases...
Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
Submitted by: steve
Update maximum message size for certifiate verify messages to support
4096 bit RSA keys again as TLS v1.2 messages is two bytes longer.
Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Reviewed by: steve
- remove some unncessary SSL_err and permit
an srp user callback to allow a worker to obtain
a user verifier.
- cleanup and comments in s_server and demonstration
for asynchronous srp user lookup
New function to retrieve compression method from SSL_SESSION structure.
Delete SSL_SESSION_get_id_len and SSL_SESSION_get0_id functions
as they duplicate functionality of SSL_SESSION_get_id. Note: these functions
have never appeared in any release version of OpenSSL.
Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Reviewed by: steve
Remove unnecessary code for srp and to add some comments to
s_client.
- the callback to provide a user during client connect is
no longer necessary since rfc 5054 a connection attempt
with an srp cipher and no user is terminated when the
cipher is acceptable
- comments to indicate in s_client the (non-)usefulness of
th primalaty tests for non known group parameters.
Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Reviewed by: steve
Make SRP conformant to rfc 5054.
Changes are:
- removal of the addition state after client hello
- removal of all pre-rfc srp alert ids
- sending a fatal alert when there is no srp extension but when the
server wants SRP
- removal of unnecessary code in the client.
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Send alert instead of assertion failure for incorrectly formatted DTLS
fragments.
using OBJ xref utilities instead of string comparison with OID name.
This removes the arbitrary restriction on using SHA1 only with some ECC
ciphersuites.
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Setting SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS should be ignored for DTLS, but instead causes
the program to crash. This is due to missing version checks and is fixed with
this patch.
Submitted by: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Call ssl_new() to reallocate SSL BIO internals if we want to replace
the existing internal SSL structure.
than client side as we need to keep the handshake record cache frozen when
it contains all the records need to process the certificate verify message.
(backport from HEAD).
Parse certificate request message and set digests appropriately.
Generate new TLS v1.2 format certificate verify message.
Keep handshake caches around for longer as they are needed for client auth.
all ssl related structures are opaque and internals cannot be directly
accessed. Many applications will need some modification to support this and
most likely some additional functions added to OpenSSL.
The advantage of this option is that any application supporting it will still
be binary compatible if SSL structures change.
(backport from HEAD).
different options:
"64" The build system will choose /POINTER_SIZE=64=ARGV if
the compiler supports it, otherwise /POINTER_SIZE=64.
"64=" The build system will force /POINTER_SIZE=64.
"64=ARGV" The build system will force /POINTER_SIZE=64=ARGV.
This meant a slight renumbering in util/libeay.num due to symbols
appearing in 1.0.0-stable. However, since there's been no release on
this branch yet, it should be harmless.
- safestack macro changes for C++ were incomplete
- RLE decompression boundary case
- SSL 2.0 key arg length check
Submitted by: Google (Adam Langley, Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller)
Submitted by: Jack Lloyd <lloyd@randombit.net>, "Mounir IDRASSI" <mounir.idrassi@idrix.net>, steve
Reviewed by: steve
As required by RFC4492 an absent supported points format by a server is
not an error: it should be treated as equivalent to an extension only
containing uncompressed.
Submitted By: Artem Chuprina <ran@cryptocom.ru>
Check return values of HMAC in tls_P_hash and tls1_generate_key_block.
Although the previous version could in theory crash that would only happen if a
digest call failed. The standard software methods can never fail and only one
ENGINE currently uses digests and it is not compiled in by default.
